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Abstract 
 
Homo oeconomicus has dominated mainstream Economics during the last 
century. One of the main assumptions of this model is that humans maximise their 
own utility functions. In other words, homo oeconomicus, before taking action, 
considers the consequences on their own future interests, which are generally 
assumed to be monetary. This thesis provides experimental results showing that 
human behaviour often differs from that of homo oeconomicus, particularly in 
environments where trust and reciprocity are salient concerns. To be precise, this 
dissertation analyses the employment relationship, focusing particularly on the 
importance of trust and the role of direct reciprocity in the relationship between 
managers and workers. Reciprocity is an important contract enforcement device in 
the presence of incomplete labour contracts. By reciprocity between employer and 
employee, what is meant is a predisposition, within the institutional context of 
defined employment tasks, to cooperate with the other party even at personal cost, 
and a willingness to punish the other party if they violate cooperative norms, even 
when punishment is costly to the individual. 
The original contribution of this thesis goes beyond this result and shows the 
impact of informal employment rules on reciprocity. In particular, it uses 
experimental methods to identify two distinct governance patterns for 
employment relationships: the rigid governance structure and the flexible 
governance structure. The former is characterised by task-centred rules and 
defines the boundaries of jobs in a much more specific way than the latter, which 
is characterised by function-centred rules, and gives rise to a more flexible and 
discretionary model of employment relationships. The most important original 
experimental result of this thesis is that rigid governance characterised by task-
centred rules and low reciprocity is better suited to one-shot transactions, whereas 
flexible governance characterised by function-centred rules and a high level of 
reciprocity is better suited to repeated transactions. 
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Introduction 
	  
	  
	  
Homo oeconomicus dominated mainstream economics for most of the last 
century. One of the main assumptions of this model is that human beings 
maximise their own utility functions. In other terms, before taking action homo 
oeconomicus considers the consequences on their own future interests, which are 
generally assumed to be monetary (or material gains).  John Stuart Mill 
(1909/1848) introduced the model of homo oeconomicus as an abstraction of 
human behaviour and argued that economics 
  
«is concerned with him solely as a being who desires to possess 
wealth, and who is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means 
for obtaining that end » (John Stuart Mill, 1909/1848: 326).  
 
This model of the rationally self-interested agent has been used by rational 
choice theory to explain how people behave in strategic situations. Conversely, 
this thesis provides experimental results which show that the behaviour of many 
people departs from that of homo oeconomicus in environments where trust and 
reciprocity are salient concerns. To be precise, this dissertation analyses the 
importance of trust and the role of direct reciprocity between managers and 
workers within the employment relationship.  
Trust can be defined as an expectation and it is related to situations of 
uncertainty in which agents take risks. Trust means that people do not expect 
others to exploit their vulnerability.  
 
«when we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we 
implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is 
beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider 
engaging in some form of cooperation with him»  (Gambetta, 1988: 217).  
 
In other words, trust emerges in circumstances wherein the risk a person takes 
depends on how another person acts (Coleman, 1990).  
On the one hand, agents are “trusters” when they have faith in others who do 
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not take advantage of them. On the other hand the trustees, that is, agents who 
receive such positive expectations are trustworthy if they do not take advantage of 
others (when trusted). According to rational choice theory, people are trustworthy 
in the absence of strong incentives for them to behave opportunistically. 
Trustworthiness, according to the homo oeconomicus model, occurs when rational 
agents are – or appear to be – honest if this behaviour pays more than dishonesty. 
In this approach, people trust others when it is in their interest to behave honestly 
and to honour the positive expectation received. The problem with this 
perspective is that by changing the transaction payoffs, agents may cease to be 
interested in being trustworthy. In effect, situational changes may reduce the 
incentive to cooperate.  
In contrast to rational choice theory, in which trust depends on the expected 
payoffs of the cooperative game (see Sugden, 1989), people can have faith in 
others even in the absence of explicit incentives. Trust does not derive solely from 
such incentives, thus it cannot be entirely explained by traditional rationality 
defined in terms of the consequences of behaviour. Trust can exist when people 
retain a vulnerability to exploitation. This kind of trust is a stronger concept than 
that based on material incentives since it may survive situational changes. 
It is possible to understand why people trust others, even when they remain 
vulnerable to exploitation, if we look beyond the homo oeconomicus model. 
Individuals could either be genetically programmed to trust others and be 
trustworthy or they could be culturally driven to be cooperative. Rather than being 
motivated by material gain, agents may obtain personal satisfaction by being 
spontaneously cooperative.  
Generally speaking, intrinsic kindness may be fostered by social preferences 
such as altruism (Andreoni and Miller 2002), inequity aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999) or reciprocity. These preferences induce individuals to trust and 
be trustworthy even if both actions may not pay monetarily. Pure altruism is a 
form of unconditional kindness, i.e. individuals may be willing to transfer material 
resources to a relevant reference agent. This form of altruism does not originate as 
a response to received kindness. According to Thomas Nagel, altruism is  
 
«(…) a willingness to act in consideration of the interests of other 
persons, without the need of ulterior motives »  (Thomas Nagel, 1970:79).  
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Thus an individual’s preference for another individual’s material well-being is 
called unconditional altruism. Furthermore, giving may increase personal 
psychological pleasure, a process known as “warm glow” (Andreoni 1990). This 
motive is understood as the donor’s preference for giving per se, different from 
the profit attained by the recipient. A combination of pure altruism and warm 
glow is impure altruism (Andreoni 1989;1990).  
An altruistic individual, thus, never behaves in a way that reduces the payoff 
of a reference agent. Instead, according to the model of inequity aversion (Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999), people do not like inequitable income distribution. Instead, 
they want to reduce the level of other individuals’ material payoff if this level is 
above the equitable level. Furthermore, money is not people’s only concern, and 
they may be altruistic towards subjects having a level of payoffs smaller than 
some equitable benchmark.  
Another important form of social preference, as noted above, is reciprocity. 
Direct reciprocity occurs when people act in a more cooperative way in response 
to the kind behaviour of others (positive reciprocity) and behave in a hostile 
manner when treated in an unkind way by others (negative reciprocity). 
Reciprocal individuals want to be friendly with people that have been previously 
kind to them, and want to punish others for unfair or hostile actions. How 
kindness is perceived depends on the fairness or unfairness of the effects and the 
intentions in relation to the behaviour of other agents (Charness and Rabin, 2002). 
By other agents’ intentions, we mean why agents have taken particular actions. 
Fairness may be quantitatively defined by the difference in the payoffs of the 
receiving and sending subjects (see also Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). 
Furthermore, reciprocity differs from “retaliatory” behaviour in repeated 
interaction. Certainly, reciprocity does not depend on expectations about future 
material gains, but goes beyond extrinsic incentives. Intrinsic reciprocity occurs 
when people reward kind actions and punish unkind actions, even if this is costly 
in terms of material well-being (e.g. Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 
2004) 
In the workplace, employees react to fair wages with increased job effort, and 
to unfair wages with decreased effort. The importance of reciprocity in labour 
markets has been demonstrated by previous experiments (Fehr Kirchsteiger and 
Riedl, 1993; 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Croson, 1996; Guth, Klose, Konigstein 
and Schwalbach, 1998; Keser and Winden, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Falk 
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and Gächter, 2002; Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004).  
The original contribution of this thesis is to examine both positive and 
negative reciprocity in employment relationships by assessing the role of informal 
employment rules in several tightly-controlled laboratory experiments. According 
to David Marsden (1999), certain kinds of transaction rules may gradually emerge 
which define workers’ obligations and limit the authority of employers. The 
impact of such rules on reciprocity in the employment relationship is complex. 
They are simple rules that may focus on function or may directly identify certain 
kinds of work tasks. Two kinds of transaction rules can be identified: task-centred 
rules and function centred rules. The former identify individual tasks and define 
the assignment of jobs to groups of workers. These rules create a clear and rigid 
relationship between tasks and jobs and may be inflexible. The latter, instead, 
focus on procedures and functions required by an organisation. These rules are 
more flexible and define jobs in a closer relation to their final purpose.  
By focusing on several institutional contexts of the employment relationship, 
this thesis identifies the different effects on reciprocity and thus on performance. 
In other words, this study attempts to understand the institutional embeddedness 
of reciprocity. The notion that the employee’s discretion differs between 
institutional environments may also help to explain some of the many differences 
observed in the reciprocal behaviour of employees.  
In principal-agent theory, principals will be exploited if they give discretion to 
agents. The temptation for an agent to shirk may be reduced by the provision of 
material incentives. More precisely, the payment the principal offers depends on 
the level of discretion permitted.  On the one hand, when an agent has more 
actions to choose from, the principal may reduce the temptation to shirk by tying 
large material incentives to the desired course of action. On the other hand, if the 
agent has less discretion, the implementation of an action is less costly for the 
principal. In such a situation the principal should reduce the discretion given to 
the agent in order to reduce implementation costs. Furthermore, the principal may 
derive supplementary informal signals about the agent’s behaviour through closer 
monitoring and control (Grossman and Hart, 1983). In this situation the 
implementation of an action may require cheaper incentive compatibility 
constraints. 
Similarly, on the basis of Tayloristic principles (also referred to as 'scientific 
management') the diffusion of tightly-controlled rules and the prevalence of 
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standardisation of the production process in many organisations becomes 
necessary in order to increase the efficacy of control, workers’ effort and, 
consequently, firms’ profits. Nevertheless, contemporary human resource 
management theories emphasise the cost of control, and emphasise that work 
discretion is an important source for providing job satisfaction, quality of life 
among employees, organisational flexibility, and efficiency. Under these new 
approaches, whilst strictly applied rules do increase enforceability, they may also 
reduce productivity and efficiency. Workers who have less discretion are unable 
to use their own knowledge and creativity to solve problems on the shop-floor. In 
contrast, flexible rules increase the vulnerability of the organisation in the sense 
that employees have the autonomy to choose whether to act in the interest of their 
organisation or to shirk. This said, such rules allow workers to solve problems 
caused by changes in the working environment. Furthermore, offering discretion 
to an agent may be a critical component of a trust strategy. While a control 
strategy based on rigid rules is a signal of distrust, discretion combined with high 
wages may increase reciprocity and thus efficiency. 
Reciprocity works better with function-centred rules rather than task-centred 
rules, and with discretion rather than rigid regulation. This thesis investigates this 
idea using an experimental analysis of the relationship between reciprocity and 
the workplace environment in which employees operate. In particular, this 
research analyses the degree of autonomy that workers have to organise their 
work and accomplish their job tasks. Where workers have more decision powers, 
they are able to achieve high performance and create an environment of trust. 
Therefore, discretion is an important workplace characteristic, which can have a 
significant impact on trust and reciprocity.  
 
Chapter 1 – The Theoretical Prerequisites of Trust based on Reciprocity – 
This chapter addresses the fundamental question of whether trust based on 
reciprocity can be considered as a governance device to enforce fulfilment of 
economic transactions. Trust means accepting vulnerability on the basis of 
positive expectations about the intentions or the behaviour of others (Rousseau et 
al. 1998: 395). If agents are trustworthy, the returns to people who display trust 
towards them are increased. The question remains though, as to why people 
should be trustworthy, since according to the standard theory economic agents are 
rational and self-interested. They protect their reputation - the level of trust one is 
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perceived to merit - because it increases future trading opportunities (Kreps 1988). 
As a consequence, agents may confide in other individuals on the basis of rational 
calculation. In recent years, several economists analysed social or “other-
regarding preferences” (For example, Bowles and Gintis 2011, Camerer and Fehr 
2006, Charness and Rabin, 2002, Fehr and Camerer 2007) finding that reciprocity 
is an important social preference.  Thus, from this perspective it can be seen that 
trust does not necessarily follow rules of calculation; rather, it can be argued that 
it proceeds from the idea that other individuals are intrinsically trustworthy. 
People may trust other individuals’ intentions because they have social preference 
for reciprocity. If an agent has been kind to another agent, the latter would be 
influenced and may feel obliged to reply in a positive reciprocal manner. There is 
a significant distinction between these two kinds of trust. Trust based on 
reciprocity emphasises the relationship between trust and investment in relations 
and lies primarily in the intrinsic value of reciprocity (Blau 1964; 1994).  
Homo oeconomicus would never behave in a reciprocal manner, given that he 
pursues material self-interest. An alternative model is homo reciprocans, who acts 
on the basis preference for reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).  
This kind of agent is capable of intrinsic reciprocity because they have a moral 
code, meaning ethical feelings and beliefs formed in the social interaction process. 
In addition, genetic mechanisms should be analysed in order to understand the 
evolution of morality and sociality. As such, both genetic and cultural 
mechanisms are needed to explain prosociality. 
 
Chapter 2 – Reciprocity and the Gift Exchange Game – This chapter 
introduces the nature of the employment contract and explains how employees 
agree to accept the authority of their employer in exchange for a wage. The 
employer’s authority means the possibility of choosing a set of specific actions 
which workers must perform. The employer’s ability to continually influence 
workers’ behaviour is a considerable advantage. In other words, the possibility of 
identifying an agreed zone of acceptance for the worker is a source of flexibility. 
However, employees have more information about the work tasks. In this context 
of asymmetric information, workers will not be cooperative unless incentives 
make it in their interest to do so. According to Williamson (1975), economic 
agents are boundedly rational and self-interested (1975). Furthermore, in the 
social domain of market relationships, trust is redundant, since it is immediately 
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exploited by other opportunistic parties (Williamson, 1993).  
In particular, the chapter analyses Williamson’s contractual approach and 
suggests going beyond it by investigating an alternative approach to the 
employment relationship. Williamson’s “opportunism core model” is not 
confirmed by the experimental evidence, which shows that people are not solely 
opportunistic, but are also inherently trustworthy and have preferences for 
reciprocity.  More precisely, reciprocity as a governance device in the presence of 
imperfect labour contracts is analysed and experimentally verified by means of 
the gift-exchange game (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). In the 
experiments, people deviate from purely selfish actions in a reciprocal manner 
(see, Fehr Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Croson, 1996; 
Guth, Klose, Konigstein and Schwalbach, 1998; Keser and Winden, 2000; Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000; Falk and Gächter, 2002; Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). 
 
Chapter 3 – Beyond the Gift Exchange Game: the Institutional Details of 
Reciprocity – This chapter goes beyond the concept of organisations as a nexus of 
internal contracts (as developed by Transaction Cost Economics) and instead 
focuses on firms as institutional and reciprocal exchange networks. More 
specifically, Williamson (1993) tells us that trust is redundant in economics, and 
that economic agents are interested only in their own material well-being. This 
thesis considers these assumptions and evaluates the insights derived from them 
by means of experimental tests. The predictions of the theory are compared with 
the choices made by experimental subjects in controlled laboratory conditions. 
The experimental results deviate substantially and systematically from what the 
theory suggests, showing that William’s opportunism theory of the firm is not 
certain. Many experiments indicate that reciprocity matters: see, Fehr Kirchsteiger 
and Riedl, 1993; 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Croson, 1996; Guth, Klose, 
Konigstein and Schwalbach, 1998; Keser and Winden, 2000; Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; Falk and Gächter, 2002; Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004. Furthermore, 
reciprocity can ensure more efficient payoffs, and is influenced by the 
characteristics of the institutional environment. Thus, governance models based 
on employment rules and reciprocity affect and change the payoffs attached to 
particular choices and actions for the parties involved in employment 
relationships. Reciprocity is influenced by the details of various transaction rules. 
Experiments allow us to test the different effects of several rules and to 
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understand economic performance.  
An analysis of efficiency and enforceability of reciprocity requires an 
understanding of how it is combined with varying transaction rules. Institutions 
may thus have an impact on reciprocity. An employment contract is not 
completely specified and is costly to enforce. The conditions of the relationship 
depend on organisational governance, which can emerge out of interaction 
between informal rules and reciprocity. Informal rules enable employers and 
employees to identify the tasks over which a particular job extends. They have to 
satisfy two sufficient and necessary conditions to enable effective employment 
relationships to take place: efficiency and enforceability. The latter is an essential 
requirement of the norms for controlling possible forms of opportunism, and it 
may be achieved by means of two different types of transaction rules: task centred 
rules, which are rigid and directly identify particular task characteristics which 
link them to a job; and function-centred rules, which are flexible and provide only 
an indirect link between individual tasks and jobs. As such, this thesis suggests 
introducing other variants of the gift exchange game representing different 
institutional environments. 
 
Chapter 4 –Rigid Governance Structure versus Flexible Governance 
Structure in the Institutional Gift-Exchange Game – This chapter describes the 
“institutional gift-exchange game” in detail, and offers three important 
innovations: the introduction of new types of transactions which take into account 
various institutional cultures affecting labour relations; the completion of real 
tasks; and the use of computers by the players during the course of the 
experiment. More precisely, the “institutional gift-exchange game” comprises four 
treatments: the one-shot rigid treatment, characterised by non-repeated iterations 
and a rigid institutional environment; the one-shot flexible treatment, 
characterised by non-repeated iterations and flexible institutions; the repeated 
rigid treatment, characterised by repeated iterations and a rigid environment; and 
repeated flexible treatment, characterised by repeated iterations and flexible 
institutions. The transaction rules and reciprocity mechanisms in these treatments 
offer a foundation out of which employment cooperation and spontaneous 
coordination may be achieved. 
Furthermore, this chapter summarises the main results of the institutional gift-
exchange game and analyses how the power of reciprocity depends on the specific 
19 
 
make-up of the institutional structure of employment relationships. Both the rigid 
and the flexible governance structures help to overcome opportunism in the 
employment relationship. It is unlikely that one is absolutely superior to the other, 
although the flexible governance structure fosters reciprocity and high 
performance but does not guarantee stability. The rigid governance structure, on 
the other hand, provides stability by reducing reciprocity and by sacrificing 
flexibility and efficiency in production. In order to understand the game and its 
experimental results better, this chapter presents a payoff map, representing a set 
of possible combinations of the employer’s profits and worker’s benefits that are 
achieved in each period. The map clearly provides complete information about 
workplace welfare (the total amount of players’ gains). By tracing the points 
corresponding to the payoffs obtained during the experimental iterations onto the 
map, we can immediately verify the various patterns of performance, show the 
location of points compared to the theoretical payoff frontier (a geometric location 
of points which correspond to optimal payoffs) and make comparisons between 
the different treatments.  
Finally, this thesis concludes with brief observations derived from the 
experimental results. A significant problem is whether these experimental results 
can be generalised. There are two issues regarding this problem: whether the 
chosen subjects are representative (population validity), and whether laboratory 
experiments are too simple compared with the environment of the real firm and its 
employment relationships (environment validity). With regard to the first point, 
students are often used as subjects because they are available and have relatively 
low opportunity costs. There are also several replications of experiments using 
real world traders, managers, professional auction bidders and lobbyists as 
participants. Even though some differences can be seen, the general pattern of 
observed behaviour tends to correspond remarkably well with those of the student 
subjects. With regard to the second point, environment validity, it must be 
accepted that all economic models are abstractions. In economics, the main 
purpose of experimentation is to identify the essentials of an environment in order 
to be able to disregard less important variables. However it must be recognised 
that experiments, like any method, have their limits. Experiments are no panacea, 
but rather a valuable additional source of information.  
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CHAPTER 1 
The Theoretical Prerequisites of  
Trust based on Reciprocity	  
	  
	  
1. Introduction 
	  
It is widely believed that trust, as an instrument for the governance of 
economic relationships, contributes to prosperity by reducing both uncertainty and 
transaction costs. As is often mentioned in the literature, the general notion of 
trust is closely related to the notion of uncertainty or risk in the sense that things 
can go wrong. Trust may mean accepting risk or uncertainty about the 
competence or the intentions of other actors as well as events that might arise in 
the future and increase vulnerability (Luhmann, 1979; 1988; 1995; Rotter, 1980; 
Shapiro, 1987; Zucker, 1986). Trust may be defined as  
 
«a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or the behaviour of another» 
(Rousseau et al., 1998: p. 395). 
 
Behavioural interpersonal trust may be defined as the willingness to be more 
vulnerable to those whose behaviour is not controlled (Zand, 1972). This thesis 
deals with trust in relation to the possibility of opportunism (Barber, 1983). Trust 
in a person’s technical competence must be distinguished from trust in a person’s 
intentions, character or moral disposition, since the former is not directly related 
to the concept of opportunism (Barber, 1983; Gabarro, 1978; Sitkin and Roth, 
1993). The reason why workers may not honour their commitment may be 
incompetence, force majeure or opportunism, and the appropriate response from 
managers depends which of these is applicable. For example, managers may 
develop workers’ skills by training or improving their motivation, or by exerting 
greater control. 
Trust in an individual’s intentions consists in believing the other party will 
not behave opportunistically even though it has the ability to do so, and where it 
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may even be in its short-term interest to do so. In other words, one party trusts the 
other if it believes that the opportunity to defect will not lead to a reduction in the 
other party’s trustworthiness (Nooteboom, 1996; 2000). On the one hand, trust 
does not always follow calculative rules; on the other, trust is not only blind but 
may be based on reciprocity. If one agent makes a gift to another, they have made 
an investment in the relationship that has an immediate return as relational credit. 
They trust others’ intentions because they feel obliged to return this favour. This 
definition of trust based on reciprocity is related to concepts such as beliefs, 
norms and morality.	  
Our understanding of organizations and employment relationships is 
inadequate unless we appreciate the moral motivations of individuals within them, 
and how those institutions help to sustain and replicate these moral sentiments. 
Morality or reciprocity is a profoundly social phenomenon, reflecting both our 
biological inheritance and our embeddedness in society. 
	  
2. Calculative Trust and Trust based on Reciprocity 
	  
Many versions of rationality have been provided in economics (Sen 1987). 
One predominant notion of rationality is “payoff rationality” or “payoff 
maximization”. According to this theory, economic agents are rational and self-
interested, not motivated by morality, and seek only to maximise their selfish 
utility function. Economic man is narrowly defined as a “pleasure machine” 
without a moral code. Hodgson claims:	  
	  
«Economic man is a pleasure-maximizing machine, rather than a reflective 
individual capable of addressing moral dilemmas, absorbing moral principles, and 
performing or reframing from true generosity. For economic man, utility is the 
only measure of moral worth» (Hodgson, 2012: 10).	  
	  
Economic man’s satisfaction is influenced solely by explicit rewards. In 
other words, the dominant concept of rationality in modern mainstream 
economics concerns the maximisation of payoffs consisting only of pecuniary 
gains. By “payoff rationality” Hodgson means: 	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«the maximization of such explicit payoffs by players, given the information 
available to them plus their assumption that other players are also payoff 
maximizers»  (Hodgson, 2012: 47). 	  
	  
The question why rational individuals trust or why people are trustworthy is 
an interesting one. Trust involves risk related to other people (Coleman, 1990; 
Sztompka, 1999; Gambetta 2000; Hardin, 2006; McKnight & Chervany, 2001). If 
people have positive expectations about the future, they voluntarily make 
themselves vulnerable and spontaneously accept the cost if the events they trust in 
do not materialise (Coleman, 1990). One reason why people trust may be based 
on the perception that the other party will cooperate because it is in their own 
interest to do so. In other words, trust may be calculative in the sense that people 
confide in one another on the basis of rational considerations about the 
consequences of their trust decision. According to this perspective, the decision to 
trust another person is essentially strategic. Thus, calculative trust may arise from 
the strategic interaction of egoistic economic agents and may be preserved so long 
as it serves their own self-interest. The probability of opportunistic behaviour is 
reduced by control, sanctions and punishment (Dasgupta, 1988).  
If people are simply egoistic utility maximisers, trust may be also based on 
the reputation. Calculative agents may be trustworthy because they want to build 
their reputation and permit others to trust them. In this way they increase the 
probability of future profitable exchange. An individual’s reputation is increased 
by adherence to the norm and is reduced by resistance to the norm. Indeed, people 
see this as a signal of trustworthiness and as a predictor of individuals’ future 
conduct (Axelrod, 1986). Reputation in repeated games with a fixed set of players 
may be achieved over time by investing a small amount of resources at the 
beginning of the game when information about the other party is limited, and by 
sustaining mutual trust through increased cooperation following successful 
experiences (See Sobel, 1985). 	  
In game theory, a payoff is described as a monetary or explicit reward. 
However, according to the experimental evidence (Smith, 1982), there is not 
always a “parallelism” or a “monotonic relation” between the utility function and 
monetary payoffs. Hodgson states that if people act according to payoff rationality 
they also act on the basis of rationality, which involves consistent actions. Despite 
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the axioms of payoff rationality implying consistent actions, the opposite is not 
necessarily verifiable. Thus Hodgson concludes: 
 
«Without logical contradiction, one can abandon payoff rationality and still 
uphold that behaviour is consistent, and even utility-maximizing» (Hodgson, 
2012: 48).  
 
Gintis is one of the most important economists taking this view, providing a 
concept of rationality defined as consistency of behaviour.  In particular, having 
analysed many experiments, he explains that agents also behave consistently in 
the absence of payoff maximisation. Such behavioural consistency is based on 
instincts and urges which are genetically rooted and which have evolved over 
time. Human beings are not merely self-regarding, but are predisposed to respond 
in specific ways to specific cues (Gintis, 2007; 2009). Thus, trust can also be 
based on the perception that the other is not only instrumental but may be 
intrinsically trustworthy. As such trust or trustworthiness may not be completely 
calculative, but may be based on other motives that go beyond personal gain. 
Therefore, it is possible to identify certain social reasons why people trust that are 
not necessarily related to the reputation of the other party.  
In the utility maximising model, the role of human culture and institutions 
and the importance of human psychology are not analysed deeply. These elements 
are distinctive, and separate human beings from animals. According to standard 
economic theory, the preferences of “rational economic man” are not affected by 
institutions or culture. For Hodgson, the human psyche, human interaction and 
human nature are not deeply analysed in the homo oeconomicus model. In 
particular, Hodgson claims:  	  
 	  
«The nonfalsifiability of the concept of rationality as-behavioral-
consistency-or utility-maximization sustains an epistimic critique. It does not 
clinch the matter. One has to consider the theoretical limitations of this stance. 
Here rationality-as-behavioral-consistency-or-utility-maximization falls down for 
at least two reasons. First it neglects the problem of explaining the causes of 
behaviour. Second it fudges the question of the individual development of 
capacities and dispositions» (Hodgson, 2012: 54).	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Thus, utility theory is not able to explain human dispositions and 
interactions, but is rather a kind of formal and mathematical ex-post explanation 
of behaviour. As such it is not a grounded causal theory able to understand the 
nature of human motivation and behaviour. Hodgson argues: 	  
	  
«For related reasons, claims that there is an evolutionary basis for utility 
maximization (Robson 2001, Gintis 2006, p.17) do not pass muster. It is 
insufficient to show that the behavioral outcomes of evolution are consistent with 
some utility function. Ultimately this claim is trivially true, because one can 
always find a function that fits. One has to show that utility maximization is 
useful causal account of behavioral motivation. This is problematic, (...). Indeed, 
it is rather odd to claim simultaneously that evolution has produced individuals 
that maximize utility and are also capable of altruism, as a consequence of 
inclusive fitness or whatever » (Hodgson, 2012: 54) 	  
 
Human beings are also concerned with “doing the right thing”. Many 
individuals and also certain non-human animals show clear patterns of altruism 
and reciprocal behaviour. De Waal (1989), for example, explains that food sharing 
is a common phenomenon among chimpanzees. Thus, we need to go beyond the 
model of homo oeconomicus in order to explain altruism and reciprocal behaviour 
by reference to psychology and other evolutionary and social matters. Payoffs 
may be also implicit in this.  
As a rule, human beings seek honour, justice and prestige. Furthermore, 
people sacrifice their material well-being to help others. For example, people 
exhibit social preferences if they also care about the material resources allocated 
to their trading partner, their manager or other actors. Recently, many economists 
attempted to explain cooperation, altruism and “social” or “other-regarding” 
preferences (e.g. Bowles and Gintis 2011, Camerer and Fehr 2006; Charness and 
Rabin 2006, Fehr and Camerer 2007). This dissertation focuses on one kind of 
social preference, namely the preference for reciprocity. In particular, the main 
idea developed is that reciprocity radically changes the interaction strategy 
between economic agents. Thus, individuals’ sole objective is not simply 
pleasure, but they are affected by moral concerns such as self-image, integrity and 
commitment which are essential to understanding phenomena such as trust or 
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reciprocity. For Hodgson, individuals act according to some moral code of 
behaviour. In particular he claims:	  
 	  
«... real humans are often concerned with doing the right thing, 
sometimes even against their own interests, and notwithstanding that their 
moral code may be flawed. We seek honour and justice as well as our own 
prosperity and prestige. We sometimes act out of duty and not mere self-
interest. We have moral motivations because we have long evolved as 
social beings and we are affected profoundly by our interactions with 
others» (Hodgson, 2012:  x). 	  
 
Accepting the importance of morality is crucial for explaining human 
motivations, the behaviour of individuals and their interaction with others.	  Thus, 
trust and trustworthiness may be driven by other factors unrelated to material 
payoff, such as unconditional kindness, as demonstrated by experiments 
conducted in Russia, South Africa, and the U.S. by Ashraf et al. (2006). Trust 
may therefore be based on « some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other »  
(Seligman, 1997:43). 
Trust may be moralistic in the sense that it may be based on close, long-term 
relationships, a sharing of goals and expectations and the suppression of short-
term self-seeking. This can result in a degree of altruistic behaviour. The parties’ 
behaviour is not reducible to self-interest, even of a long-term kind: instead, it is 
suggested that social or personal trust develops from and is maintained by shared 
cultural values and history. Morality is an alternative explanation for some of the 
other forms of trustworthiness, with moralistic trust going beyond instrumentally 
rational behaviour. Herbert Gintis, Joseph Henrich, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd 
and Ernst Fehr argue that:  	  
	  
«… ethical behaviour was fitness-enhancing in the years marking the 
emergence of Homo Sapiens, because human groups with many altruists 
fared better than groups of selfish individuals, and the fitness losses 
sustained by altruists were more than compensated by the superior 
performance of the groups in which they congregated» (Gintis et al., 2008: 
2). 
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Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis (2011) have analysed the evolution of 
cooperative and altruistic behaviour. Any analysis of cooperation and altruism 
must take into account morality. Individuals, as members of a group, are affected 
by their group’s moral norms as Hodgson notes: « Humans were the first species 
to develop and articulate moral codes; but the foundations of morality go back 
into our prehuman past » (Hodgson 2012: 106). Furthermore, Hodgson argues:  
 
« The whole point of a moral system, and a reason for its evolution 
and survival, is that it acts partly at the discursive level to restrain all 
persuasive rationalizations of self-interest. This does not mean that it always 
works in this way. But it can be a powerful social mechanism to restrain 
deliberative revelations of self-interest » (Hodgson 2012: 120) 
 
Altruism may derive from a number of motives, including perceptions of 
moral obligation. However, altruism and morality are not the same and should not 
be treated as interchangeable. Thus, as Hodgson notes, « moral factors are 
irreducible to altruism » (Hodgson, 2012: 124). 	  
 
3. Direct and Indirect Reciprocity  
	  
As noted above, the empirical and experimental evidence indicates that 
people reveal social preferences, in the sense that they not only care about the 
material resources assigned to them but also about the material resources assigned 
to other relevant agents such as their relatives, their neighbours, colleagues and 
trading partners (for surveys see Fehr and Schmidt, 2001a; 2001b and Sobel, 
2001). 	  
Traditional theory explains “altruism” or “cooperation” in terms of 
individual utility maximisation. It does not focus on pure altruism. Pure altruism 
implies that the act must consider the interests of other people and that one does 
not need “ulterior motives” (for example, selfish motives) to justify such 
behaviour (Thomas Nagel, 1970:79). Clearly, other motives may exist but they 
cannot be the only motives to explain altruistic behaviour. Taking into account the 
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role of prosocial motivations does not mean limiting selection to a virtuous, 
trustworthy human being. Individuals may be selfish and prosocial.	  
Reciprocity should be distinguished from purely altruistic actions, which 
consist in isolated and one-way transfers. If agents do not receive reciprocity their 
level of trust in the other party will be reduced and the relationship may end. But 
in this case, unlike the exchange situation, the logic of the transfer is changed. In 
the exchange relationship, the transaction is carried out only after the parties have 
reached an agreement and have determined the price. In a reciprocal relationship, 
on the other hand, the transfer takes place (locally and temporally) prior to other 
transfers. In this scenario the parties have only an expectation, rather than a right, 
to receive the transfer. One could say that reciprocity occupies an intermediate 
position between economic exchange and pure altruism and that trust based on 
reciprocity lies between blind trust and calculated risk (Kolm, 1994). 
Reciprocity can be considered as a contingent social preference because it is 
correlated with the behaviour of a reference person.  By judging the consequences 
and the fairness of the intention underlying the principal’s action, the reciprocal 
agent may perceive it as either kind or hostile. In the first case, the agent evaluates 
the principal’s material payoff positively, in the second case negatively. 	  
In repeated interactions, it is important to distinguish reciprocity from 
“cooperative” or “retaliatory” behaviour. In the former, individuals are responding 
to friendly or hostile behaviour even if no material benefits can be expected, 
whereas in the latter, agents expect future explicit payoffs from their behaviour, 
Furthermore, while explicit performance incentives may cause a hostile social 
environment and reduce the willingness for co-operation, reciprocity-based extra 
effort may cause an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation. Bewley shows 
that many managers believe that explicit « punishment should be rarely used as a 
way to obtain cooperation »  (Bewley, 1995: 252). 	  
In a reciprocal relationship, individuals do not keep detailed track of each 
other’s input in joint tasks, because such record-keeping is not necessary in the 
allocation of rewards (Clark, 1984). Parties in such relationships do not like to use 
cash to pay the other party because the relationship is seen as too special to be 
carried out with general-purpose money (Webley and Lea, 1993).	  
The returned benefit of a reciprocal relationship is understood as an attempt 
to fulfil a need, to please the other or to respond positively to the sadness of 
another person (Clark 1981; Clark et al., 1987; Clark and Mills, 1979; Uehara, 
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1995; Deutsch, 1975). The intention of each party is to increase the welfare of the 
other party because he or she is included in the extended self (Cialdini et al., 
1997). Mutual awareness of the responsiveness to each other’s needs creates a 
basic feeling of safety (Chance, 1988).The parties involved provide a value to the 
reciprocal relationship in itself. This meaning is given even when there is no need. 
This non-instrumental attitude towards the relationship involves a different 
perception of its costs and benefits and is based on reciprocal positive 
expectations (O’Connel, 1984). Furthermore, agents who are involved in a 
reciprocal relationship have a non-calculative attitude towards the short-run 
results of the relationships. Thus, agents in this diffuse exchange do not calculate 
the benefits of each individual transaction, but look for some degree of 
equivalence over time. If the party who received a gift attempts to repay it 
immediately, they might embarrass the other party (Clark and Mills, 1979; 
Schwartz, 1967). Such benefits need to be comparable, but their non-
comparability does not limit the functioning of transactions because it is 
supported by reciprocity. Individuals have diffuse expectations for a return of 
benefits in the sense that they are willing to agree to an imbalance for a non-
determined period. There is always a kind of balance, but more in the sense that 
“It will all work out” than in the sense of a calculated risk (O’Connell, 1984). 
Instead of expecting the gifts to be instantly repaid, the agents of reciprocal 
relationships expect a response when they have specific needs. In general, they 
would like a better state of balance, but if this is unfeasible, they avoid over-
benefiting more than under-benefiting (Uehara, 1995; Van Tilburg 1992). If 
individuals over-benefit, they do not feel like returning benefits but are affected 
by feelings of uneasiness or even guilt.	  
The concept of reciprocity may be strongly related to feelings, beliefs, 
obligations and other cognitive aspects. In particular, strong reciprocity emerges 
even if people do not know who they interact with.  It depends on well-defined 
conditions and it is an important source of cooperation even in one-shot 
interactions where the tit-for-tat mechanism is absent.  
Many studies demonstrate that individuals are also driven by strong 
reciprocity. It is possible to distinguish two kinds of strong reciprocity: strong 
positive reciprocity and strong negative reciprocity. The former is a predisposition 
to be kind to those have been kind to us; the latter is based on the “eye for an eye, 
tooth for a tooth” principle and lies in the disposition to strike back. Many people 
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respond kindly to “gifts” and retaliate if they have been hurt. Strong reciprocators 
will reward subjects that cooperate, and punish individuals that defect, even if it is 
costly for them. Furthermore, individuals may bear the cost of rejecting positive 
but unequal offers. As a consequence, the other individuals avoid unfair treatment 
and attempt to negotiate by making equal offers (for a survey of experimental 
results see Camerer and Thaler 1995, and Roth 1995) 
Positive reciprocity has been analysed in the original trust game provided by 
Berg and others (1995). In this game, there are two kinds of participants, both of 
which receive an endowment: the sender and the responder. The former may 
decide to send the total, a part or nothing of his endowment, to the unknown 
responder. Any money transmitted is increased three times by the experimenter. 
The responder who sees an increase in their money may choose to return it (totally 
or in part) to the sender. Any money the responder does not give back may be 
retained. If the responder is a rational maximiser agent they do not return the 
money; they play a dictator game and the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for 
this game (for self-interested actors) is for the responder to retain the money, and 
thus for the sender to send none. This elementary trust game resembles the 
economic setting of one-shot investing with imperfect contracts. The sender 
(investor) produces value with their investment but is not able to absolutely enter 
into agreement with the responder (agent) to guarantee sharing the value 
produced. Furthermore this game is useful to analyse trust and reciprocation in 
economic conditions. More precisely, this game allows us to study the importance 
of trust regarding the sender, and of reciprocity regarding the responder. 
The experimental research of Berg and others (1995) showed evidential 
levels of trust and reciprocation: 30 and 32 transmitters sent money in the game 
(demonstrating trusting behaviour), and 24 of those 30 decisions had money given 
back in the end (demonstrating positive reciprocity). 	  
Negative reciprocity has been analysed in the ultimatum bargaining game 
where many individuals interact anonymously with each other and are willing to 
pay for rewarding kind and punishing hostile acts. An example of negative 
reciprocity is altruistic punishment. Negative reciprocators take money out of 
their own pocket to punish unkind individuals. 
Hays (1985), in a longitudinal study of friendship, showed that friendship 
intensity was more highly correlated with the benefits-plus-costs score than with 
the benefits-minus-costs score (Hays, 1985). Thus, the parties of a reciprocal 
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relationship or, in general, the members of a close-knit social network have 
positive feelings towards each other’s behaviour and intentions (Lee and Robbins, 
1995; Bollen and Hoyle, 1990). 	  
Aristotle uses the term “antipeponthós” to communicate the concept of 
commercial relationships and relationships between citizens, because all the 
relationships within the “polis” (or city-state) involve the idea of proportionality 
of conditions . Gloria Vivenza explains this clearly: 	  
	  
«Aristotle uses the term reciprocity (antipeponthós, in Nicomachean 
Ethics, 1132 b 21) to talk about exchange in general. But in all the forms 
of counter-exchange there is a clear meaning of the term relativity: to give 
back in proportion (precisely antipeponthós) holds the community 
(koinonía) together (sunéchei). In brief, the factor which holds together the 
relationships between citizens or participants in the same community is 
giving back in proportion to how much one has received; commercial 
exchange is a particular category of this reciprocity» (Vivenza, 2004: 78.) 	  
 
Another term used by Aristotle regarding reciprocity is “antiphílesis” or 
“antiphilía”, which denotes reciprocal affection, feelings, or returning love with 
love of the same kind and intensity. The prefix “anti” always denotes a response. 
The term appears, seemingly not by chance, in the “Nicomachean Ethics” (1155 b 
28). 	  
Reciprocity and a typical economic exchange includes a two-way exchange 
involving giving and returning, even though the economic transaction is 
differentiated by the fact that a third party can render the return obligatory, 
whereas in simple reciprocity the return gift may be expected but is not 
obligatory. Relationships which are based both on contracts and on reciprocity 
contribute effectively to achieving individual and collective results. All the same, 
cooperation based on reciprocity is more complex than contractual cooperation 
whose basis is in the mutual consideration of personal interests as set out by 
Hume (1978(1740)). Instead, cooperation based on reciprocity, tends to be 
overlaid with the typical relational logic of friendship (philia) even when such 
behaviour might appear to be contrary to the personal interests of the individual 
for a brief period of time. Again, Aristotle, in the “Nicomachean Ethics”, created 
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the paradigm of the theory of friendship (intended as a form of reciprocity) in 
Western culture:  
• Equivalence: the first characteristic of reciprocity-philía is equivalence, 
not necessarily in the mathematical sense but in the sense of justice or 
equity, since it associates friendship with justice. 	  
	  
• Equality: Aristotle did not believe that friendship could exist between a 
free man and a slave. This is because there was effectively an inequality 
between the participants and the “rules of the game” tend to artificially re-
establish the equality which is lacking. 	  
 
• Liberty: For Aristotle only the free man could have friends since one 
initiates and terminates a friendship freely.	  
 
• Non-transferability: friendship is not transferable in the sense that if X is a 
friend of Y and if Y is a friend of Z then X will not necessarily be a friend 
of Z. According to Aristotle, it is not possible to be friends with lots of 
people.	  
 
• Conditionality: the logic of reciprocity-philía is that in friendship one 
makes the first move and grants the other party trust based on prior 
actions, and one is also inclined to forgive. For the reciprocal relationship 
to continue over the course of time, the other party must reciprocate the 
treatment. In practical terms, in a relationship based on philia (that is, on 
friendship related to the internal dynamics of a team of colleagues) one 
does not calculate the costs and benefits of a single act and one even 
tolerates actions which are wrong, and is inclined to forgive. However, the 
friendship is terminated when we see the willingness to be a friend cease 
on the part of the other party, or, in other words, when we realise that he or 
she does not wish the friendship relationship to continue.	  
 
Moreover, Aristotle describes three types of friendship: friendship based on 
“pleasure”, friendship based on “convenience” and friendship based on “virtue” 
(Nicomachean Ethics, VIII, l, p. 341). The real distinction here is between 
friendship which is based on pleasure or convenience, and friendship which is 
based on virtue. What the first two types of friendships have in common is that 
they are instrumental, egocentric and uninterested in underlying motives. In short, 
the friendship is not an end in itself, but it is the way that individuals can obtain 
pleasure and convenience; for this reason Aristotle believes that friendships are 
based on convenience or pleasure, which is always temporary and unstable. 	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The first two types of “philia” belong to the family of strategies founded on 
self-interest. Instead, a friendship which is based on virtue is one that is founded 
on reciprocal trust, which when mutual is an intrinsic value. In other words, one 
way of expressing “reciprocity” as a type of “philia” is when a person who 
chooses to behave in a cooperative way has the “expectation” that the other party 
will also act in the same way. Disposition is not action: what counts is the 
intention, not only the action. Non-intentional hurtful actions of an agent are 
easily forgiven by the counterpart because this agent demonstrates that it was not 
their intention to disappoint their expectations.	  
Reciprocity has been analysed by many researchers using many different 
models. In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have analysed reciprocity using a 
model of inequity aversion. The intention is fair when it is based on the equity of 
the payoff distribution. Moreover, in a closely-knit social network characterised 
by reciprocal relationships, the interests and aim of its members are extended to 
embrace not only those of additional persons but also of impersonal organisations 
(Brewer and Gardner, 1996). Members of organisations feel that they belong to a 
reciprocity group, meaning they are relieved of the burden of keeping track of 
who helped whom. Belonging to a group built on reciprocity provides its 
members with the feeling of safety and the awareness that in the future, when 
needs may arise, the other members will help them (Ueahara, 1995). Thus the 
motivation which governs the actions of a person who forms part of a team 
relationship is explained in terms of giving a “sense of belonging” and by the 
desire to obey social norms and to follow duty (Bruni, 2006).  
Sugden (1984; 1993; 2000), in his concept of “team thinking” and 
“membership”, identifies the definition of rationality of the group (which he 
distinguishes from the selfishness of the group). “Membership”, as he defines it, 
has the effect of motivating a person to adopt a “we-mentality”, which has a 
meaning similar to its original concept whereby the arms and legs are “members” 
of the body. To act as a member of the team is to operate according to a 
coordinated plan the prime purpose of which is to achieve the team objectives.	  
Another way to sustain cooperation is the mechanism of indirect reciprocity, 
which is not just about repeated games, but concerns interactions within a network 
of individuals based on their reputations (Nowak & Sigmund 1998, 2005).  One 
player will cooperate with the other party only if they have a sufficiently strong 
reputation for cooperating (Sugden, 1986; and Alexander, 1987). Nowak and 
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Sigmund explain the mechanism of indirect reciprocity and how cooperative 
individuals can prosper in a networked population. While direct reciprocity is 
based on the concept of «You scratch my back and I scratch yours», indirect 
reciprocity is based on the logic of «you scratch my back and I scratch someone 
else’s» (Nowak & Sigmund  2005:1292). 	  
Experimental and theoretical studies show that human beings display a high 
degree of cooperation with non-relatives (Fehr & Fischbacker, 2003). Such 
cooperation is based on moralistic emotions (for example, the anger directed 
towards cheaters or the “warm inner glow” felt after behaving in an altruistic way) 
and it gets sustained by a group mechanism under certain conditions (Milinski et 
al. 2002, Panchanathan and Boyd 2003, 2004, Nowak and Sigmund 2005, Nowak 
2006). Indeed, individuals not only feel strongly about direct interaction with 
other parties but they also judge the behaviour of third parties, as evidenced by 
what is said in gossip (Wedekind and Milinsky 2000). However, indirect 
reciprocity is a mechanism requiring rigorous conditions that are absent in many 
interactions. For example, several simulations depend on reliable and adequate 
information in order to build up and maintain reputation. As a result, defectors 
make the group vulnerable to their invasion when there is incomplete information. 
Such an invasion takes advantage of other people’s goodwill, thereby swamping 
the group (Uchida and Sigmund 2009).  
Some experiments analyse how a small number of players may act 
strategically to create a cooperative reputation (Engelman and Fichbacher, 2009), 
finding that strategic players outperform non-strategic players and non-
reciprocating players also outperforming reciprocating players. These findings 
throw evolutionary explanations for indirect reciprocity into doubt. In other 
words, it seems that indirect reciprocity cannot explain the evolution of 
cooperation. The outcomes achieved vary significantly according to the selected 
specific assumptions.  
Thus far there is in sufficient evidence enabling us to distinguish one set of 
theoretical propositions from others. However, the focus of this thesis is direct 
reciprocity. 
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4. Biological inheritance and the social embeddedness of 
prosociality 	  
	  
Where do prosocial preferences and beliefs come from? According to a 
number of experiments conducted in several different countries (Roth, et al., 
1991, Henrich et al. 2001), they emanate from culture. Some experiments which 
use children as subjects show that social motivations are created through 
socialisation and the internalisation of norms (Durkheim 1951, Benedict 1934, 
Mead 1963, Parsons 1967, Grusec and Kuczynski 1997). Such a process consists 
in the transmission of values and objectives from an older generation to a younger 
one through repeated personal interactions, based on a complex interplay of 
affect, authority and a distinctive psychological predisposition.  The hypothesis 
that altruistic dispositions are products of the cultural environment is supported by 
solid empirical evidence (Enrich 2000). Altruistic disposition may depend on the 
various cultural environments within which they develop.  
People’s behaviour may be constrained by several kinds of social 
punishment, i.e. social disapproval or the power of others. However, the main 
problem is not to accept that individuals are influenced by culture, but to 
understand the origins and the formation of social norms. While some researchers 
argue that culture provides a sufficient explanation of social motivations and 
cooperation, others, instead, claim that this kind of cultural explanation is 
insufficient because it does not explain the origins of social norms. According to 
Hodgson, biology may support the cultural explanation because it helps us 
understand how culture originated and evolved. Given the importance of culture, 
Hodgson argues: 	  
	  
« before such a culture existed, it would be highly unlikely for a critical 
mass of cooperating individuals to become established. Any such emergent group 
would be highly vulnerable to invasion by free-riders, cheats or opportunists. A 
wholly cultural explanation cannot get off the ground » (Hodgson, 2012: 62). 	  
 
Furthermore, social motivations and moral claims are a question of  neither 
preference nor utility function since they have evolved over millions of years 
(Darwin, 1871) and are sustained by emotions (Mackie 1977, Joyce 2006). Their 
development does not simply depend on conformity to norms or conventions, but 
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is driven by emotion and unavoidable rules. For Hodgson, the moral nature of 
humans is thus a social phenomenon depending on social environment and 
biological evolution. Human beings are a social species, with emotional, linguistic 
and decision-making abilities. The origin of morality may be discovered if we go 
back to the history of our ape-like ancestors (De Waal 1996, 2006). Hodgson also 
claims: 	  
	  
«Both selfish homo oeconomicus and culturally-driven homo sociologicus 
are challenged by recent research. Human nature is not a tabula rasa upon which 
cultures write values and goals. Neither does society cohere simply on the basis of 
self-interest. No single discipline is able unaided to solve the problem of 
cooperation. Explaining human cooperation involves multi-disciplinary 
cooperation» (Hodgson, 2012: 64). 	  
	  
A further reason for considering the evolutionary explanations of prosocial 
preferences as well as the human predisposition to cooperate in particular 
circumstances is the evidence from the studies of the human brain that individuals 
are innately wired to care. Studies such as Tankersley, Stowe and Huettel (2007) 
have attempted to identify the brain centres associated with altruism. Other 
neuroeconomists such as Paul J. Zak (2004) argue that oxytocin levels in the brain 
are related to levels of trust. This analysis is supported by several studies 
analysing neural processes and pro-social dispositions (e.g. Fehr and Camerer 
2007, Vercoe and Zak 2010). Furthermore, other studies analyse the areas of the 
brain which are associated with emotions. More precisely, they claim that the 
areas of the brain associated with moral judgments are not only those related to 
the pre-frontal cortex but also those that have evolved over millions of years 
(Green and Haidt 2002, Tancredi 2005). 
Kin altruism (Hamilton, 1964) and reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) are 
two important theories which explain pro-social human motivation. In 1964, 
Hamilton developed an evolutionary explanation for altruism among relatives, 
explaining the concept of “inclusive fitness” and expanding the basis of 
Darwinian fitness. The concept of fitness as « effective design for reproductive 
survival » (Williams 1966:158) is derived from Darwin and it is a probabilistic 
concept. Darwinian fitness is the likelihood that an organism will successfully 
reproduce by transferring their genes to future generations through direct 
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descendants. In other words, the “Darwinian fitness” of individuals may be 
defined as the expectation of their personal contribution to their descendants. If, 
instead, individuals of a species renounce their benefits for the advantage of other 
members beyond spouses and descendants, on average they would have fewer 
successful descendants. Thus, an inherited propensity for this behaviour would not 
permeate the entire population. 
Hamilton’s (1964) definition of inclusive fitness concerns reproductive 
success, which includes close relatives who become ancestors of descendants with 
similar genetic material. More precisely, his explanation is as follows:  
 
«Inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness which an 
individual actually expresses in its production of adult offspring as it becomes 
after it has been first stripped and then augmented in a certain way. It is stripped 
of all components which can be considered as due to the individual's social 
environment, leaving the fitness which he would express if not exposed to any of 
the harms or benefits of that environment. This quantity is then augmented by 
certain fractions of the quantities of harm and benefit which the individual himself 
causes to the fitnesses of his neighbours. The fractions in question are simply the 
coefficients of relationship appropriate to the neighbours whom he affects.»   
(Hamilton, 1964:8) 
	  
Thus, Hamilton provides the rule by which the indirect fitness of altruistic 
individuals can be determined, and explains how altruistic traits (for example, 
helping relatives) leads to more offspring being born. In practice, inclusive fitness 
is very difficult to measure scientifically, which weakens the theory (for the lack 
of precise measurements of Hamilton’s rule see Gadagkar, 2010).  
Maynard Smith (1964) analyses another mechanism, known as “kin 
selection”. Natural selection works mainly within the gene pool. A gene disposing 
a person to be altruistic or unselfish - even if there was a cost or risk for that 
individual - gets selected only when altruistic behaviour enables enough relatives 
to share the same genes.  More precisely, an individual would risk their life to 
save at least two of their siblings in order to avoid the reduction of the frequency 
of their genes in the whole population. Several studies develop Hamilton’s 
calculation by providing considerably more detailed conditions (see for example 
Dawkins, 1979). This theory of kin altruism is one of the most important 
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explanations why many animals look after their young, and why humans take care 
of their family. However it is unable to demonstrate why cooperation, generosity 
and reciprocity are developed in large social groups (Frank 1988, Field 2001, 
2007, 2008, Henrich 2004). 
More than 30 years ago Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) proposed a theory 
developed by several computer-based models of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
(IPD) that were used to analyse the evolution of cooperation via Reciprocal 
Altruism (Trivers, 1971). In their article, they explain the evolution of cooperative 
traits and specify that when relatives are the beneficiaries of altruistic behaviour, 
cooperation can evolve through inclusive fitness, and when non-relatives are the 
beneficiaries, cooperation can evolve through reciprocal altruism.  
Some studies (Trivers, 1971) provide some biological examples (for 
example warning calls in birds) in order to explain how natural selection could 
lead to cooperation between unrelated individuals. Reciprocal altruism (also 
called “weak reciprocity” or “tit-for-tat behaviour”) is an additional gene-based 
explanation. It argues that individuals act in an altruistic manner only if there is a 
sufficiently high probability that this behaviour will be reciprocated (Friedman 
1971, Trivers, 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). According to the “Folk 
theorem”, reciprocal altruism may foster a stable evolutionary equilibrium 
(Rubinstein, 1979, Fundeberg & Maskin 1986). When interactions are repeated 
over a long time, interacting individuals influence each other’s fitness. In a social 
group with repeated social interactions, if the long-term amount of punishments is 
higher than the short-run rewards deriving from defection, then best choice for an 
individual is to cooperate. Thus, showing that reciprocity is an equilibrium 
depends on the strong probability that individuals will repeat their interaction. 
While kin groups may provide this critical mass (Trivers 1971), in large groups 
the probability of meeting the same person again is small. In other words, 
reciprocal altruism may explain the evolution of cooperation between neighbours 
in small societies, but it is not a sufficient explanation in large communities.  
Many experiments (for example see, Bowles 1998, 2004, Field 2001, Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2002,) have been carried out in order to explain prosociality in 
large groups. “Social preferences” may go beyond kin and other small groups and 
may be explained in terms of biological inheritance (Field 2001, 2007, 2008). In 
other words, altruistic dispositions have a cultural embeddedness, but they have 
also a biological foundation. The evolution of cooperation may be explained by 
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the mechanism called genetic group selection (cfr. Bowles, S. and Gintis, H., 
2005). Group selection operates by the same rules as individual selection except 
that this mechanism is related to a process of natural selection favouring group 
characteristics, and identifies the fitness of one group relative to other groups. 
Trait group selection may be used to indicate the ties between two or more 
individuals, which in themselves represent a mechanism of differential survival 
(Wilson, 1980).  Price (1970, 1972) argues that the effects of natural selection on 
gene distribution could be portioned into “group-level” and “individual-level” 
components. 
Henrich (2004) has used a variant of the Price equation to analyse the 
differences between genetic group selection and cultural group selection. Whilst 
the former identifies genes as the source of variation, the latter explains how 
cooperation may arise from biased cultural transmission of behaviour in the sense 
that habits, social norms and cultural mechanisms are the causes of variation.  
Following Hodgson (2012), who analyses Henrich (2004) and the studies 
developed by Hull (1988) and Dawkins (1976), the main difference between the 
two types of group selection can be identified as the different type of replicator. In 
both mechanisms, groups are the interactors, but in genetic group selection the 
replicators are the genes whereas the in cultural group selection the replicators are 
socio-cultural factors such as habits and organisational routines (Aldrich et al. 
2008). Furthermore the functioning of the two mechanisms depends on factors 
such as the impact of migration. Genetic group selection requires migration to be 
limited, and works with a small variation. Conversely, cultural group selection 
works even though the group may be invaded by a large number of immigrants 
that increase the variation within the group (Boyd and Richerson 1985, Henrich 
2004).  
As Hodgson (2012) states, there is no complete evidence that genetic group 
selection of prosocial disposition has occurred:  
 
« Overall, the evidence we have from primates and contemporary hunter-
gatherers undermines genetic group selection as an explanation of the origins of 
cooperation. But the question is still open because evidence on primates or 
humans today is not evidence about prehistoric humans » (Hodgson, 2012: 70).	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Thus, it can be seen that an adequate explanation of prosociality requires 
both biological and cultural explanations. 
 
5. Conclusions 
	  
Humans are not only self-interested but can also act prosocially and are 
concerned with “doing the right thing” even when it may be against their own 
interests. Individuals have evolved over a long period of time as social beings who 
accept the rules of their community, have ethical feelings, beliefs and respect 
authority. Furthermore, they behave according to moral principles, and sympathy 
and true generosity are strong reciprocators. They are affected by the social 
environment, which enables the education of individuals and influences the 
development of their social preferences.  Moreover, social motivations are partly 
developed within a cultural setting and are partly inherited (Simon, 1990). The 
evolutionary origins and persistence of prosociality can be explained by genetic 
mechanisms such as inclusive fitness, kin altruism or genetic selection-group.  
Thus, social motivations are the outcomes not only of human enculturation 
but also of a long evolutionary process: culture is vital for the development of 
prosociality, but so too are genetic mechanisms. Following Darwin’s ideas, 
Hodgson argues: 
 
« Yet much of mainstream economics, even when it predicts correctly, lacks 
a causally plausible and informative account of human motivation that is 
grounded on our understanding of human evolution. Evolution has to be a vital 
guide, additionally informed by our knowledge of social relations and culture. 
When we make assumptions about human agents we are required to ask how 
possibly they could have evolved and have had a survival advantage for our 
species. Taking account of this point involves a major challenge to much of 
existing economics and leads to its rebuilding on evolutionary foundations » 
(Hodgson, 2012: xi).  	  
	  
Any useful reference to human evolution is absent in mainstream 
economics, to explain the model of homo oeconomicus used to analyse how 
people behave in strategic situations. Furthermore, homo oeconomicus aims at 
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material self-interest and would never act in reciprocal manner. However, many 
economic experiments show that cooperation, human altruism and reciprocity are 
important, thus contradicting the theoretical predictions of mainstream economics. 
An alternative model is homo reciprocans who is capable of intrinsic motivation 
and behaves in reciprocal manner on the basis of preference for reciprocity. He 
has a moral code and social motivation formed in the interaction process with 
other individuals. Homo reciprocans is culturally driven and genetically 
programmed to trust others and to be cooperative. Such trust and cooperation is 
based not only on material incentives but may be fostered by social preferences 
such as reciprocity. 
Reciprocity is an important kind of social preference and occurs when 
individuals behave in a kind way in response to the cooperative action of others, 
and when they act in an unkind manner following hostile treatment by others. 
Trust based on reciprocity does not necessarily follow calculative reasoning, but is 
also based on informal rules. The analysis of the institutional context of 
organizations may help us to understand how such rules limit individual’s 
behaviour, affect social motivations and shape human interaction.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 Reciprocity and the Gift-Exchange Game  
 
1. Introduction 
 
David Marsden opens his book on “A Theory of Employment Systems” with 
the observation that one of the great innovations behind the rise of the modern 
business enterprise is the employment relationship. He argues that:  
 
«the key to the employment relationship is that it enables management to 
decide detailed work assignments after workers have been hired. Given the 
huge difficulty of anticipating the problems to be resolved in providing 
customers with the goods and services they desire, such flexibility is a 
formidable advantage» (Marsden, 1999: 3). 
 
To summarise, the benefits of employment contracts over sales contracts for 
employers and workers are threefold. Employers gain flexibility and know that 
work will be available when they know more precisely what their work needs will 
be. Employees gain by the continuity of activity, which is a useful advantage 
when their principal source of income is the sale of their work. Finally, both sides 
benefit by substituting a single transaction for what otherwise would have been 
separate transactions. 
The employment relationship is about more than an exchange of work for 
money. At the time the contract is made, workers do not know the specific details 
of the performance required by the employer. Furthermore, the employer pays a 
wage in order to have the option to postpone defining the terms of the contract 
until later. In other words, given the difficulties of precisely defining the terms of 
contract in an uncertain context, the possibility of the employer progressively 
specifying the appropriate behaviour required from the worker as more complete 
information becomes available is a substantial advantage in the employment 
relationship.  
However, employers are unable to ascertain the true productivity of workers. 
In general, workers will have more detailed knowledge of work tasks. In the 
employment relationship, opportunism originates from the absence of a clear 
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definition of the range of tasks over which the employer’s authority extends, and 
regarding which tasks the employee will agree to undertake (Marsden, 1999). In 
such a context of asymmetric information, if workers are selfish they will choose 
their minimum effort level. 
In reality, individuals are not only “calculators” of pleasure and pain, but they 
can also be trustworthy. They vary in decency, fairness and moral commitment, 
and these variations can provide a basis for cooperative economic relations. 
Furthermore, they are reciprocators and act according to social norms. By 
reciprocity between employer and employee, this study means the predisposition 
in the institutional context of a defined employment task, cooperation with the 
other party even at personal cost, and a willingness to punish the other party if 
they violate cooperative norms, even when the punishment is personally costly. 
Reciprocity is an important contract enforcement device where incomplete labour 
contracts exist (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). 
In order to understand the effects of different governance devices and 
empirically verify these propositions, it is necessary to carry out some economic 
experiments. By using different experimental groups in different treatments 
characterised by different transaction rules, the role of economic incentives and of 
alternative motivators such as reciprocity can be analysed. Economic experiment 
is thus an important instrument for investigating how the open-ended employment 
relationship may be managed and how different corporate governance patterns 
may give different degrees of flexibility, provide protection against opportunistic 
behaviour and offer a stable basis on which cooperation between manager and 
workers may develop.  
In particular, experimental evidence shows that people are motivated not only 
by selfish motives, but also by social mechanisms such as reciprocity (Fehr et al., 
1993; 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Falk and Gächter, 
2002; Croson, 1996; Guth, Klose, Konigstein and Schwalbach, 1998; Keser and 
Winden, 2000). The concept of reciprocity as a source of spontaneous 
coordination is analysed in the gift-exchange game (both in the one-shot and 
repeated game versions). It analyses the emergence of spontaneous coordination 
as a result of an interactive process based on social values and preferences such as 
reciprocity. In particular, this chapter explores the contractual paradigm provided 
by Williamson (1975) and then offers an alternative approach to the employment 
relationship.  
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2. Opportunism in the Employment Relationship 
 
Employment contracts are incomplete in the sense that they stipulate a fixed 
or variable wage without specifying the details of the individual worker’s tasks, 
which are left to be determined by a managerial authority. This incompleteness 
allows firms to have flexibility in their employment relationships. It also saves 
costs because, as Coase (1937) observes, a single, flexible transaction is 
substituted for a multitude of separate transactions for each service required by the 
firm (ibid.). Nevertheless, this incompleteness provides scope for opportunistic 
behaviour by either party with regards to the employment contract. In particular, 
“motivation problems arise only because some plans cannot be described in a 
complete, enforceable contract” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992: 127) and, given the 
assumption of the bounded rationality of the parties, the authority relationship 
inherent to the employment contract does not fully resolve the problem of 
opportunism (Williamson, 1985). 
Indeed, for Williamson, opportunism is the central feature of the model of the 
economic agent and trustworthiness is redundant. He argues that: 
 
«there appears to be developing a general consensus» that «opportunism is 
a central concept in the study of transaction costs» (Williamson, 1979: 
234) 
 
Williamson (1975) used the notion of «atmosphere», and recognised the effect 
on transactions in the wider context where they are embedded, but the nature and 
workings of this context are not analysed. In his 1993 article, he explicitly tackles 
the notion of trust, and he claims that if trust does not go beyond calculative self-
interest then it is redundant in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1993).  
It is possible to define four areas of possible opportunism in which workers 
and firms would derive benefits from the employment relationship. Marsden 
(1999) summarises them as follows: 
 
The area of “job boundaries and work allocations” concerns the control of 
work assignments. Employers may attempt to impose additional tasks. 
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Alternatively, workers might seek to improve their job prospects on the 
basis of other group tasks.  
 
The area of “continuity of employment” concerns two major sources of 
opportunism and employment conflict. They may be distinguished in the 
use of task reallocation to cut jobs and in the use of restrictive job 
definitions to restrict certain labour tasks.  
 
“Task variability” and “unusual tasks” generally occur as unexpected 
production problems or demand emergencies (Koike and Inoki, 1990). 
Their quantitative importance is hard to measure, but a number of job 
experts have long argued that they are becoming increasingly important as 
“routine tasks” become embodied in technology (Davis, 1971; Lawler, 
1994), and as workers have to react more frequently to remaining, 
unanticipated problems. Their significance is now widely acknowledged. 
They can be a positive source of problem-solving activities, and hence of 
incremental improvements in workers’ skills, productivity and quality 
(Koike and Inoki, 1990). However, they can have a negative effect because 
of information asymmetries, and so threaten management control even in 
environments where workplace unionism is weak. 
 
The last kind of opportunism that may arise from the employment 
relationship concerns the “recognition of skills” applied on the job which 
may establish conditions under which experienced employees will agree to 
“transmit their skills” to new employees. Both of these need to be resolved 
if workers’ competencies and employers’ job demands are to evolve 
together over time. However, if the nature of the skills developed is 
difficult to define, and the employer refuses to recognise them, workers 
may find it difficult to defend their skills progression. 
	  
To solve these and other kinds of opportunism and hazards, transaction cost 
economics elaborate various farsighted responses. One such response would be to 
decline to engage in these transactions in favour of shorter, simpler transactions. 
A second would be to modify the price of the complicated transaction to reflect 
the additional hazards. A third and more elaborate solution would be to define ex 
45 
 
ante safeguards (credible commitments), the effects of which are to mitigate 
opportunism. 
Williamson (1996), in his article on “Efficiency, Power, Authority and 
Economic Organisation” argues: 
 
«This last is to be contrasted with Machiavelli, who also subscribed to 
opportunism but viewed contracting myopically. Thus, whereas 
Machiavelli advised his Prince to breach contracts with impunity –get 
them before they get us – transaction cost economics advises the Prince to 
devise (give and receive) credible commitments. Not only will the latter 
deter inefficient breach, but it encourages investment in productive but 
otherwise risky assets and supports greater reliance on contract (as against 
no trade or vertical integration). Farsighted agents who give and receive 
credible commitments will thus outperform myopic agents who are 
grabby» (Williamson, 1996:19). 
 
According to Williamson, power, contractual safeguards, prices and 
efficiency play an important role in long-term transactions. Transaction cost 
economics focuses mainly on organisations which have formal rules, contracts 
and efficient governance devices. Instead, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that 
considerations of trust (based on the perception that the other party is inherently 
trustworthy) and reciprocity are critical to an adequate theorisation of the relations 
between employer and employees within the firm.  
The employment contract, as an incompletely specified contract, can foster 
trust within a relationship, characterised by the fact that the administrative process 
enables a compromise to be negotiated between the aims of the two parties. Thus 
there is a reciprocal benefit in postponing the definition of commitments; there is 
a “liquidity preference” which the two parties express within the employment 
contract, both in the event of “contingencies” and in dealing with the problem of 
the interdependence between reciprocal actions. Under certain circumstances and 
on certain occasions, people use ingenious kinds of contracts to demarcate the 
boundaries of rationality in everyday transactions (letter to Williamson, 
September 29, 1993, see Auigier and March, 2001). This may explain why the 
employment relationship is attractive to managers. It is a common example of 
procedural rationality, enabling them to organise production and services without 
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complete information about future labour needs, particularly when there is 
uncertainty about the precise tasks that will need to be accomplished.  
The employment contract includes the agreement of the employee regarding 
their willingness to accept the authority of an employer in exchange for a wage. 
Authority is described as the employer’s right, within limits, to determine a set of 
specific actions that the worker must perform, i.e. their behaviour (Simon, 1951). 
The employer and the employee agree a set of tasks from which the former may 
choose once the contract has been signed. Thus, the employment contract may be 
defined as the possibility of identifying a zone of acceptance comprising a set of 
possible behaviours to which the employee is indifferent, with respect to the 
decisions made by management; it is the who pays for the advantage of 
postponing the terms of contract (Simon, 1951). In a context of uncertainty, the 
most important benefit of the employment contract is that it is «advantageous to 
postpone a decision... in order to gain from information obtained subsequently» 
(Simon, 1951: 304). The employment contract indicates a preference for liquidity 
on both sides: the employer can indicate the most appropriate action required from 
the worker after the stipulation of the contract, and the worker finds it 
advantageous for their behaviour not to be completely fixed. It is possible to 
derive from this that employment contracts are better than sale contracts. The 
most advantageous conditions are found inside the firm.  
The next sections explore a range of different factors, such as loyalty and 
commitment, which potentially limit opportunism. However, they will take us 
beyond assumptions based primarily on opportunistic behaviour (Simon, 1991) 
and they will allow us to explore concepts such as trust and reciprocity and other 
important elements in the development of cooperative workplace relations. 
Concepts such as trust and reciprocity must be regarded as important elements in 
the development of cooperative workplace relations. 
 
3.Tit for Tat strategy vs Reciprocity 
 
The previous section has explained how the incompleteness of the 
employment contract creates scope for opportunistic behaviour by either party in 
the employment relationship. According to Williamson (1985), managers and 
employees have a conflict of interest. Given the assumption of the parties’ 
bounded rationality, the employment relationship does not fully solve the problem 
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of opportunism. In transaction cost economics, self-interested actions have 
received considerable attention within the company. Furthermore, organisations 
are viewed as a “nexus” or “network” of contracts. This model is one that could 
be called an "opportunism core model", or one which is based solely on 
opportunism. Williamson further argues that trust as a category is irrelevant in 
economic transactions, calling it "redundant" (Williamson, 1993). In the same 
article Williamson sought to clarify the growing literature on trust in economic 
relationships. Most of this literature concerns calculated risk. That is, with 
contracts being incomplete, there is a possibility that the agent does not fulfil the 
contract, thereby causing losses. In the literature, mechanisms are analysed to 
make the agent act in observance of the contract. He argues that a common 
mechanism envisaged is the design of incentives in the contracts to encourage 
trust. He goes on to say that this is unnecessary because such transactions can be 
explained in terms of calculated risk, and so it is confusing because it refers to a 
different kind of relationship and it is in appropriate to economic relationships in 
which gains are maximised. 
Williamson (1993) argues that calculated risk cannot be thought of as trust. 
Therefore, he uses the concept of “personal trust” to distinguish this concept from 
trust as a calculated risk. He states that, without doubt, personal trust exists, but 
that it is irrelevant in economic relationships. When an agent trusts the other 
economic party, it is akin to inviting exploitation, since the world of commerce is 
dominated by cynical behaviour rather than innocence. (Williamson, 1993). The 
relevance of personal trust is thus limited to the world of family, friends and 
lovers. This kind of trust should be considered as disinterested and not calculative 
because agents are prepared to incur costs without any compensating gain. In 
other words, Williamson sees calculative risk as being incompatible with personal 
trust because it transforms the relationship into an instrumental one. Williamson 
(1993) describes trust relationships as being characterised by the absence of 
monitoring, a propensity for forgiving predictions and discretion, that is to say 
that the relationship is not subject to market incentives.  
Williamson (1993) refers to Dunn’s concept of trust as a human passion 
because he seeks to describe a relationship based on mutual trust where each 
individual believes in the good intentions of others, and where he considers the 
other’s behaviour to be friendly, favourable and helpful. In this case, each 
individual in the relationship rejects the option to monitor and control the other’s 
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behaviour. He cites Nozick’s description of Love’s Bond as an example of such a 
relationship, and as an explanation of the existence of this kind of satisfaction. In 
a loving relationship, people seek to create an “us” and to extend their self in 
order to take their partner into account. As a result, in such special relationships, 
the action of one of the partners does not have the same meaning, value or impact 
than in a relationship where the self of individuals is not extended. Thus 
Williamson (1993) argues that in economic relationships, trust as a human passion 
(personal trust) is superfluous and he (1995) analyses a particular kind of 
satisfaction:  
 
«Also pertinent is that individuals keep informal social accounts and find the 
exchange of reciprocal favors among parties with whom uncompensated 
spillovers exist to be satisfying  (Gouldner, 1954). Trasforming these casual 
social accounts into exact and legal obligations may well be destructive of 
atmosphere and lead to a net loss of satisfaction between the parties. » 
(Williamson, 1995: 232-233). 
 
This satisfaction comes from the output of transactions, which may be 
embedded in relationships between transaction partners. They characterise a 
special relationship in which reciprocal favours are exchanged. The relationship is 
valued in itself, and not only for its output. 
Particular categories of action, special kinds of satisfaction and the norms of 
reciprocity (analysed as a set of feelings and beliefs about social) have been 
studied by Gouldner (1960). The norm of reciprocity is based on two simple 
principles: 1) helping those who have helped you; 2) not injuring those who have 
helped you. If the norms with these principles are internalised, then acting 
according to them creates positive feelings and pleasure. However, even if the 
concept of internalisation is not accepted as a theoretical explanation, we may 
instead believe that it feels good to be one of the parties in a mutual relationship. 
According to Williamson (1993), if people are able to identify their partner as 
part of their extended self, then they can value relationships in themselves and 
they are able to ascribe safe intentions towards another person. However, he 
further argues that agents in economic relationships are mainly characterised by 
an invariant opportunism model. Furthermore the concept of atmosphere in the 
firm described by Williamson is still a long way from the concept of personal trust 
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and reciprocity. In transaction cost economics, it is assumed that economic agents 
are simply opportunistic and trust can be based only on the perception that the 
other party will cooperate because it is their interest to do so. The notion of trust 
in transaction cost economics is close to the concept of reputation, and depends on 
the characteristics of the situation (Noorderhaven, 1996). Agents guard their 
reputation because it influences future trading opportunities, and it has this 
influence because agents guard it (Kreps, 1990; Axelrod, 1984). 
In contrast, in this thesis the other party may be inherently trustworthy and 
may discharge the fiduciary obligations and responsibilities taken on by an 
expression of commitment. In such cases, trustworthiness is identified as a 
disposition to live up to both the explicit and implicit commitments expressed by 
written or oral communication respectively, or by merely being present at a 
specific place and time. These commitments are a product of a complex, non-
linear interaction process that is “history-dependent”. Thus, economic agents are 
not only opportunistic, but are also inherently trustworthy and vary in decency, 
fairness and morality; these variations presumably lead to differing levels of trust. 
Moreover, trust has been defined as accepting risk, vulnerability and uncertainty, 
as well as a subjective probability that something will not go wrong (Dasgupta, 
1988; Mayer, Davis and Schoorman, 1995).  
Commonly, the social contract relies on unspecified implicit obligations 
between people, depending on shared systems of meaning, belief, and ethics. 
Economic exchange includes non-contractual elements, and trust may be based on 
reciprocity. This kind of trust emphasises the relationship between trust and 
relational investment and lies primarily in the anthropological and sociological 
meanings of reciprocity (Blau, 1964; 1994).  
Williamson introduces Gouldner’s (1954) attempt to explain whether 
reciprocity is important in social life and how it is related to the purely economic 
model of exchange. In particular, Gouldner seeks to understand whether the 
impact of the norm is similar in different cultures, and whether the norm is 
operative in every instance of an interaction. He explains how in some countries, 
such as the Phillippines, all relations are affected by this norm, which is also 
endemic in other countries such as the United States and other market societies. In 
these countries, the norm does not characterise all the dominant culture, but is 
enforced by friendship, kinship and neighbourly relations. It is also found in 
institutionalised and rationalised sectors. Furthermore, he argues that if there is a 
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lack of reciprocity, some compensatory mechanisms such as the concepts of 
“noblesse oblige” and clemency may make a relationship stable and coercive.  
Gouldner (1954) attempts to introduce reciprocity in the economic model and 
economic relationships. A purely economic or utilitarian model cannot explain 
how all economic transactions begin and function. The norm of reciprocity may 
stimulate economic transactions by offering grounds for confidence that the 
person who invests in advance will be repaid at a later date. Certainly, if both Ego 
and Alter are obliged to repay a benefit received and know that the other is also 
obliged, there will be less indecision in initiating the transaction. Another 
important reason for beginning a relationship is the special satisfaction people 
have when involved in this kind of reciprocal relationship.  
As a result, the conclusions reached by Williamson and Gouldner are 
diametrically opposed. For Williamson (1993), trust is irrelevant for market 
transactions and is applied exclusively to interactions between family, friends and 
lovers, whereas for Gouldner (1954), trust is necessary for market transactions 
and is based on the norm of reciprocity which is applied in a wide array of 
interactions in all human societies. Thus, trust is provided by the reciprocity 
principle required for market transactions to take place. In contrast, reciprocity 
implies trust because each participant feels confident that they will be helped by 
the other in times of need. Individuals in reciprocity relationships are reactive to 
each other’s needs, and understand this component of the relationship. They are 
confident and feel included in the extended self of the other party who wants also 
to share values, principles and concerns that might arise. Trust is implied by 
reciprocity because it involves not only an appraisal of a partner’ reliability, but 
also the belief that partners have concern for one’s needs and can be counted 
when required, and that they feel confident in the strength of the relationship 
(Rempel et al., 1985). According to many social scientists, other concepts such as 
justice (or fairness), morality and altruism, are also implied by the “reciprocity 
complex” (de Vos and Wielers, 2003).  
Williamson and Gouldner’s divergent views about the reciprocity principle 
can be summarised in the following way:  
- According to Williamson (1993), the market is dominated by cynics and self-
interested individuals who do not trust each other and only calculate the risks 
of the transactions that they face. The only type of reciprocity compatible with 
Williamson’s approach is the economic concept of tit-for-tat strategy 
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developed by Axelrod (1984) in his computer tournaments. 
- According to Gouldner (1954), it is difficult to begin and develop transactions 
if individuals are exclusively interested in the anticipated gratification of the 
net return of such transactions. The concept of reciprocity here is different 
from the economic concept of Axelrod’s tit-for-tat strategy. In real economic 
transactions, people trust each other and gain satisfaction from being involved 
in reciprocal trust relationships. 
 
4. Opportunism and Reciprocity in the Gift-Exchange Game 
 
Experimental evidence shows that people are influenced not only by selfish 
motivation, but also by the norms of reciprocity (Fehr et al., 1993; 1997; Fehr and 
Falk, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Falk and Gächter, 2002; Croson 1996; Guth, 
Klose, Konigstein and Schwalbach, 1998; Keser and van Winden, 2000). For 
these authors, in the presence of incomplete labour contracts, reciprocity is an 
important contract enforcement device (Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). 
In particular, Fehr et al. (1993) present a version of the gift exchange game that 
they use in order to test the potential role of reciprocity in employment contracts. 
This basic version of the game investigates the empirical importance of 
reciprocity through a two-player sequential move game consisting of two stages. 
In the first stage, a “firm” offers its “worker” a wage w. In the second stage, the 
worker can either accept or reject the offer. A rejection ends the game and results 
in zero profits for both players. Upon acceptance, the worker has to choose the 
effort level e. The higher the effort level, the higher the associated effort costs, 
c(e). The second stage is completed after the manager has been informed of the 
employee’s effort decision. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to the roles as “employers” and “workers”, 
respectively, and kept their role throughout the experiment. There were an 
identical number of workers and firms. Procedures and payoff functions were 
known by all the players, i.e. they were explained in the instructions provided by 
the experimenter. The employer’s earnings decrease as the effort (e) decreases, 
and increase as the wage (w) decreases, whilst the worker’s earnings increase as w 
increases, and decrease as e increases.  
We can generalise a sequential game in two moves in which a manager makes 
a salary choice between 20 and 120 and an employee makes a choice of effort 
52 
 
level between 0.1 and 1, or alternatively they may decline the offer.  
In the one-shot gift-exchange game, the “standard prediction” under the 
assumption of common knowledge of rationality and selfishness is easy to derive 
with backward induction. Since effort levels above the minimum are costly and 
workers are the second movers in this two-stage game, they will choose the 
minimum effort level. A firm’s best response is to offer the lowest wage to a 
worker. We call these reference outcomes w* and e*, respectively. The resulting 
equilibrium payoffs are less efficient than those of more cooperative play. Thus, 
there is a significant possibility for cooperation in order to achieve joint 
improvements. Expressed in non-mathematical terms, this represents the “total 
distrust” of the worker, or an expectation of minimum effort. In other words, the 
employer believes that his worker will always offer the minimum effort level no 
matter what salary is offered. On the basis of these expectations the employer will 
offer the minimum salary (wmin). It is simple enough to imagine that the worker 
will react by working at the minimum effort level (or even refusing the offer) thus 
proving that the orthodox theory hypothesis is true. The lesson one learns from 
this is that where there is total distrust, low earnings are realised. 
Although some economic transactions are similar to the anonymous one-shot 
games studied above, many employment contracts are clearly different. They do 
not occur only once, as in the one-shot version of the gift-exchange game. In 
labour relations people interact repeatedly, which provides many opportunities for 
reciprocation, reputation formation, and social exchange. The mix of social 
motives and economic incentives to cooperate may actually have interesting 
effects on interaction. Some people, even those who are totally selfish, may have 
an economic incentive to cooperate. Consequently, it is very important to 
understand how subjects behave in repeated interactions. The most important 
question is whether the mere fact of repeated play can actually help to solve the 
efficiency problem. The experiments provided by Falk and Gächter (2002), which 
is a version of the gift-exchange game created by Fehr et al. (1993), directly 
address this question in the context of the gift exchange game. As mentioned 
above, in this type of game the baseline treatment was a so-called “One-Shot 
treatment”, which is a sequence of one-shot games played in each period by 
different worker-firm pairs. In the second treatment, each pair plays ten repeated 
versions of the same game. In this “repeated game treatment”, since the 
participating pair has a common history, repeated game effects are possible. In the 
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repeated game, Falk and Gächter (2002) investigate the empirical importance of 
incentive contracts and long-term contracts, i.e. repeated interactions. 
In the repeated gift-exchange game with definite time, it is difficult ex ante to 
have a specific theoretical prediction. If there is only a small probability that the 
adversary is, for example, a “tit-for-tat” player, cooperative play can be supported 
until the final period (Kreps et al, 1982). Furthermore, even with complete 
information but multiple equilibria in the stage game, cooperative equilibria exist 
wherein wages and effort above w* and e* are observed for all but the last period 
(Benoit and Krishna, 1985). Boundedly rational players may also take repeated 
game effects into account (Selten, 1978; Selten and Stoecker, 1986). These 
sources suggest that wages and effort levels at least as high as w* and e* can be 
observed. A “repeated game effect” can therefore be defined as the difference 
between observed behaviour in the repeated treatment (RG) and the one-shot 
treatment (OS). 
In summary, an opportunistic core model would predict a flat line around the 
minimum wage and minimum effort in the one-shot version of the game. This 
prediction is similar to those of the traditional prisoner’s dilemma. Furthermore, 
there may be a bit of tit-for-tat strategy in the repeated game, which would 
differentiate it from the one-shot game. This would show up in the behaviour of 
the final round.  
Fehr’s research has shown that many people are motivated by reciprocity and 
that w* and e* are not usually the observed outcomes in the one-shot version of 
the game. The most obvious result of the experiments is that both average wages 
and effort levels clearly exceed the levels predicted under opportunistic behaviour, 
meaning that compared to the reference outcome (w*, e*) there is strong and 
systematic deviation. This deviation is persistent across all periods.  
 
« Hypothesis: Wages and effort levels are positively correlated, i.e., corr 
(w, e)>0 holds) » (Falk and Gächter , 2002: 6)  
 
If employers pay “generous wages” (w>w*) and employees reciprocate by 
providing higher levels of effort (e>e*), both trading partners greatly improve 
their payoffs compared to the subgame-perfect play.  
Efficiency is increased considerably relatively to the reference outcome. Thus 
reciprocity is capable of supporting cooperative play, thereby ensuring mutual 
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benefits. In the version of the game provided by Falk and Gächter (2002), this 
hypothesis, in a multiple one-shot gift exchange game, is confirmed by the 
experimental results (tobit regression results). This means that reciprocity matters. 
Furthermore, in such a game the potential role of reciprocity is tested by the 
experimental results (tobit regression results) in a repeated game. More precisely, 
one can deduce from this that human behaviour is characterised by a positive level 
of trust based on reciprocity but not blind faith. Instead, rather more sensibly, we 
should expect the employer to have a more positive outlook regarding the 
behaviour of their workers, and that a level of effort which increases in proportion 
to the salary offer will be obtained. In other words, they expect the worker to 
reciprocate their generosity and be more willing to work the higher the salary 
offered. 
The employer may reasonably expect a constructive correlation between w 
and e. However, the employer does not know the worker’s reply in advance, 
meaning they can only guess. This lack of coordination, which is also a lack of 
knowledge of the preference function of the other, does not always allow higher 
profits to be achieved. One of the aims of this research is to understand why this 
does not always happen and to discover how his problem might be mitigated. The 
main problem lays in the fact that it is difficult for the employer to know the 
worker’s response in advance, that is, the extent to which (or indeed whether) they 
will reciprocate. It is also possible that in the course of a game the parties may 
have the chance to get to know each other better, and to learn how to manage their 
relationship and send each other signals.  
Comparing the repeated game with the one-shot game makes it possible to 
separate the impact arising from the cooperation of a repeated interaction with the 
same opponent from the impact of a pure reciprocity effect. Hence, the change in 
reciprocity in the RG treatment relative to that observed in the OS treatment 
determines the extent to which reciprocal behaviour is altered by some repeated 
game effects.  
As in the OS treatment, both average wages and effort levels exceed the 
subgame perfect levels in the RG treatment, meaning that  compared to the 
reference outcome (w* = 21 and e*= 0.1) there is a strong and systematic 
deviation which is persistent across all periods. These data show the importance 
of both reciprocity and repeated game effects. Wages in all periods are similar 
between the two treatments, and reciprocity is relevant in their experiment. This 
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said, workers’ behaviour is more cooperative in the RG treatment, which shows 
higher effort levels. In both treatments, they find subjects who are motivated by 
reciprocity. Moreover, the repeated game nature of RG treatment has the effect of 
disciplining some selfish people who would, in the absence of repeated 
interaction, play uncooperatively, as in the OS treatment. 
Furthermore, there is an “endgame effect”, i.e. a considerable drop in effort 
levels in the final period. Although wages did not fall (it does not result in effort 
levels of e*) the average effort fell to around the levels of the one-shot game 
(which was on average e=0.41). Average effort levels in period 10 of the RG 
treatment are (a) lower than in period 9. The relationship here is thus seen 
primarily in economic and social terms. The parties involved in the agreement are 
motivated not only by the economic incentives of the game, as described above, 
but may also be influenced by relational motivators and customs which may alter 
their way of interpreting external relationships with other companies. However, 
reciprocity may increase the risk of exploitation by each party and so make the 
employment relationship more unstable. When the employment relationship is not 
long-term, reciprocity may not be sufficient to effectively co-ordinate 
expectations and interactions between managers and workers (Nooteboom, 1996). 
Given the intrinsic features of such relational mechanisms, it seems that 
employer and employees who consider this device as a possible basis for their 
interaction tend to seek reasons why the risk of trust will not exceed a certain 
limit. Relationships based on reciprocity can never be built on complete 
information since it would make them superfluous, yet they do require the 
environmental and institutional factors on which they rely (Zucker, 1986; Reed, 
2001). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Employment contracts differ from conventional sales contracts because they 
do not specify the terms of action of the two parties. The workers do not promise 
to perform a specified set of tasks, instead agreeing to accept the authority of their 
employer in exchange for a wage (authority is defined as the employer’s 
possibility of choosing from a set of specific actions which the workers must 
perform, i.e. their behaviour). Over time, the employer can define the meaning 
appropriate behaviour as more information becomes available. In other words, the 
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employment contract can be defined by the possibility of identifying an agreed 
zone of acceptance for the worker – an area in which the worker is disinterested in 
the choices made by others, and the employer pays for the privilege of postponing 
the terms of the contract. Given the complex and uncertain environment in which 
firms act, such flexibility is a considerable advantage. There are different methods 
that can be used to describe employment relationships.  
According to Williamson (1993), in the social domain of market relationships, 
trust cannot be applied in a stable fashion because it would be immediately 
exploited by the opportunism and calculativeness of the other party. In transaction 
cost economics, Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that the employment relationship 
is founded on the premise that managers and employees have a conflict of interest 
and elaborate coercive authority incentive alignment mechanisms. Opportunism 
(self-interest seeking with guile) arises because some plans cannot be described in 
a complete, enforceable contract, given the assumption of the bounded rationality 
(limits in the acquisition and processing of information) of the parties. 
Nevertheless, he does not claim that all agents are opportunistic all the time, but 
he argues that the nature of different governance structures depends necessarily on 
potential or actual opportunism.  
In summary, Williamson views the employment relationship in terms of 
efficiency and opportunism, which are the core of economic action, and considers 
trust to be redundant. This thesis, in contrast, attempts to demonstrate that 
considerations of trust and reciprocity are critical to an adequate theorisation of 
the relations between employer and employees within firms. In particular, the 
concept of reciprocity, as a source of spontaneous cooperation and as a significant 
contract enforcement device in the presence of imperfect labour contracts, is 
analysed by means of the gift-exchange game (Akerlof 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 
1990).  
This thesis summarises some important experimental results regarding the 
role of reciprocity in employment relationships, and discusses the wider problem 
of how experimental findings fit into an evolutionary perspective on human social 
motives and emotions.  
 
 
 
 
57 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 Beyond The Gift-Exchange Game:  
The institutional Details of Reciprocity 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Reciprocity does not emerge in a vacuum, but is based on specific 
institutional arrangements representing a world of shared meaning and normative 
rules of behaviour within organisations. One conclusion which may be drawn 
from this notion is the importance not of reciprocity in itself, but of the impact of 
institutions (employment rules) on reciprocity.  
Thus, reciprocity as a habit is justified by the opportunities and constraints arising 
from the institutional environment. Individuals have an incentive to act in a way 
consistent with social institutions regarding a selection process that helps those 
who have most interest and eliminates outliers. The institutional structures created 
must therefore influence behaviour so as to improve the performance of the 
individuals.  
Institutional changes can modify individuals’ habits of thought and behaviour 
as well as create new perceptions, preferences and intentions. In short, individuals 
form their habits on the basis of constraints imposed by institutions (see Hodgson, 
1988; 2002; 2003). More specifically, institutions can be defined as those 
universally-accepted rules and guidelines that structure social interactions. Since 
they set limits on human behaviour, they reduce uncertainty. In other words, 
institutions are social structures that give individuals accurate expectations about 
the behaviour of others.  
This chapter explains how, based on different combinations of employment 
rules and reciprocity mechanisms, two distinct patterns for controlling 
employment relationships can be identified: the rigid governance structure and the 
flexible governance structure. The rigid governance structure, based on specific 
rigid employment rules, provides an institutional framework sufficiently stable to 
build a secure agreement between companies and workers to cooperate. However, 
members of the company do not possess the discretion necessary to react swiftly 
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to changes in an uncertain environment.  In contrast, the flexible governance 
structure attempts to build a more adaptable framework for stable collaboration 
between manager and employees. This approach focuses on the relationship 
between trust and informal flexible rules. In avoiding any direct connection to the 
tasks workers carry out, this structure provides a more flexible model of 
employment relationships, operating at an inter-personal level, and functioning 
most effectively when reciprocity mechanisms dominate the relationship.  
 
2. Employment rules 
 
Establishing trust based on reciprocity within an employment relationship is 
not always easy: it is not something which can be purchased by the pound. The 
problem of reciprocity is that it may take a long time to grow, and it may not be 
sufficient to co-ordinate the expectations between employment relationship 
parties, particularly in large and complex organisations. Some authors, such as 
Marsden (1999), have emphasised the role of impersonal transaction rules in the 
employment relationship in order to overcome these problems. These employment 
rules can be seen as governance devices in that they reduce transaction and 
production costs, increase flexibility by reducing the need for detailed contracts, 
and restrain the opportunism of the parties.  
The employment contract may be identified as an institutional authority 
relationship where impersonal rules provide a framework for spontaneous co-
operation between manager and workers. These rules provide potential solutions 
to the problem of unstable employment relationships since they limit both 
managerial authority and employees’ freedom to act, as well as providing 
protection against opportunistic behaviour by either party. The rules that are 
included in the structural arrangements of the organisation limit individuals’ 
behaviour by restricting their decisions. Consequently they emerge as a de-
personalised institutional order (Lane and Bachmann, 1998).  
Institutions can be defined as “the rules of the game” which affect a 
company’s performance or, more formally, as the human-devised constraints that 
shape human interaction (North, 1990). To reduce uncertainty, institutions define 
and limit an individual’s set of choices and diminish the transaction costs. They 
provide the framework within which human interaction takes place, and they are 
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similar to the rules of the game in a competitive team sport. The purpose of these 
rules is to define both the way the game is played and the objective of the players 
(economic agents) within these rules to win the game. In other words, such 
institutions are rules that reduce uncertainty (by establishing a stable, but not 
necessarily efficient, structure for human interaction) and affect economic 
performance through their impact on the costs of exchange and production (North, 
1990).  
 
Employment rules can be seen as governance devices in that they reduce 
transaction and production costs, restrain the opportunism of both parties and 
provide flexibility, due to the need for detailed contracts. As a result, they emerge 
as simple, de-personalised but legitimised institutional orders in that they are 
included in the structural arrangements of organisations, limit individuals’ 
behaviour by blinding their decisions and enforce the employment relationship, 
changing its nature in the process. According to Marsden, such rules may be a 
more simple solution which enables both management and workers to identify the 
kind of tasks which are included in particular jobs.  He argues:  
 
«in the place of a complex list, there is a simple rule for allocating 
tasks; if the rules are sufficiently robust, they can be applied across a 
variety of workplaces; when they are known and understood by the parties, 
they give fairly predictable results and each knows what they are letting 
themselves in for; application of a rule also provides a key for settling 
disputes other than by naked power; and rules can be adapted logically to 
new situations» (Marsden, 1999: 17). 
 
Thus, the employment relationship is effective if the employment rules 
follow two sufficient and necessary conditions, namely efficiency and 
enforceability. Efficiency means that employment rules must sustain job demands 
and worker competencies in order to improve production. In other words, they 
must be attractive, offering both parties the security and support of an 
employment contract (Marsden, 1999: 31). 
Enforceability, meanwhile, means that employment rules reduce the 
employees’ ability to shirk and protect them from an employer’s request for 
flexibility. Enforceability concerns the transparency of task allocation rules, an 
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essential element of norms for limiting potential forms of opportunism, and hence 
for enforcing agreements. This may be achieved through two different ways of 
identifying job tasks: task-centred rules and function-centred rules. Task-centred 
rules build a specific relationship by defining the technical competencies of jobs 
and the precise attributes of the tasks. This is a simple and clear way of task 
identification but may also be a source of rigidity in task allocations. Function-
centred rules create a less specific link between individual tasks and jobs by 
offering discretion and flexibility to employees. These norms favour employers 
because they can tailor jobs more closely to the final output desired.  
Task-centred rules may be further sub-divided into two different types, each 
of which specifies the nature of the individual tasks which management may 
assign to individual workers.  Work post rules, firstly, arise from the production 
approach to task organisation, and define a one-to-one relationship between the 
individual and the job. Its goal is to guarantee responsibility, meaning that 
individual workers are responsible for their own work post. In this system, a 
company is divided into work posts; when workers are hired, they do not know 
the specific tasks they will have to accomplish, but rather they expect a system of 
work-post rules that provide a specific job description and an inventory of tasks. 
Work post rules are common in US manufacturing and in the French 
manufacturing and service industries. Secondly, there are job territories rules, 
which stem from the training approach. They avoid listing tasks and are 
applicable to both blue and white-collar professional work.  
The “tools of the trade” is a specific type of job territory rule applied to 
blue-collar work. It identifies tasks on the basis of either the kind of tools used or 
the materials handled by workers. Workers of a specific trade follow management 
directives to accomplish tasks within their given area. Management uses the tools 
of workers’ trade only for the required job. These tools are closely related to the 
kind of competence to be applied, such as the electrician’s screwdriver. In a 
different context, such as white-collar and professional work, the job territory rule 
takes a different form by focusing on particular types of administrative 
transactions or technical operations. “Tools of the trade” has been mainly applied 
to industrial and construction skills in craft labour markets in the UK. 
 Function/procedure-centred rules take a more indirect approach in their 
procedures, within which workers are organised in different categories. However, 
the problem of robustness limits the range of possible procedures that may work 
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effectively. Two main procedures can be identified in this case: the production 
approach and training approach. Under the former, competence rank rules assign 
members their work group position according to the range of tasks which they 
have the experience to undertake. The allocation of tasks is flexible and worker 
seniority plays an important role in a worker’s rank. Seniority helps workers 
better manage several difficult tasks, and also promotes cooperation because it can 
reduce competition between members of the work group. However, worker 
seniority does not play an effective role when the group depends upon positive 
actions by its members. Such work assignments are based on seniority, which is 
related with average competence levels, and rank, which reflects the recognised 
competences of workers. These competence ranking rules are applied in large 
Japanese industrial firms. 
 
Under the training approach, on the other hand, qualification procedural 
rules allocate tasks on the basis of recognised qualifications. These qualifications 
are conferred by formal agreement, convention or may rest on peer group custom. 
These rules define the work competencies and, only indirectly, the individual 
tasks. Under this approach a flexible process of skill recognition assures the link 
between workplace functions and the identification of appropriate work. Such a 
process involves some form of workplace traineeships which provide the 
procedures by which different kinds of workers can be identified and work 
distributed. Since both employees and managers have learned how workplace 
traineeships work in practice, competence rank rules are very robust, solve the 
problem of work experience and promote socialisation. Qualification rules are 
applied in German Industry for both skilled blue and intermediate white collar 
workers. 
According to Marsden (1999), these four types of rules are sufficiently strong 
to offer the necessary guarantees to firms and workers and to manage the kinds of 
opportunism which commonly arise from the incompleteness of the employment 
contract.  They are powerful institutions in the sense that they can affect the 
behaviour of individuals in the firm, absorb risk, and increase the chances of 
cooperation in the employment relationship. 
According to evolutionary game theory, informal norms are not in themselves 
entirely exogenous, but rather emerge as part of a process of social interaction. 
They can emerge endogenously, even in the absence of state action, and develop 
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out of the free choices of companies and workers. They offer flexible limits to 
management authority and to the obligations which employees enter into with 
their employers. As a result, they restrain potential opportunism, raise the quality 
of performance and guarantee the stability of employment relationships.  Without 
these protections, the employment relationship would not work, and firms would 
not exist as employing organisations (Marsden, 1999: 254). 
The similarity between this and the appearance and prevalence of territorial 
rules among many species of animals was outlined by Maynard Smith (1982) in 
his “evolutionarily stable strategy”. Such models of behaviour are neither dictated 
by central authority nor enforced by collective institutions. Rather, they emerge 
out of repeated interactions between animals of the same species attempting to 
maximise their collective survival chances. It seems that human beings learn 
interaction rules more effectively than animals, regarding not only their own 
behaviour but how to interpret and respond to the behaviour of others. Thus, a 
crucial characteristic of any evolutionarily stable strategy in the field of 
employment is that once a particular rule has become prevalent, it becomes easier 
to predict how others will behave. A broadly diffused and well-tested rule is one 
that can be trusted, and as a result, whatever its intrinsic merits for a particular 
business, reactions to the rule will always l be influenced by the decisions of 
others. 
A similar process is at work with the decentralised diffusion of employment 
rules, in that they may be considered part of the relevant skills and a basis for 
other learned organisational routines. The firm progresses through its structured 
routines which rather than individual learning represent the key element of 
organisational learning, which is seen as a collective process involving individual 
elements that depend on the collective context into which knowledge is generated:  
 
« learning to drive, for example, is an individual process, yet many of the 
key routines we are taught have a collective outcome. To enter a 
roundabout, we learn to give priority to vehicles coming from the right 
(that is, in Britain, where vehicles drive on the left). This is a simple 
routine, but it ensures a collective outcome that is also learned, namely a 
smooth flow of traffic through the road system. It only works if every 
driver respects it (Marsden, 1999:250) ». 
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Furthermore, organisational learning may be seen as a product of the 
resources flowing through a person’s web of contracts. In personal trust 
relationships, enforcing informal employment rules involves mobilising members’ 
connections both within and between its various units, and with external 
organisations so as to gain access to a variety of resources.  The interaction 
between employer and employee, and between workers themselves, develops new 
cognitive skills and competences, and allows workers to better manage their 
actions. The agents of an organisational framework acquire routines or habits in 
the sense that they develop mechanisms for relegating particular ongoing actions 
from continuous rational assessment. Such habits may be regarded, as stated 
above, as the outcome of a process of “natural selection” Hodgson, 1997, 2004a; 
2004b). This ensures that the predominant informal rules tend to be efficient 
simply because they allow the survival of agents of the firm. Employment rules 
are strong because it is often too costly to change the rules of the game. The 
agents in this framework are portrayed as having plans or strategies, but when 
they enter a network, their preferences can change because institutions and 
relational mechanisms, such as reciprocity, influence them. 
 
3. The Interplay between Employment Rules and Reciprocity: 
some Examples 
 
In the attempt to produce conditions for the trust process to develop, 
detailed contracts can be destructive since the mistrust they demonstrate might 
engender further mistrust, risking it becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy 
(Macaulay, 1963; Zand, 1972). Managers’ suspicion of workers’ motivation leads 
them to set low-discretion work rules, which in turn provoke low-trust conduct by 
workers, thus confirming and indeed strengthening management’s initial attitude. 
Fox (1974) defined this spiral of low-trust relations as a syndrome leading to low 
levels of workplace cooperation, where employees believe management they 
cannot be trusted, of their own volition, to deliver desired work performance.  In 
this context the low-trust-low-discretion strategy is a common solution, the 
purpose of which is to limit opportunism in contractual relations. This strategy 
provides a safety net in that it not only protects employers from shirking by 
employees, but also protects workers from the power of their managers (Marsden, 
1999: 255). In other words, this strategy consists of providing a specific definition 
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of job activities that constrain employee behaviour through standardised rules and 
routines, and in defining punishments and incentives in order to solve the frequent 
conflict between employer and employees (Fox, 1974).  
The reason for such a downward spiral is not only the contrast between 
contract and trust but also the interpretation of contract with a detailed 
specification of duties. There are indeed different institutional arrangements that 
underpin employment relationships and which provide different levels of 
employee discretion. As described above, on the one hand, employment rules may 
be a source of high trust relationships in the workplace so long as they are flexible 
and allow a great deal of freedom, but on the other hand such rules require high-
trust relationships because they lack the safety net provided by rigid rules. Thus, 
the managerial strategy arises from a virtuous circle rules-trust relations-
mechanism that offers an alternative framework for organisational action.  
The gradual process of developing reciprocity between manager and 
employee based on this mechanism moves through several stages. The trust 
process may develop if the employer, within certain margins of risk, gives the 
employee the flexibility to act at his or her own discretion within the constraints 
of certain flexible rules. The process tends to start cautiously, where small 
successful steps generate increasing levels of trust. In other words, actions and 
relations based on trust are non-reflective in that they are non-calculative. Rather, 
trust depends on previous behaviour, and increased if one party’s previous actions 
have been positive. In the workplace, this practice becomes an important element 
of tacit knowledge and tacit definition of work, and can quickly generate 
improved conduct and habits, thereby establishing an environment of trust.  
Reciprocity and high-trust relationships compensate for flexible institutions’ 
lack of robustness by facilitating effective sanctions and providing relational 
enforcement. Furthermore, they can affect access to information and improve a 
company’s efficiency by facilitating coordinated actions. Thus, a high-trust/high 
discretion strategy may be optimal as it helps to reduce transaction cost (such as 
control costs) and has the advantage of flexibility because of the reduced need for 
detailed arrangements (Fox, 1974). 
To summarise, there are two employment governance structures: the rigid 
governance structure and the flexible governance structure. The former is 
characterised by low reciprocity and low personal trust, as well as detailed 
employment rules and procedures. It relies on task-centred rules that identify job 
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tasks directly, simply and clearly. Employment parties trust each other because of 
the detailed institutional inventory of the organisation as well as the external 
environment in which it is embedded. The latter, on the other hand, is 
characterised by fewer detailed employment rules and reciprocity. It is based on 
function-centred rules that give only an indirect guide to work allocation. 
Discretion and reciprocity offer a stable framework for the actors’ expectations 
and interaction, and they are sources of high interpersonal trust between employer 
and employees. 
The aim of this chapter is to understand how relational mechanisms such as 
reciprocity may be efficiently combined with the transaction rules governing 
employment relationships in order to obtain stable co-operation between employer 
and employees. Usually, economic experiments put their subjects in an artificial 
situation, created according to a research structure involving either a specific 
variable or question. In other words, subjects are presented with an economic 
situation in which the behavioural response is predominantly numeric or nominal 
(e.g. price, costs, salary, categories of choices, yes/no answers). An economic 
experiment which aims to simulate a work situation should take into consideration 
the fact that the situation it attempts to replicate also involves choices which are 
not purely monetary. In fact, in a working relationship the employer must make an 
offer of a salary but the worker provides work which is not intrinsically a financial 
variable.  
 In experiments conducted by Falk and Gächter (2002), the offer of work and 
the effort level are reduced to choices with purely monetary consequences. The 
worker has to choose a level of effort, which has a cost dependent on different 
employment rules. This thesis will attempt to replicate the institutional details of 
employment relationships. The introduction of “actual tasks” permits a far more 
accurate simulation of work situations, since it facilitates the replication of the 
mechanisms which characterise the employment relationship and the working 
culture which otherwise cannot be simulated with economic experiments of the 
traditional kind. 
The next chapter focuses on the “institutional gift-exchange game”, a version 
of the “gift-exchange game” (Fehr et al, 1993). In this new institutional version of 
the experiment, the actual tasks consisted of research in fixed lists. Each worker 
had three lists made available to him or her: a telephone directory, in which they 
had to research the telephone number of a certain subscriber, an extract from an 
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Japanese-Italian dictionary, in which they had to research the Italian word that 
corresponded to a given word in Japanese, and a list of acronyms and 
abbreviations, where they had to search for the meaning of the acronym or 
abbreviation given.  
 The work contract involved carrying out ten tasks, although the worker 
could decide how many searches they wanted to carry out. Each search carried out 
successfully corresponded to an effort level of 10%. The increment in effort level 
was assigned when the worker correctly keyed the data into the computer. The 
software then checked the exactness of the research, to ensure that the research 
had been carried out correctly and thus the effort invested had been effective. The 
minimum level of effort required for the contract to be accepted, and therefore for 
the corresponding salary to be obtained, was 10% (one research task) in 
experiments with a flexible culture and 30% (three research tasks) in experiments 
with a fixed work culture.  
 Because of the importance of discretion to the evolutionary success of 
reciprocity it is useful to analyse the difference between rigid and flexible 
employment rules in the real world. Institutional gift exchange attempts to identify 
such differences by providing different methods of working. In such an 
experiment the function-centred rules of work in the flexible culture involved 
discretionary tasks, i.e. the option to choose which tasks to complete. The worker 
could choose whether to only search for telephone numbers, Italian words or 
acronyms and abbreviations, or indeed choose how many searches to carry out in 
the dictionary, how many words to look up or how the number of acronyms and 
abbreviations to find. Therefore, they could decide which combination of tasks 
suited them best. 
On the other hand, task-centred work rules within a rigid work culture were 
more demanding in that the required research had to follow a specific sequence. 
The computer randomly presented a list of ten tasks, mixing together telephone 
lists, Japanese words and acronyms. Thus, from the outset, tasks had to be 
completed in the order given. 
In the case of both function-centred rules and task-centred rules the worker 
had the right to choose the quantity of work they wished to undertake, a choice 
which was enacted on the basis of calculations allowed by the software. The 
factor which changed, in accordance with the rules of the game, was the quantity 
of work. The hypothesis of this research was that different institutional cultures 
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can influence working relations, even in psychological terms. 
Overall, in institutional environments dominated by rigid employment rules, 
the relationship between employer and employee lies in respecting terms which 
have been specifically defined. By definition, no exercise of discretion is called 
for, since the specificity of the terms excludes choice. In terms of inspection, 
supervision and authority, these rules regulate the actions of employees in their 
task activities, in the rewards and punishments brought to bear upon them and in 
the relationship between employer and employees. In such a system obedience is 
the critical obligation for the employee’s actions. No implicit obligations are 
required since the nature of these norms requires no favours or effort superior to 
the level specifically required. Anyone who is able to conform to the prescriptive 
rules must do as required. 
Only flexible informal rules tend to engender feelings of personal obligation 
and reciprocity since they tend to generate a spiral of rising trust. Furthermore, 
trust between employer and employees may encourage them to go beyond formal 
contracts. In such an institutional context, individuals are not only motivated by 
the returns they are expected to achieve in the employment relationship. They do 
not always attempt to define the exact terms of interaction, but they also do 
favours, and while there is a general expectation of some future return, the exact 
nature of exchange is not definitively stipulated in advance. Favours create diffuse 
future and unspecified obligations. An institutional environment based on flexible 
employment rules can be analysed with the high-discretion, high-trust model. 
 
4. Rigid Governance or Flexible Governance Structure? 
 
The types of governance analysed in this thesis depend on the establishment 
of informal organisational norms, values, culture and relational mechanisms such 
as trust and reciprocity. The careful selection of members and socialisation help 
promote these common values and beliefs. Rituals and ceremonies serve to 
identify and reinforce acceptable behaviour among members of the clan, and 
individuals are rewarded for acting in accordance with the group’s values (see 
Ouchi, 1980). Such types of governance may also be based on factors such as 
friendship and relationships as well as the reciprocity which arises from relational 
investments (Wittex, 1999). More precisely, based on the different combinations 
between distinguishing kinds of employment rules and reciprocity mechanism we 
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can identify two several distinct alternative patterns of co-ordinating employment 
interaction between manager and workers: the rigid governance structure and the 
flexible governance structure. 
The rigid governance structure is characterised by low reciprocity and 
personal trust, and detailed employment rules and procedures. This structure is 
conducive to the production of trust arising from institutions within the 
organisation. It relies on task-centred rules which identify job tasks directly, 
simply and clearly. Employment parties trust each other because both the detailed 
institutional inventory of the organisation and the external environment in which 
it is embedded offers a stable framework for actors’ expectations and interactions. 
As such, the rigid governance structure is strong and, in an environment of low 
interpersonal trust, may limit the four areas of opportunism identified in the 
previous chapter. Specifically, when it relies on the “work post” rule, tasks are 
assigned to workers via an abstract inventory.  
In fact, the essence of the work post rule is the identification of a set of 
complementary tasks which are assigned to an individual job holder responsible 
for their execution. This kind of explicit relationship identifies a set of discrete 
areas of work for which employees are individually responsible, and provides a 
clear and unmistakable job definition. In addition, it reduces the scope for 
opportunism in the sense that the work post rule sets clear individual 
responsibilities for the execution of certain tasks, thereby limiting the potential for 
employees to either cut tasks from their own jobs or impact on the tasks of other 
workers. This rule defines the limits within which management may exercise its 
authority over the assignment of work. Thus, the clarity of task assignments in 
work posts enables both management and workers to identify those who are and 
those who are not responsible for particular tasks. The other purpose of work post 
is to define responsibility so that employees’ tasks obligations can be better 
enforced:  
 
« It is notable that under many work post systems management 
have opposed workers assisting each other in the fulfilment of their 
tasks because this blurs the lines of accountability. The clarity of 
work assignments protects both parties from unilateral job 
enlargement and reduction because the demarcation lines have been 
clearly set out. In practice, the job descriptions associated with 
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work post often diverge considerably from the work actually 
undertaken » (Marsden, 1999: 48). 
 
The rigid governance structure may also be based on a second type of task-
centred rule, namely the job territory rule. Through this rule, management limits 
an employee’s authority by establishing a criterion for identifying the tasks 
associated with a particular job territory or tools of the trade. The main difference 
between the work post and job territory rules is that under the training approach, a 
job territory’s key operations are determined in relation to training and skills 
needs rather than complementarities in production. Under job territory rules, 
institutional governance may be a partial solution to the opportunism in the area 
of job boundaries and work allocation. Management knows that if a particular task 
requires the use of certain tools, then it can be assigned without further 
negotiation to a specific class of workers. Moreover, it knows who is in charge if 
certain tasks are not performed. As with the ‘work post’ rule, independent 
reassignment of tasks by either party would upset the equilibrium with other 
groups. For the worker, this transparency makes it difficult for management to 
reassign and add tasks unilaterally, meaning that both parties are protected from 
opportunism. 
The flexible governance structure, on the other hand, is characterised by 
function-centred rules which provide only an indirect guide to work distribution. 
The structure allows workers and management discretion in identifying tasks, and 
at the same time, provides a high level of flexibility in task assignments. This 
structure additionally benefits the employer in that they have a tool to maintain a 
cooperative relationship. However, there is also risk associated with these rules. If 
cooperation were to stop, management would find it difficult to identify which 
individual was responsible, and there is no clear definition of duties that can be 
used to draw the line collectively. Thus the consequence of failed cooperation in 
these kinds of rules is more serious than when it has easily enforceable job 
descriptions. 
 Such a system provides, in addition to formal knowledge, a significant 
amount of implicit knowledge regarding work tasks and the practical function of 
work groups. Through apprenticeships or professional training, workers learn how 
to apply the rule in practice, when faced with a variety of workplaces. It provides 
benefit to both management, who can assign tasks to employees with greater 
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flexibility (especially for incidental tasks that do not belong to a skill’s core 
competence, but which cannot easily be assigned to other workers without loss of 
efficiency) as well as workers (former trainees) who gain greater familiarity with 
task allocation norms, resulting in them being better able to identify and enforce 
limits to managerial authority.  Thus, in the flexible system there is no one-to-one 
linking of workers to jobs, and jobs to tasks, but a more flexible institutional 
structure that relies on procedures that regulate the distribution of work within 
groups. Such an indirect link with work task makes monitoring more difficult, 
creates capacity for jobs with diffused and overlapping boundaries, deprives 
workers of any clear reference point limiting their contractual obligations to their 
employer and, therefore, increases the possibility of opportunism. Nevertheless, in 
a flexible system and under given requirements, work group organisation and the 
status system characterised by the progression between ranks over time and 
depending on long-term employment, may restrain the opportunistic behaviour of 
both parties. 
 In the production approach, there are compensating mechanisms that rely on 
a kind of reciprocity in that the worker benefits from more flexible working 
practices and a greater quality of skills so long as he or she respects the internal 
norms of the work group over task allocation (positive reciprocity). Otherwise, if 
the employer does not respect the pay and other norms that sustain the 
competence rank model, then the work group can react by diminishing 
cooperation (negative reciprocity). Given the presence of abuse of authority and 
absence of a safety net provided by specific job descriptions, workers may feel the 
stakes are too high, which may damage the flexible working environment. 
Furthermore, management can gain a measure of control through staff appraisals 
conducted by line managers, and can use this to manage the rate of progression 
between ranks. However, if the progression were too slow its incentive effect 
would be lost. This would be especially dangerous because this rule lacks the 
safety net provided by the explicit job descriptions of the work post system. In 
addition, a degree of reciprocity is possible with the “qualification rule”. The 
possession of occupational skills means workers can quit if the managers’ offer 
looks less stable than elsewhere. The clear classification of skills by qualifications 
and their associated training procedures, something which is absent under the 
production approaches, enables skilled workers to easily identify who should 
receive skilled rates of pay, whatever the tasks on which they are currently 
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engaged. Thus, task assignments can be controlled effectively by making it more 
expensive for the employer to allocate them a range of lower-valued tasks. 
Competence rank rules avoid the detailed identification of individual 
workers and offer the possibility for worker improvement and new learning 
opportunities (Koike and Inoki, 1990) Ranking procedure systems give workers a 
greater degree of autonomy than the work post rule since they are able to both 
conduct tasks and work-related problem-solving activities and increase their skills 
through job-training. Rank determines the conduct of training in the sense that 
higher-ranking workers help train more junior ones, and the latter accept their 
position in the expectation that they will someday rise to a higher rank. 
Management respects these norms because were it to abuse its authority, the 
knowledge that resides in the work group might be used against it. 
Qualification rules offer more variety in problem solving and pose a less 
significant threat to the integrity of the allocation rule because workers behave 
flexibly. Qualification rules provide an incentive to develop skills and new 
competencies, and provide a more efficacious way of dealing with unusual tasks 
than under task-centred rules, because the desire of the worker to maintain the 
benefits arising from controlled flexibility is greater than the defensive protection 
offered by task-centred rules. 
Furthermore, under competence rank rules, jobs lack the distinctive identity 
provided by the detailed job descriptions of the ‘work post’ rule. In addition, 
experienced workers lack the safety of clearly defined posts, and junior workers 
lack signs of progression between tasks that might motivate them to learn. 
Without a clear job structure, senior workers cannot work appropriately. One of 
the most important protections offered by the competence rank model is the 
ranking process itself, since this is an outward, evident sign of management’s 
recognition of worker competencies.  
According to the theoretical background of this thesis, the following 
represents the first hypothesis:  
 
- Hypothesis 1: The positive impact of reciprocity is stronger in flexible 
transactions than in rigid transactions. 
 
In other words, reciprocity is more important in the flexible governance 
structure than in the rigid one. In the flexible framework, individuals develop trust 
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in their relationships primarily on the basis of inter-personal contacts. 
Interpersonal trust requires considerable effort on the part of individual actors. It 
depends on their idiosyncratic interests and the situation within which they make 
their decisions. Consequently, the flexible system must rely on relational 
mechanisms such as reciprocity in order to maintain the power of authority and 
protect against opportunistic behaviour by either party. Positive reciprocity 
enforces the work of less specific rules by providing socially-effective sanctions, 
and represents a complementary means of developing cooperation within the firm. 
The second hypothesis is as follows:  
 
- Hypothesis 2: The positive impact of reciprocity is stronger in repeated 
transactions than in one-shot transactions. 
 
In one-shot iterations, reciprocity may be riskier than in the rigid approach. In 
other words, reciprocity takes time to develop because individuals develop trust in 
relationships primarily on the basis of personal contact. Interpersonal trust 
requires considerable effort on the part of individual actors. It depends on their 
idiosyncratic interests and the circumstances in which they make their decisions. 
It may be riskier than power mechanisms in that when trust breaks down, 
devastating effects on interpersonal relationships may results, which quickly erode 
the organisational climate.  
On the basis of these two hypotheses we may assert the following main 
proposition: while rigid governance characterised by task-centred rules and low 
reciprocity is better suited in one-shot transactions, flexible governance 
characterised by function-centred rules and a high level of reciprocity is better 
suited to a repeated game. 
Strongly institutional governance (based on the application of the two 
different task-centred rules) deals with the different areas of opportunism by 
clearly establishing and directly limiting employees’ obligations. It is forceful and 
makes the open-ended employment relationship a viable and attractive form of 
contract. It restrains exploitation by either workers or employers, provides 
impersonal forms of trust and offers stable co-operation in the employment 
relationship. Nevertheless, this kind of governance has the disadvantage of being 
rigid, struggles to adapt its rules to more variable work demands connected to new 
technology and team-work. Rigid transactions may sacrifice high efficiency in 
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order to provide stability, but in a one-shot scenario it may be better than the 
flexible approach since reciprocity takes time to develop. 
With a flexible governance structure, employer gives employees a greater 
degree of discretion. The rules of this structure are more flexible but less robust 
than task-centred rules, and rely heavily on high-trust relationships based on 
reciprocity. With long-term transactions, reciprocity between employer and 
employees affects the behaviour and attitudes of the parties, and represents a key 
element underlining flexible governance. Such mechanisms may lead to mutual 
dependence between the parties and enforce mutual trust. Trust, in this case, 
resides in implicit relational dependence between individual actions. As stated 
above, the pro-social action of one party generates friendly behaviour on the part 
of the other party and vice versa. In this way employer and employee may 
perform better. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Two main traditional governance devices that can enforce employees’ behaviour 
and promote co-operation between employers and workers can be identified. In 
rigid environments characterised by task-centred rules, job tasks are assigned in a 
clear way, and sub-standard performance may be easily attributable and 
sanctioned.  Task-centred rules are robust and can function well where there are 
low levels of personal trust. The detailed institutional inventory of the 
organisation, as well as the external environment where it is located, offer a stable 
framework for an actor’s expectations and interactions. Rigid employment rules 
are supported by monitoring, detection mechanisms and punitive sanctions. They 
are low-discretion rules which alienate employers from the moral nature of work. 
In this sense, the rigid governance structure is strong and, where there is low 
interpersonal trust, may restrain opportunism and deal with problems of 
uncertainty. Hence, a governance structure that relies on such rules does not 
require significant investment in employer relations and may therefore be defined 
as the rigid governance structure. 
Thus, rigid employment rules tend to promote a spiral of failing personal 
trust, defining an employment relationship in terms of specific terms of exchange. 
In other terms, the detailed employment rules applied in this governance structure 
are sufficiently stable to build a secure agreement for cooperation between firms 
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and workers. Institutional governance is not very flexible in that the parties do not 
have a high level of discretion to react swiftly to changes in an uncertain 
environment. Furthermore, institutional governance reduces the positive impact of 
reciprocity. 
 In contrast, through function-centred rules, the employer gives a greater 
degree of discretion to employees. Personal trust and reciprocity are a critical 
element of a management strategy that provides informal employment 
commitments and may be defined as flexible governance structure. Reciprocity 
represents a complementary means of maintaining power of authority, 
compensates the loss of strength of function-centred rules and underpins 
cooperation in the firm (Powell, 1996).  This kind of governance is less robust 
than institutional governance because the function-centred rules on which they 
rely are partially unstable. They need to be enforced by interpersonal trust and 
reciprocity, but this mechanism takes time to build and solidify. When 
understanding and expectations are violated through opportunistic behaviour, 
reciprocity is weakened and it can be very difficult to re-build. 
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Chapter 4 
The Rigid Governance Structure versus  
the Flexible Governance Structure  
in the Institutional Gift-Exchange Game 
	  
	  
1. Introduction 
 
The analysis undertaken here has produced several insights, which are 
outlined below. Firstly, the traditional opportunistic model of economic behaviour 
proposed by Williamson could be replaced by an alternative, more comprehensive 
micro-foundation of action where different social norms are also decisive 
elements. Secondly, if this is true, then it becomes important to have a model of 
an economic agent that focuses on the importance of social preferences such as 
reciprocity. Williamson’s bounded rationality model defines economic agents as 
being selfish, and only takes into account traditional economic incentives. The 
employment rules and reciprocity analysed in this thesis are new, creative, 
relational and institutional governance devices. 
Fehr et al.(1993), in particular, created a version of the gift exchange game, 
the purpose of which is to test the potential role of reciprocity in a multiple one-
shot gift exchange game. In many cases reciprocity may be more appropriate than 
an economic incentive contract, for example in uncertain situations where there is 
low measurability of performance. This is because it aims to reduce the 
discrepancies between organisational goals and employer’s interests through the 
establishment of common values and interests. Reciprocity may maintain mutual 
cooperation by ensuring mutual benefits and can deter employees from acting 
opportunistically.  
Even so, when the opportunities to defect are high, reciprocity may not be 
sufficient to constrain strategic opportunism and must be completed by certain 
institutional arrangements. An analysis of this would suggest the need to develop 
an alternative micro-foundation of organisational behaviour, and to study the 
institutional and relational structure within which the actions take place. This 
chapter goes beyond the gift-exchange game provided by Fehr and others (1993) 
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and shows that the power of reciprocity depends on the details of the institutional 
structure of employment relationships. 
Depending on the institutional situation, there are two distinct governance 
patterns of controlling relationships: the institutional rigid governance and the 
relational flexible governance. The former is characterised by task-centred rules 
and defines the boundaries of jobs in a much more specific way than the latter. 
The relational flexible governance characterised by function-centred rules 
provides a more flexible and discretional model of employment relationship. 
This chapter elaborates the “institutional gift-exchange game”, a version of 
the “gift-exchange game” (Fehr et al, 1993). Its principal innovations are as 
follows: an analysis of new kinds of transaction not hitherto studied by means of 
experiments, and which have given rise to new theoretical insights; the 
completion of real tasks which better simulate the work situation in which the 
transaction rules would apply; and the use of computers, which has enabled the 
experiment to be set up more efficiently. 
The second section analyses the potential of experiments in labour market 
phenomena. To understand how experiments can work in the labour market as 
well as in personal economics, two crucial points need to be made: firstly, that the 
norm of reciprocity that leads to gift exchange is an effective contract 
enforcement device where uncertain conditions exist and, secondly, that 
institutions and the rules of the game shape the effects of reciprocity. One of the 
main advantages of experiments is that they can establish institutions of the game 
in order to examine the power of reciprocity in different normative environments, 
thus enabling ideal conditions for the proper analysis of employment theory 
predictions.  
The third section explores the institutional details of reciprocity and its 
interplay with transaction rules in the institutional gift-exchange game. In doing 
so it also provides research implications. The proper analysis of the efficiency of 
this governance device requires an understanding of how it is combined with 
different informal employment rules. As such this thesis studies the four 
treatments of the “institutional gift-exchange game”: the one-shot flexible 
treatment (with non-repeated interactions and flexible rules) the repeated flexible 
treatment (with repeated interactions and flexible rules); the one-shot rigid 
treatment (with non-repeated interactions and rigid rules) and the repeated rigid 
treatment (with repeated interactions and rigid rules). Generally speaking, the 
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mixture of employment rules and trust mechanisms offers a foundation on which 
employment relationships may be built, and thus ensures that both parties obtain 
some of the key benefits they seek.  
The fourth and the fifth sections show the experimental results of the 
institutional gift-exchange game. To better understand this game and its 
experimental results, the sixth section creates a payoff map. This map is a set of 
possible combinations of the employers’ profits )(π  and the workers’ gains (u) 
that are achieved in each period. It directly provides complete information about 
workplace welfare (the total amount of players’ gains). By tracing the points on 
the map which correspond to the average levels of payoff obtained during the 
course of the iterations, a comparison between the average levels of workplace 
welfare obtained in the different treatments and the levels predicted by game 
theory can be obtained. In addition, by tracing the payoff frontier (i.e. the 
geometric location of the points corresponding to optimal payoffs) the 
performances of the different treatments can be examined. Conclusions will also 
be provided in this final section.  
 
 
2. Some General Considerations about Experiments in Economics 
 
Before testing the research hypotheses and analysing the experimental results 
of the institutional gift-exchange game, it is necessary to make some general 
observations about the importance and relevance of experiments.  
Experimentation is very common in those branches of science where it is 
necessary to analyse causal affirmations. The need to investigate the relationship 
between cause and effect in the behavioural sciences has brought about the 
application of scientific method. Experiments also play an essential role in 
advancing economic models, and will become more important as scholars develop 
increasingly sophisticated research programmes. Economic experiments consist of 
reconstructing artificial situations which simulate real ones, wherein the subjects 
have to make economic decisions. Such situations are under the control of the 
experimenter in the sense that he or she can control the external variables and 
measure the independent and dependent variables.  
In other words, the experimenter can perfectly observe and certify the choices 
made by subjects, and evaluate the consequences of these decisions. Moreover, 
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the situation in which subjects make their decisions can be carefully controlled 
and mixed by the experimenter. As in experimental physics, it is not necessary 
wait for something to happen by chance, rather an experimental situation can be 
established according and the effects observed. Thus different research designs 
should be used, with different treatments being applied to different groups, each 
of which is randomly assigned.  
If groups are assigned randomly, the possibility of systematic error can be 
reduced, thereby allowing inferences regarding their casual relationship to be 
made. In the experiments, the deliberate assignation of selfish players exclusively 
to a treatment causes a systematic error and invalidates the results. Randomisation 
also helps to guarantee independence both within and between treatments’ 
observations. Independence is essential for many experimental analyses, and its 
failure can lead to misleading conclusions. An objective randomisation procedure 
reduces the risk that participants in one treatment might systematically vary from 
participants in other treatments. 
Economic experiments can be analysed using game theory methodology, in 
both descriptive and in predictive terms. When game theory predictions are not 
verified by empirical results, one must review the theory and hypotheses of the 
research, and propose a new behavioural model. Experiments, however, may 
bring with them particular problems. One such problem is whether experimental 
results can be generalised. Herein there are two questions to consider: that the 
selected subjects are representative (population validity) and that laboratory 
experiments are too simple relative to the problems of the outside world 
(environment validity). These problems have been present in the methodological 
debate ever since the first publications on the scope and method of economics, 
remaining unchallenged until the mid 20th century when the first experiments 
were conducted. In the Southern Economic Association of 1991, Charles R. Plott 
argued that « economics is one of the few fortunate sciences to have both the field 
and the laboratory with which to work » (Plott, 1991: 918).  
The first concern of external validity is population validity, that is, the choice 
of experimental subjects. University students are frequently employed as subjects 
since they are available and have relatively low opportunity costs. The problem, 
however, is whether their behaviour is indicative of the behaviour of “real” 
market participants such as employers or employees. To investigate this problem, 
there are many experiments which use the relevant subjects as participants 
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(traders, managers, professional auction bidders, lobbyists). Even though some 
dissimilarities are found, these studies find that the general patterns of behaviour 
frequently correspond remarkably well to the students’. As demonstrated by 
Friedman and Sunder (1994:5), the results of an experiment are externally valid if 
they may be generalised in another field. Experimental results are valid if the 
causal affirmations of experiments are applicable to other circumstances. 
To guarantee the involvement of participants in the experiment (i.e. to ensure 
that they act, as far as possible, in the same way as they would in real life), it is 
important that they have a genuine interest. As such, monetary gifts are generally 
offered, so that by participating in the experiment they can earn as in real life. 
Obviously, this money is earned as a result of the choices they make during the 
experiment and are not normally of a high value (see appendix II). Moreover, 
economic experiments are usually designed to minimise the convenience of lying. 
In economic experiments, the participants have incentives to make an effort to tell 
the truth because they are paid on the basis of the decisions they make. 
With regards to the second issue of oversimplification, it is important to note 
that all economic models are abstract. Thus if one wishes to challenge 
experimental economics, one must also criticise economic modelling. Like 
economic modelling, experiments identify the basics of different environments 
where economic activities take place. In other words, experiments take into 
account the main variables of the problem under examination. In traditional 
economic observations, the observer cannot control all the variables which might 
influence the outcomes of the objects of study. In defence of this, this would not 
be possible, or at least it would be improbable, when the subject of study is 
something like the world economic system, a national or regional economy, or the 
practices of a company. Microeconomic investigations conducted by means of 
experiments are more easily achieved, especially when the subject is human 
behaviour. Experimental economics are sufficient to create a real microeconomic 
system, as defined by Smith in his seminal 1982 paper Microeconomic systems as 
an experimental science, where he defines the microeconomic system through two 
basic concepts: the microeconomic environment and microeconomic institutions. 
The former is defined as “the initial endowments, preferences and costs that 
motivate the exchange.” (Smith, 1994: 113) while the latter is described as:  
 
« the language (messages) of market communication (bids, offers and 
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acceptances), the rules that govern the exchange of information, and the rules 
under which messages become binding contracts. This institution is defined 
by the experimental instructions which describe the messages and procedures 
of the market »   (Smith, 1994: 113).  
 
The experimental performance is thus a function of both the environment and 
institutions that represent the controlled variables of the experiment.  
Experiments allow researchers to verify theories and to test the role of the 
environment and of institutions. Thus it is becoming more common, normal, since 
one of the main results of experimental inquiry is that institutions matter (Smith, 
1991; 1994; 2002; Plott, 1991). More precisely, experiments allow the 
comparison of different normative environments and define empirical regularities 
as a basis for new theories.   
To appreciate the role of the experiments in this thesis it is useful to point out 
the following two main advantages. Williamson’s theory makes assumptions 
about the agents and the institutions as well as the behaviour of the agents to 
derive predictions about the outcome of the system. One of the main assumptions 
is that trust is very low in economic transactions. It is usually assumed that agents 
are rationally bounded and self-interested, that is, they are only interested in their 
own material well-being. In other words, they do not deal with information 
optimally, and have opportunistic expectations about the behaviour of other 
agents. Thus the question as to whether this theory describes and predicts 
economic decisions and behaviour accurately must be asked.  
To decide whether a theory is right or wrong using field data faces a number 
of problems. The predictive power of the theory can be evaluated only if the 
assumptions about the environment and institutions in the model are consistent 
with those of the field settings to which the theory is applied. Data about 
institutions, relationships and all relevant features of the agents are not always 
available. If the predictions of the model seem to fail, we can never be sure 
whether the behavioural assumptions of the theory are flawed, or else whether the 
assumptions about the economic agents and the institutions are not in line with 
those of the field setting. 
One main advantage of experiments is that they may be designed in such a 
way that the experimenters are able to control the relevant variables. They can set 
up the characteristics of the agents and the rules of the interaction in the 
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experiments. This enables experimenters to evaluate the predictions of the theory 
under ideal conditions, a process sometimes known as testing a theory in its own 
domain. Another important advantage is that experiments can provide information 
about the performance of institutions even where theory gives little guidance, 
since some institutional settings are too complex to be solved theoretically. 
Instead, experiments can examine the performance of different institutions 
because the ceteris paribus clause can be honoured. This is extremely helpful in 
order to draw valid conclusions about comparisons and to examine comparative 
predictions. The experimenter can design the normative environments and obtain 
important information about the impact of each single institution.  
We can therefore conclude by proposing that economic experiments are an 
important alternative instrument in the field. They improve the depth of the 
research and make a contribution that could not be obtained from other sources. 
At the same time it must be acknowledged that experiments, like any method, 
have their limits. Whilst experiments are no panacea, they are a valuable 
additional source of information.  
 
3. The Institutional Gift-Exchange Game 
 
In the one-shot gift-exchange game, the standard prediction of the minimum 
effort level and of the lowest wage offer is not empirically confirmed.  The results 
of one-shot experiments show that, contrary to the selfishness prediction, workers 
choose effort levels that increase the offered wage payment (Fehr et al. 1993; 
1997). Players seem to understand that standard equilibrium payoffs may be 
dominated by more cooperative play. Furthermore, the effects of repeated games 
may contribute to increasing effort levels relative to the inefficient reference 
outcome. Experiments by Falk and Gächter (2002) show that average effort levels 
are significantly higher in the RG treatment than in the OS treatment. Reputation 
and reciprocity are complementary enforcement devices. Given the empirical 
importance of reciprocity in these baseline treatments, this thesis investigates the 
occurrence of reciprocity in different institutional environments, and asks two 
specific questions: can the findings about reciprocity in the baseline treatment be 
replicated in flexible or rigid transactions, and does reciprocity in the repeated 
game depend on flexible or rigid transactions?  
The “institutional gift-exchange game” goes beyond the previous version of 
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the so-called “gift-exchange game” introduced by Fehr et al, offering the 
following innovations: the introduction of new transactions which take into 
account the various norms regulating labour relations; the completion of real 
tasks; the use of the computer by players during the course of the experiment (see 
appendix II). The software used to carry out the experiment allows players to 
rapidly perform the calculations necessary to make decisions, whereas in the 
experiments of Fehr and Gächter these were carried out on paper (so-called paper-
based economic experiments). Workers do not limit themselves merely to 
choosing a level of responsibility: they must also carry out actual personal tasks. 
The contract proposed to the employees requires the researching of vocabulary 
from three lists made available to them (a list of telephone numbers, a glossary of 
Japanese vocabulary and a list of jargon and acronyms). The software monitors 
the execution of the tasks, with every word searched for needing to be keyed into 
the computer. The number of iterations of each section of the experimental 
“institutional gift-exchange game” is six, fewer than that in the experiments of 
Falk and Gächter (2002). The reason for this is that subjects require more time to 
accomplish actual tasks.  
In the “institutional gift-exchange game” various institutional working 
environments are simulated, characterised by either rigid or flexible rules, which 
are applied both to the one-shot and the repeated elements (where interactions are 
always repeated with the same person). Flexible rules (function-centred rules) 
permit a certain level of discretion in carrying out the real tasks and fix the 
minimum effort required to accept the contract at a low level. Rigid rules (task-
centred rules), on the other hand, set up more demanding real tasks and fix the 
minimum effort required to accept the contract at a high level.  
To be more specific, the combination of the one-shot game / repeated game 
and the flexible norms / rigid norms permits the following treatments: 
- The one-shot flexible transaction (OSF), characterised by non-repeated 
iterations and a flexible institutional culture. 
- The repeated flexible transaction (RF), characterised by repeated iterations 
and a flexible institutional culture. 
- The one-shot rigid transaction (OSR), characterised by non-repeated 
iterations and a rigid institutional culture. 
- The repeated rigid transaction (RR), characterised by repeated iterations 
and a rigid institutional culture. 
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The structure of the game played in the experiments is a version of the “gift-
exchange game” (Fehr et al., 1993). This is also a two-player, sequential move 
game. In the first stage, the employer offers its employee a salary w. In the second 
stage, the employee can either accept or reject the offer. In case of rejection both 
parties gain nothing. If the employee accepts the offer, he or she must decide on 
an “effort level” e related to a “effort cost” c(e). The second stage is completed 
after the employer has been informed about the employee’s effort choice. At the 
beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to their roles as 
“employers” and “workers”, keeping their role throughout the experiment. There 
were an identical number of workers and firms. After the subjects’ roles were 
determined, workers and firms were randomly assigned to the four different 
transactions (the One-shot flexible transaction, the Repeated flexible transaction, 
the One-shot rigid transaction and the Repeated rigid transaction). The 
experiments were not performed using hard copy, rather each player had a 
computer containing the institutional gift-exchange game software. Procedure and 
payoff functions were explained in the instructions provided by the software. 
Employers made their wage offers by inserting them privately into their computer 
(see software instructions). The software then recorded and transmitted this 
information to the workers. Only the worker matched with a particular employer 
was informed about his/her employer’s wage offer. Following this, the workers 
made their effort level choices. In these experiments, participants not only chose 
the level of effort, they also actually carried out the tasks assigned by the 
employers. These are experiments with real effort (or tasks). The software 
checked the executions of tasks assigned. For each right number, word or key 
meaning completed by the workers, the software attributed a level of effort of 
10%. Specifically, the feasible effort levels and costs of effort in the experiment 
were as depicted in table 4.1: 
Table 4.1 Levels of effort and costs 
Phone 
Numbers 
Words 
Meanings 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
 
8 
 
 
9 
 
 
10 
 
Effort 
Level 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
Cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
The software subsequently transmitted information about the employee’s 
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performance to the employer. In total there were six sections, with each one-shot 
negotiation involving a sequence of six one-shot games and ensuring that a 
particular pair of subjects interacts only once. Conversely, in the repeated 
transactions, each pair was informed that they would play six repeated versions of 
the same game. The players were informed that their identity would not be 
revealed. 
In the one-shot game employers and workers were matched with a different 
partner for each iteration. It is necessary to have a number of pairs equal to or 
greater than the number of iterations. Since six iterations are carried out, at least 
six pairs are required; in other words twelve people are needed to complete a 
single one-shot experimental session. The workers used the same seat, and thus 
the same computer for each iteration, whilst the employers rotated for each turn. 
Nobody was informed of the method of rotation but obviously they did know that 
they were meeting a different employer (if a worker) or a different worker (in the 
case of employers) each time. At the start of each turn the workers sat in the 
position indicated by the position cards they were given. As a result of the rotation 
indicated the employers found themselves in a different position for each turn. 
Since the computers used in the experiment were not connected to a network, the 
choices of effort-level made by the workers, sitting in the same seat for the entire 
simulation, were not communicated across the board to all the employers, but to 
the same experimenters. The employers used the programme interface to calculate 
the profits of the previous iteration and formulate their offer for the next one. 
In flexible transactions, an employer’s payoff function in terms of 
experimental money π, is given by  
 
π = (v –w) e 
 
 where v represents an exogenously given redemption value, that is the 
maximum amount of money an employer may offer to employee. An employer’s 
redemption value was v = 120. However, the minimum wage offer, w = 20, is 
equal to the worker’s opportunity cost for being in the job. As such, the wage 
offer had to be between 20 and 120 (20 ≤ w ≤   120). A worker payoff function is 
simply the difference between the accepted wage, w, and the effort cost c(e) 
minus some fixed cost of 20:  
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U = w – c(e) – 20.  
 
The minimum enforceable level of effort is 0.1. 
In flexible transactions, the employee has a considerable degree of discretion 
over tasks assigned, being able to freely choose the kind of tasks to perform. What 
mattered was the number of words, numbers or meanings entered. 
In rigid transactions, the employer’s payoff function is the same as in flexible 
transactions, namely  
 
π = (v –w) e 
 
However, the wage offer had to be between 22 and 120 (22 ≤ w ≤ 120). In 
rigid transactions, the minimum wage offer is 22 because of the minimum 
enforceable level of effort is 0.3. Furthermore, the fixed cost is 22. In this way, the 
rules of game of rigid transactions are perceived by employees as being more 
severe than those of flexible transactions. A worker’s utility function is  
 
U = w – c(e) –22.  
 
In the transactions characterised by task-centred rules, employees must 
accomplish the task assigned in accordance with the detailed list provided by the 
software. What mattered was not only the amount of tasks accomplished but also 
the order and the types of tasks specified by the software. 
The main differences between the different transactions are illustrated in table 
4.2:  
 
Table 4.2 Different transactions 
Transaction Interactions between parties 
Rules of the 
game Minimum/Maximum effort Minimum/Maximum wage 
OSF Non-repeated 
 
Function-
centred 
10% 100% 20 120 
OSR Non-repeated 
 
Task-centred 
 
30% 100% 22 120 
RF Repeated 
 
Function-
centred 
10% 100% 20 120 
RR Repeated 
 
Task-centred 
 
30% 100% 22 120 
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The players were given printed cards with their reference code and the place 
they were required to sit for each turn. Each place, equipped with a computer, was 
labelled with a unique identifying number. On their cards the players noted their 
choices of salary and effort level, as well as their own earnings and those of their 
partner for each turn. This allowed them to retain information from previous 
interactions and thus make their decisions with the benefit of the information 
accumulated. The impact of mistaken recollection was therefore eliminated, 
meaning that the players could act in a more realistic way, referring back to the 
outcomes of previous interactions.  
 
 
4. Experimental Results 
 
Ninety-six subjects participated in the experiments, twenty-four for each of 
the four treatments. The subjects were students (not in economics) recruited from 
public lectures at various education institutions in Sicily, Italy. None of them had 
ever participated in an experiment. The experiments lasted between four and six 
hours. The general experimental results of the four treatments are shown in the 
table of appendix I, while table 4.3 below shows the summary of average value 
during the four treatments:  
 
Table 4.3 Summary of average values during the treatments 
 w  e  π  
 
σ (π ) 
 
u  u+π  
One-shot flexible 35,95 0,18 14,40 
 
11.32 
 
14,60 29,00 
One-shot rigid 46,18 0,26 18,52 
 
9.14 20,85 39,37 
Repeated flexible 46,21 0,35 23,42 
 
14.42 21,33 44,75 
Repeated rigid 38,80 0,25 20,14 
 
11.15 14,31 34,45 
 
The average salaries, effort levels and profits are shown, as well as workplace 
welfare ( u+π ), namely the average sum of the employer’s profit and worker’s 
utility which can be used as a simple index of the performance of the employment 
relationship. Furthermore, the tobit regression results and the general 
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experimental results of the four treatments are shown in the tables 4.4: 
 
Table 4.4 Tobit  
 
Variable osf Osr Rf rr 
Model     
W 0.00399014** 0.00445954 0.01053265*** 0.0096865 
Constant 0.3335401 0.09786463 -0.14310535 0.26943146*** 
Sigma     
Constant 0.13105137 0.05414654*** 0.18623569 0.05005373** 
 
Similar to Falk and Gächter (2002), this thesis uses the tobit model because it 
estimates a linear regression model for a left-censored dependent variable (effort) 
where dependent variable is censored from below (the minimum enforceable 
levels of effort is 0.1 in the flexible treatments and 0.3 in rigid treatments). The 
wage effect on effort level is not statistically significant in both the OSR and the 
RR treatments. Reciprocity is not relevant in rigid environments. Instead, wages 
positively affect the effort levels in the OSF and the RF treatments. Wage 
coefficients in both the OSF and RF treatments are positive and highly statistically 
significant (p<.001). The positive impact of reciprocity is stronger in flexible 
transactions than in rigid transactions. Furthermore, the tobit regression results 
reported in table 3.2 suggest that repeated flexible interaction strengthens 
reciprocity. More precisely, the impact of wage on effort (the regression 
coefficient is 0.0105) is stronger in the RF treatment than in the OSF-treatment 
(the regression coefficient is 0.0040). In addition, workers' behaviour is more 
cooperative in the RF treatment. In short, the positive impact of reciprocity is 
stronger in repeated transactions than in one-shot transactions. Indeed, figure 4.1 
shows the evolution of average wages and effort levels in the OSF treatment.  
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Fig. 4.1 Average wage (w       ) and effort levels (e      ) in the OSF treatment   
	  
The immediate conclusion here is that both average wages and effort levels 
clearly exceed the levels predicted under opportunistic behaviour, i.e., compared 
to the reference outcome (w* = 21 and e*= 0.1) there is a strong and systematic 
deviation. Firms pay w>w* and workers reciprocate by providing e>e*. 
Behaviour based on reciprocity significantly improves their payoffs compared to 
the levels predicted under opportunistic behaviour.  
Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of average wages and effort levels in the one-
shot rigid (OSR) treatment.  
Fig. 4.2 Average wage (w      ) and effort levels (e      ) in the OSR treatment       
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In the OSR treatment, average wages exceed the levels predicted under 
opportunistic behaviour; i.e., compared to the reference outcome (w* = 23) there 
is a strong and systematic deviation. Rather, effort levels are below the predicted 
level (e*= 0.3). In the OSR game reciprocity is incapable of raising effort levels 
above the minimum enforceable levels. However the power of the rigid system 
may enforce labour contracts and sustain an average effort level (0.26) higher than 
the OSF average effort level (0,18). Although the average effort level is below the 
predicted level in the OSR treatment, the robustness of task-centred rules 
increases their efficiency relative to the OSF treatment. In one-shot transactions, 
workplace welfare is higher in the rigid system than in the flexible system (39,37 
OSR > 29 OSF).  More precisely, the employer’s average utility in the OSR 
treatment (20.85) is higher than the average utility in the OSF treatment (14.60); 
and the actual average period profits in the OSR treatment (18.52) is higher than 
the average profit in the OSF treatment ( 14,40).  Furthermore, task-centred rules 
reduce risk: the lowest standard deviation is in the OSR treatment [σ (π ) = 9.14]. 
In summary, rigid governance characterised by task-centred rules and low 
reciprocity is more suited to one-shot transactions. 
Figure 4.3 shows the evolution of average wages and effort levels in the repeated 
flexible (RF) treatment. 
Fig. 4.3 Average wage (w       ) and effort levels (e      ) in the RF treatment   
 
 
Both average wages and effort levels exceed the sub-game perfect levels 
predicted through opportunistic behaviour in the repeated game treatment. This 
20,00 
25,00 
30,00 
35,00 
40,00 
45,00 
50,00 
55,00 
60,00 
65,00 
70,00 
0,00 
0,05 
0,10 
0,15 
0,20 
0,25 
0,30 
0,35 
0,40 
0,45 
0,50 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
e 
w 
90 
 
deviation is persistent across all periods. These data show the importance of 
reciprocity in both a flexible environment and in a repeated game. The workers’ 
behaviour, however, is more cooperative in the repeated game treatment, which 
shows both the highest average wage (46.21) and the highest effort level (0.35). In 
order to achieve efficient cooperation, the shared history of employer and 
employee and the effect on reputation are important. Overall, the workplace 
welfare level is the best of all treatments (44.75). In other criteria, the highest 
employee’s utility (21.33) and the highest employer’s profit (23.42) are in the RF 
treatment. Flexible governance characterised by function-centred rules and a high 
level of reciprocity is therefore better suited to the repeated game. However, the 
highest standard deviation is also in the RF (14.42). Generally, the standard 
deviation is higher in flexible treatments than in rigid treatments (11.32 OSF> 
9.14 OSR and 14.42 RF > 11.15 RR), meaning that rigid treatments are less risky 
for employers. 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of average wages and effort levels in the 
repeated rigid (RR) treatment.  
 Fig. 4.4 Average wage (w       ) and effort levels (e       ) in the RR treatment 
 
As in the OSR treatment, average wages exceed the levels predicted under 
opportunistic behaviour, but average effort levels are under the predicted levels. 
Reciprocity and reputation mechanisms are unable to raise the effort levels above 
the minimum enforceable levels (0.25 < 0.3). RR treatment is less efficient than 
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than the average profit in the RF treatment (20,14 < 23.42). However, the standard 
deviation in the RR treatment is lower than the standard deviation in the RF 
treatment (11.15 < 14.42).  
Moreover, if table A5 in appendix I (data from the repeated-flexible treatment) 
and table A6 (data from the repeated-rigid treatment) are both examined, the 
significance of the last iteration and the reputational effects can be seen. Table A5 
reveals the average salary in the sixth iteration is the lowest (41.90) of all the 
iterations, meaning that there are low effort level expectations. Employers have 
realised that was an increased probability of a lower effort level while workers 
may not have any further interest in reciprocation or building a cooperative 
relationship as it would have no future. The average effort level was also at the 
lowest of all the iterations (0.20). Consequently, the average earnings of both 
parties also reached the lowest levels of all iterations (on the sixth iteration the 
employers earned 12.86 and the workers 19.07, when the average values of the 
first five iterations were 23.53 and 21.79 respectively). It can therefore be 
understood that the last iteration drastically reduced the performance and caused 
the average earnings values to plummet. In this sense, the lack of trust during the 
last iteration brought about inferior performances.  
Similarly, table A6 also shows that the lowest average salary was also 
achieved in the last iteration, where it reached a value of 35.87. This average was 
lower than that of the repeated / flexible treatment, namely 41.90. The effort level 
in the sixth iteration was also at a very low level (0.23), although this time it was 
not the lowest (0.22), although it was lower than the average of the previous five 
iterations (0.26). The average earnings in the last iteration turned out to be 18.82 
for employers and 13.02 for workers, both of which lower than the average 
earnings in the first five iterations, which were 20.48 and 14.58 respectively.  
In one-shot treatments, salaries do not reach their lowest levels in the final 
iteration (see table A1 A2 A3 and A4 in appendix I), thus demonstrating the 
profound difference between repeated and one-shot games.  
 
5. Analysis of the Experimental Results in the Payoff Map of the 
Institutional Gift-Exchange Game 
 
The experimental data show that reciprocity is stronger in flexible treatments than 
in their rigid equivalents. Furthermore, the positive effects of reciprocity are 
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stronger in repeated rather than one-shot transactions. With repeated iterations, 
flexible governance is more efficient than rigid governance, although the former is 
riskier because if trust fails negative effects are implied. In order to better 
understand the game and its experimental results, this thesis presents a payoff 
map. This is a set of possible combinations of the employer’s profits )(π  and the 
worker’s utilities (u) that are achieved in each period. The map allocates the 
average levels of workplace welfare (the total amount of players’ gains) in the 
different treatments and directly provides complete information about their 
efficiency. In this way, a comparison between the points corresponding to the 
average levels of workplace welfare obtained in the different treatments and the 
levels predicted under opportunistic behaviour can be made immediately. 
Furthermore, by tracing the payoff frontier on the map, (i.e. the geometric location 
of points which correspond to optimal payoffs), the performances of each 
treatment can be checked. In particular, the map shows the isoeffort lines and the 
isowage curves. The set of isoeffort lines describe all combination of players’ 
possible gains among which the effort levels ( e ) are identical. Isoeffort lines 
slope downward to the right (see the isoeffort line in the figure 4.5).  
 
Figure 4.5  - Isoeffort line 
 
 
 
The equation of the isoeffort line is explained in appendix III. The coordinates 
of the isoeffort lines related to the ten levels of effort are shown in table 4.5 
below.  
u m in = -c (e )- 0
(u m ax ; p m in )
u
um ax=100-c(e)-
(u m in ; πm ax ) π m ax= 100e-
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Table 4.5 The coordinates of isoeffort lines 
 
 
 
The achievable payoffs coincide with the internal points of the isoeffort lines. 
These ten lines can be illustrated in a graph, from an initial version of payoff map 
can be obtained. This may be called the isoeffort map (see figure 4.6).  
e  )(min eu
 
)(max eπ        )(max eu  
 
)(min eπ
 
0.1 0 10 100 0 
0.2 -1 20 99 0 
0.3 -2 30 98 0 
0.4 -4 40 96 0 
0.5 -6 50 94 0 
0.6 -8 60 92 0 
0.7 -10 70 90 0 
0.8 -12 80 88 0 
0.9 -15 90 85 0 
1 -18 
10
0 
82 0 
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Figure 4.6 -  Isoeffort map 
 
-  
 
 
The uppermost line in figure 6.6 is obtained by the intersection of ten isoeffort 
lines. This line may be called the payoff possibilities frontier, and represents the 
set of efficient points. Each point is a pair of efficient payoffs. The isoeffort (or 
payoff) map is indicated by M, the frontier by F, a general point on the frontier by 
FP , the set of points that are not on the frontier by 'M  and a general point of 'M
by 'MP  then 
 
 ', '' MPFPPP MFMF ∈∈∀        with 'MFM ∪=  
 
The superior pareto relation between two general points 1P  e 2P  is indicated 
by  , meaning: 
 
2121222111 );();( ππππ >>⇔ euuuPuP  . 
 
On the extreme left of the isoeffort lines, the worker’s gains are lowest and 
the employers’ highest. At this point the wage is at its minimum (20). In contrast, 
on the extreme right, the wage is at its maximum (120), meaning the workers’ 
gains are highest and the employer’s gains lowest. By moving from the extreme 
left to the extreme right, the pairs of payoffs are associated with the higher wage 
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level. In the middle of the isoeffort lines the wage is 70. 
Appendix III demonstrates the presence of a geometric property which is 
interesting for analysing the entire payoff map and for creating the set of isowage 
curves. This set describes all combinations of players’ gains among which the 
wage level (w ) is constant.  By using a good adaptation index, the isosalary curve 
can be described as a branch of a parabola with the concave side facing down. If 
the isoeffort curves and certain “reference” isosalary curves are plotted on the 
same graph, a complete payoff map, as illustrated in figure 4.7, is created.  
 
Figure 4.7 - Payoff map 
 
 
A bisector to the first quadrant, which shall denominate the bisector of equal 
payoffs, has been added. In geometric terms this refers to the points 
corresponding to equal payoffs between employer and worker, that is, π=u .The 
intersection between the frontier and the bisector, indicated in the graph by E, 
represents the maximum workplace welfare achievable with equal payoffs for the 
employer and the employee. Appendix III demonstrates E  has coordinates 
(π=41; u=41) and it corresponds to the choices 79=w  and 1max == ee .  
The map is an important “topographic” instrument to examine experimental 
data. The map allows us to directly identify the payoffs of the treatments. More 
precisely, it shows whether the payoffs are positive or negative; the distance from 
the levels predicted under opportunistic behaviour; the distance from the efficient 
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payoff frontier; and finally the distance from the bisector of the equal payoffs. 
Furthermore, the sequences and the evolution of the game can be read from the 
map. 
In this work, the payoff map is used to suggest the differences between the 
gift-exchange game with flexible rules and the gift-exchange game with rigid 
rules. This distinction is an analysis of two different types of treatment used 
during the course of the economic experiments described in this research. In the 
experiments with flexible rules, the wage range is [20, 120] and the minimum 
enforceable effort level is 0.1. In the experiments with rigid rules, the wage range 
is [22, 120] and the minimum enforceable effort level is 0.3. These differences 
create two different payoff maps. The payoff map in the rigid environment is a 
subset of the payoff map in the flexible environment. All the possible payoffs of 
the rigid treatments are on the right of the isowage line with 22=w  and above 
the isoeffort line with 3.0=e (see the figure 4.8).  
Figure 4.8 Rigid and flexible areas in the payoff map 
100
πw=20 w=22
u
E
100e=1
0-18
e=0.3
e=0.1
Payoff possibilities
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There is a significant overlap of possible payoffs between area R (area of 
possible payoffs in the rigid environment) and area F (area of possible payoffs in 
the flexible environment). Only some F payoffs that are less efficient are outside 
area R. Furthermore, the payoff frontier is roughly common to both areas, with 
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only a very small and insignificant part of the payoff frontier not falling into area 
F. This part falls into an area where the worker receives a very low wage and his 
effort is very high. However, in the experimental results, players never play in 
such a zone, and as such can be ignored.  
Although the experimental core area is potentially accessible in both 
treatments, F results are considerably different from R results for both relational 
and institutional reasons. The expected results under opportunistic behaviour and 
experimental results of previous chapter are shown in the complete payoff map 
(see figure 4.9) 
WF and WR are the points corresponding to the levels of workplace welfare 
predicted under opportunistic behaviour.  More precisely, in the flexible area of 
possible payoffs, WF is the point corresponding to the levels of effort (e*=0.1) 
and salary (w*=21). In the rigid area of possible payoffs, WR is the point 
corresponding to the levels of effort (e*=0.3) and salary (w*=23). Both levels 
predicted are very far from the payoff possibilities frontier. 
Figure 4.9 Experimental results in the payoff map 
 
Trust based on reciprocity emerges in working relationships characterised 
by a flexible institutional environment.  
OSF is the point corresponding to the average level of workplace welfare 
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(29) in the one-shot flexible treatment. It has coordinates (π=14.4; u=14.60) 
and is the point corresponding to the average levels of effort (e=0.18) and wage 
(w=35.96). It is closer to the payoff possibilities frontier than the WF , which is 
the workplace welfare expected under opportunistic behaviour. 
RF is the point corresponding to the average level of workplace welfare 
(44.75) in the repeated flexible treatment. It has coordinates (π=23.42; 
u=21.33) and is the point corresponding to the average levels of effort (e=0.35) 
and wage (w=46.21). It is the point closest to the payoff possibilities frontier. 
In other words, the treatment that produced the best results in terms of 
workplace welfare was the repeated flexible form. Flexibility and repeated 
iterations support high salaries and effort levels and thus better performances. 
The greater variability and therefore the greater risk occurs in the repeated 
flexible culture – the very one which produced the best performances. 
Repeated iterations and a flexible environment encourage reciprocity and 
ensure superior performances. This is all the more true when the parties know 
that their relationship will be ongoing. However, the average values were also 
distant from the point E of efficient equity. Furthermore, flexible results are 
very close to the bisector of equal payoffs. The average differences between 
the parties’ earnings (π-u) are (-0.20) in the OSF treatment and (2.09) in the RF 
treatment. The most distant is the RR that is the point corresponding to the 
average level of workplace welfare (34.45) in the repeated rigid treatment. It 
has coordinates (π=20.14; u=14.31) and is the point corresponding to the 
average levels of effort (e=20.14) and wage (w=38.80). The average 
differences between employers’ average profit and workers’ average utility (π-
u) is 5,82 in the RR. It can be seen that in these repeated treatments the 
differences were more marked and to the advantage of the employers.  
As such, in the repeated institutional environments it seems that the worker 
felt encouraged to send out signals which showed that, to a certain extent, he or 
she would agree to sacrifice earnings and slightly favour the employer, in order 
to nudge their salary up to higher levels in later transactions.  
OSR, on the other hand, is the point which corresponds to the average level 
of workplace welfare (39.37) in the one shot rigid treatment. It has coordinates 
(π=18.52; u=20.85) and is the point corresponding to the average levels of 
effort (e=0.26) and wage (w=46.18). The average differences between 
employers’ average profit and workers’ average utility (π-u) is -2.33 in the 
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OSR. In the one-shot treatments, these differences were more limited and 
almost always benefit workers significantly.  
In summary, rigidity has positive effects in the one-shot environment and 
negative ones in the repeated environment. Thus we conclude by emphasising 
the most important outcome of this research, which is that while rigid 
governance based on task-centred rules and low reciprocity is better suited to 
one-shot transactions, flexible governance based on function-centred rules and 
a high level of reciprocity is better suited to repeated transactions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
As mentioned above, previous experiments have shown that people are often 
socially motivated. These behavioural patterns are robust with respect to the data 
of the flexible treatments of the “institutional gift-exchange Game”. Reciprocity 
can be a very powerful contract enforcement device. Furthermore, based on 
previous considerations, it is possible to derive two possible reasons why this 
thesis uses experiments: they may be designed in such a way that we are able to 
test Williamson’s assumption of opportunism and his predictions, and they allow 
us to examine the effect of different institutional environments. Specifically, the 
“gift-exchange game” has been replicated several times in different versions 
(one-shot game and repeated game) and under different employment rules 
(function-centred rules and task-centred rules). On the basis of the different 
combinations of employment rules and game types, four distinct treatments can 
be identified: one-shot and repeated games in the rigid environment and one-shot 
and repeated games in the flexible environment.  
The rigid environment relies on task-centred rules that identify job tasks 
clearly, simply and directly. It offers a stable framework for employers to 
improve their efficiency in one-shot interactions. In this sense, the rigid system is 
robust and given conditions of low interpersonal trust may reduce risk. In the 
flexible system, the employer gives a greater degree of discretion to employees. 
Function-centred rules are more flexible but less robust than task-centred rules, 
and rely heavily on high-trust relationships and positive reciprocity. Furthermore, 
reciprocity takes considerable time (repeated game) and depends on the 
discretion through which agents make their decisions. Discretion could be one of 
the crucial conditions of a stable cooperative employment relationship. Having 
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the opportunity to co-determine the tasks, workers take on their employer’s goals 
and adopt them as their own. Discretion promotes compromise between employer 
and employees and creates a situation which could turn out better for both 
parties. The situation being analysed is far from being one where employer and 
employee can sit together at the same table and specify exactly the payoff 
contract they desire.  
The lesson to be learned from the experimental results is that not even 
flexible governance can ensure efficient payoffs (in particular in one-shot 
transactions). However, it is also possible during the course of a repeated game 
that the parties may have a greater chance to get to know each other, learn how to 
manage their relationships and send each other signals.  
The experimental data from the repeated flexible game confirms this 
hypothesis, in that the parties achieved superior performances. Discretion and 
repeated iterations foster reciprocity but do not guarantee stability. Flexible 
treatments are riskier than the rigid system. The flexible system does not offer a 
safety net. If spontaneous cooperation based on positive reciprocity stops 
working, the costs of failed cooperation in this kind of system are more serious 
than under the rigid system. Rigid governance reduces reciprocity and sacrifices 
high efficiency in production so as to provide stability in repeated employment 
interactions. This system restrains exploitation by workers, provides impersonal 
forms of power and permits stable cooperation in employment relationships. 
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Conclusions 
 
Conventional reasoning in economics is typically based on the idea that 
agents have “materialistic” preferences, i.e. their action is exclusively motivated 
by their material self-interest. This “material self-interest” hypothesis, however, 
has been systematically rejected by experimental evidence. Indeed, experimental 
research has shown that individuals often have “social preferences”. Participants 
in experiments care not only about their own material benefits, but also about 
other individuals’ material payoffs. Individual’s behaviour is also driven by 
altruistic preferences and preferences for equality. (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; 
Andreoni and Miller 2002). 
Furthermore, experiments demonstrate that human beings are affected not 
only by selfish motives but also by the norms of reciprocity (Fehr et al., 1993; 
1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Falk and Gächter, 2002; 
Croson 1996; Guth, Klose, Konigstein and Schwalbach, 1998; Keser and van 
Winden, 2000). Some authors argue that reciprocity is a significant contract 
enforcement device in the presence of incomplete labour contracts (Akerlof, 1982; 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). In particular, Fehr et al. (1993) show a version of the 
gift exchange game that they apply to analyse the possible role of reciprocity in 
employment contracts. In their experiments, workers are frequently much nicer 
and more cooperative in response to employer’s friendly actions than is generally 
predicted by transaction cost economics. 	  
Thus, economic agents may deviate from purely self-interested behaviour in 
a reciprocal manner. They make repayments for gifts or take revenge, even in 
interactions with complete strangers, even if this is costly and yields neither 
present nor future material rewards. Our notion of reciprocity is, thus, very 
different from friendly or hostile responses in repeated interactions that are 
motivated solely by future material gains. Reciprocity means that individuals are 
willing to reply positively to kind behaviour and to respond negatively to hostile 
behaviour, even though rewards or punishment may reduce their material payoff.	  
It is very important to build up personal contacts and reciprocal obligations. 
Reciprocity may produce outcomes that have important implications for the way 
economic behaviour changes and it represents a complementary instrument for 
maintaining cooperation. The threat of sanctions increases the chances of 
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cooperation between people who have mutual friends. The shame deriving from 
cheating a long-standing friend may be significant even when it is not discovered 
if the friend becomes aware of it, the shame will only increase.  
Trusting the other party, investing in reciprocity or accomplishing the 
informal agreement does not necessarily lead to the increased vulnerability of the 
agent in cases of opportunistic actions by their partner (who may feel less closely 
monitored given the increased level of trust placed in them by their counterpart). 
The explanation for this is that when a person’s positive expectations are not 
shared, the result can be behaviour more extreme than that resulting from the tit-
for-tat policy analysed in the model. Reciprocity has a complementary function 
with respect to economic incentives. Economic agents who feel betrayed, 
swindled or offended may undertake punitive actions even when these do not 
benefit them economically. For this reason it is likely that the other party will be 
more reluctant to diverge from the agreement, even if driven by opportunistic 
motives, given the other party’s threat to return the damage done, regardless of the 
costs and opportunities deriving from that. Furthermore, the other party is affected 
by moral concerns, such as integrity, commitment, “doing the right thing”, honour 
and self-image. The reciprocal relationship is seen as too special to be driven only 
by material rewards. 	  If people receive too much benefit, they are not inclined to 
return it, but rather can be influenced by feelings of uneasiness or even guilt.	  
To understand phenomena such as trust and reciprocity, it is therefore 
important to accept the relevance of morality. Parties give a non-instrumental 
significance to the reciprocal relationship. Furthermore, they give it a value in 
itself and perceive costs, benefits and equivalence from a long-run perspective. A 
kind of equilibrium is always present, albeit one which is more "It will all work 
out" than one where there is a sense of determined risk (O’Connel, 1984).	  
In addition, social motivation and moral claims are not explained in terms of 
utility function; rather, they have developed over the course of more than million 
years (Darwin, 1871) and are emotionally empowered (Mackie 1977, Joyce 
2006). Their evolution does not rely only on norms, but they are also social 
phenomena consisting of inescapable rules created by emotion. For Hodgson 
(2012), the moral nature of human beings is, therefore, a social phenomenon that 
relies both on social conditions and on biological development. People are a social 
species, with emotional, linguistic, and deliberative strengths. The emotional fuel 
of morality and parts of our rule-structure go back to our ape-like predecessors 
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(De Waal 1996, 2006). While some scholars maintain that cultures gives a 
sufficient explanation of social motives and cooperation, other researchers, argue 
that this kind of cultural explanation is insufficient since it fails to explain the 
origins of social norms. Hodgson (2012) supposes that biology may confirm the 
cultural explanation because it helps us to understand how culture develops and 
what pre-cultural disposition provided it with the first form. 
Social motives are partly inherited and have partly evolved according to 
cultural conditions. They are the result of a long evolutionary phase and the 
enculturation of humans. Inclusive fitness, kin altruism and genetic group 
selection are significant factors which explain the evolutionary origins of 
prosociality. Human culture is also crucial for the evolution of social preferences. 
Thus, to properly understand prosociality, both genetic and cultural mechanisms 
are required. A number of experiments (for example see Bowles 1998, 2004, Field 
2001 and Fehr and Fischbacher 2002) have been made with the very purpose of 
finding an explanation for prosociality in big groups. "Social preferences" or 
"other-regarding preferences" may not be only related to family and relatives and 
other small groups, but may be explained in terms of biological inheritance (Field 
2001, 2007, 2008). Altruistic and cooperative behaviour has a cultural 
embeddedness, but it also has a biological basis and the phenomenon involved is 
genetic group selection (cfr. Bowles, S. and Gintis, H., 2005). 
The experimental evidence presented in this thesis indicates that 
Williamson’s position on trust is not, in many cases, confirmed. Organisations are 
made up not only of self-interested types but also of reciprocal types, interacting 
with each other. The experimental evidence proves that there are important 
conditions in which the economic theory based only on opportunism is refuted. 
While the self-interest model predicts no cooperation at all, in the gift-exchange 
game, reciprocity matters. Experimental results show reciprocity can ensure more 
efficient payoffs. The existence of reciprocal types may actually give rise to 
organisations with incomplete contracts, so that reciprocity helps to generate those 
conditions under which it can flourish. Furthermore, this thesis goes beyond the 
gift-exchange game developed by Fehr and other economists (Fehr et al., 1993; 
Falk and Gächter, 2002) and demonstrates that the power of reciprocity depends 
on the details of the normative environment of employment relationships. 
Institutional changes can modify the habits of thought and behaviour and create 
individual perceptions, preferences and intentions.	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In the institutional gift-exchange game, I derive two distinct clusters of job 
characteristics based on two fundamentally distinct governance structures: the 
rigid governance structure and the flexible governance structure. More precisely, 
the “institutional gift-exchange game” has been replicated several times in 
different versions. The four treatments of the institutional gift-exchange game are: 
the one-shot flexible treatment (one-shot interactions and flexible rules); the 
repeated flexible treatment (with repeated interactions and flexible rules); the one-
shot rigid treatment (with one-shot interactions and rigid rules) and the repeated 
rigid treatment (with repeated interactions and rigid rules). On the basis of the 
different combinations of the two kinds of employment rules, and one-shot and 
repeated game, the institutional gift-exchange game helps to understand the 
interplay between relational mechanisms and normative arrangements in 
employment relationship theory. The combination of transaction rules and 
reciprocity mechanisms provides a foundation for employment cooperation, and 
ensures that both parties achieve some of the key benefits they seek. 
Under the rigid governance structure, employers offer wages to workers in 
an institutional environment characterised by limited discretion and a high 
minimum effort level (0.3). Under the flexible governance structure, employers 
offer wages in an institutional environment characterised by high discretion and 
low minimum effort level (0.1).  In the flexible governance structure, employers 
pay high wages that grant a high share of the surplus; in doing so they run a 
significant risk, since a considerable amount of trust on the part of the employer is 
required. If the employee is not trustworthy, the employer incurs a significant 
loss, which thereby raises questions of viability regarding the flexible governance 
structure. 
In the institutional gift-exchange game, the treatment which provided the 
best results in terms of workplace welfare (profit and salary jointly) was the 
repeated flexible treatment. The average values for salaries, effort levels and 
profits were not only higher than in the repeated rigid treatment, but in general 
were the highest of all. Flexibility and repeated iterations were shown to promote 
better performance. The treatment which produced the lowest results in terms of 
workplace welfare was the one-shot flexible treatment, since reciprocity takes 
time to develop and produce high performance. 	  
This thesis shows, experimentally, that offering discretion to employees is 
not profitable by itself. Under a flexible governance structure, a high wage offer 
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must be combined with repeated interactions in order to increase the level of the 
workers’ effort. Experimental findings showed a positive relationship between 
flexible arrangements and reciprocity in repeated interactions: institutional 
flexibility has a positive impact on collective performances. This was true for the 
organizational performance (employer’s profit) as well as the worker’s salary. 
Flexible working is seen as a positive factor in achieving stable cooperation in 
repeated interactions. The main psychological mechanism that underlies these 
relationships is that discretion confers self-determination and intrinsic motivation, 
which are key ingredients for trust in reciprocity. Giving workers many options in 
problem-solving tasks can lead to an effort above the minimum effort level.	  
Reciprocity in one-shot interactions is risky. A treatment with more rigid 
rules actually works better. Indeed, in the one-shot rigid treatment workplace 
welfare was higher than in the one-shot flexible treatment. Generally, rigid 
treatments (both one-shot and repeated) are less risky for managers than flexible 
treatments (both one-shot and repeated). The mean square deviation is inferior in 
both treatments.	  
Overall, two distinct governance patterns for managing relationships 
emerge: the rigid governance structure and the flexible governance structure. Both 
systems of governance attempt to improve the efficiency and stability of 
employment relationships. It is unlikely that the performance of one is absolutely 
superior to the other. In opposition to the flexible structure, the rigid governance 
system is characterised by task-centred rules that identify job tasks in a straight, 
simple and clear way. Under this system, the level of trust based on reciprocity is 
very low. As a result, rigid repeated treatments achieve lower performances than 
flexible repeated ones, as shown by our experimental results. This management 
system is not very flexible in that the parties have little discretion about how to 
react to swift changes in an uncertain environment. The power of the manager is 
based on specific norms that provide a committed framework of employment 
relationships. In other words, this system restrains exploitation of the workers by 
providing an impersonal form of power. The institutional environment is viewed 
as playing a crucial role in shaping individual actions. The detailed employment 
rules applied in this management system are sufficiently stable so as to build a 
secure agreement leading to cooperation between firms and workers. The results 
show that in one-shot transactions (OSR treatment) rigid governance reduces risk 
(the mean square deviation is the lowest one). Compared to the flexible one-shot 
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treatment, the rigid one-shot treatment improves efficiency and achieves higher 
welfare in the workplace.	  
To sum up, to see the connection between reciprocity and various 
institutions, it is very important to understand organisational performance. 
Disseminating positive relational signals throughout an organisation’s 
membership in order to develop a trusting environment, rather than merely relying 
on economic incentives, is an alternative way of establishing stable cooperation 
between managers and workers. The nature of economic relationships between 
agents is dynamic, and requires a type of cooperative agreement needing to be 
updated over time which has the capacity to adapt itself when the agents involved 
in the collaboration change their objectives. 
Agents will continually search for confirmation from the positive signals 
given out by the cooperative behaviour of the other party. Such information on the 
actions and omissions on the part of businesses are the relational signals, that is, 
the signals carrying information about the nature and intentions of the agents. It is 
a requirement that both parties continually signal their intention to conform to the 
rules. Signalling is acting in a manner that demonstrates one’s intentions, abilities 
or some other characteristics of the person to others, in cases where the person has 
private information which is not verifiable (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988; 1992). If 
the other party sends positive relational signals it is possible to derive that they 
have a cooperative predisposition and, therefore, that they may collaborate. The 
more positive the signals, the more stable the employment relationship. 
Furthermore, by means of these signals the agent can also check up on other 
contractual behaviours and thus economise. 	  
In any case, the economic agent will not be limited to simply checking but, 
ex-ante, they will try to convince their partner of their intentions from the outset 
of the contractual relationship. This means that during the negotiation process and 
the checking of the contract’s terms and conditions, they will try to establish 
compatible expectations. Once such a relationship has been initiated, the company 
will try to maintain the cooperative attitude of its partner. Above all, this involves 
credibly and consistently demonstrating a concern for the general norms of 
relational exchanges, such as discretion. 
The value of the relational signal is positively correlated to the level of 
discretion. Such signals need to be given out in a flexible institutional 
environment in order to create cohesion inside the firm. This is the reason why 
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networks designed around informal flexible rules and trusting relationships are so 
important, even though its significance is not recognised by transaction cost 
economics. The failure and the decline of performance in many organisations may 
be identified with the diminution of discretion. Organisations based on task 
centred rules reduce discretion, limit opportunities for reciprocity and diminish 
organisational performance. Nevertheless, the flexible governance structure is 
characterised by function centred rules and avoids any direct connection to the 
tasks workers carry out. They operate at an inter-personal level, and the 
relationship is dominated by either trust or power.	  
Function-centred rules need to be enforced by reciprocity, but this 
mechanism takes time to build up and solidify. Positive reciprocity thus grows 
more rapidly in experiments with more discretion and repeated transactions (RF 
treatment). Discretion fosters reciprocity but does not guarantee stability. This 
kind of governance is more fragile, more vulnerable and less robust than the rigid 
governance system, because the function-centred rules on which they rely are 
partially unstable, as demonstrated by the results of our experiment. The flexible 
system does not offer a safety net. If spontaneous cooperation based on positive 
reciprocity stops working, the consequences of failed cooperation in this kind of 
system are graver than under the rigid system. When understandings and 
expectations are violated through opportunistic behaviour, trust is weakened and 
is very difficult to be rebuilt. 	  
Nevertheless, if employers have the opportunity to punish workers in this 
situation, then reciprocal manager types vigorously punish freeriders in the 
workforce, even when the punishment is costly for the punisher. The consequence 
of such behaviour is a very high level of effort achieved by workers: cooperation 
and high performances can, in fact, be achieved. These results show that in 
organisations characterised by function-centred rules, members spontaneously 
respect agreements not only because they improve expected earnings, but also 
because they are affected by relational mechanisms such as reciprocity. In this 
kind of organisation, members perceive discretion, flexible rules and agreements 
as being cooperative, where their objective is to achieve an outcome that benefits 
all those who are party to the contract, on condition that each fulfils their role (set 
of actions) even when, for particular actions, it would be to their advantage not to 
cooperate. 	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The mutual aspect of trust presented by Fox (1974, 1985) means that if the 
structures, roles and inflexible employment rules convey an absence of trust in 
workers by the employer, workers will respond with distrust. Similarly, where 
management transmits a high degree of trust to its workers, the latter will also 
respond with high levels of trust in management. Thus, the role of management 
includes the formation and running of a system conducive to trust described by 
Fox (1974, 1985) as “institutionalized” trust, which does not refer to levels of 
trust or distrust that are expressed in personal attitudes between individuals. 
Flexible tasks increase the likelihood of worker cooperation and thus their 
productivity. Work may be arranged to ensure that workers act on their own 
initiative and “own” their work; close supervision is replaced by trust, which, in 
turn leads to reciprocity and thus cooperation.  
Discretion in the workplace, in its broadest sense, is the possibility for 
workers and employers to implement modifications with regard to time, place and 
the way work is done in order to create a better equilibrium between personal 
needs and business demands. Flexible work arrangements can enable workers find 
a better equilibrium between their personal and business obligations, thus 
developing a greater sense of wellbeing and contentment. As a result, this leads to 
increased productivity, less absenteeism and reduced turnover. Furthermore, 
several authors have analysed the positive correlation between high discretion and 
“high performance” work practices (Karasek 1979, Parker and Wall 1998, Singh, 
2000, Parker 2003). Research on worker satisfaction has tended to find that 
discretion decreases work stress, in particular when job demands are high, and the 
literature on efficiency concludes that work practices which promote higher 
degrees of discretion promote increased performance (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg 
and Kalleberg 2000)  
Managers should notice that flexibility requires a management style based 
on trust and an organisational culture centred on job creativity. The experimental 
outcomes of this thesis ask us to think about work in new and different ways. 
They can be applied as a mechanism to form better approaches to achieving 
business results in a proactive manner.  It is better to think "outside the box" in a 
creative way when answering the question as to how jobs can be reformed to meet 
and surpass business targets. 
Trust based on reciprocity between managers and workers is essential for 
performance managed by results, and is a core requirement for flexible work 
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arrangements. Some employers may find it difficult to acknowledge that workers 
are genuinely at work when they are out of sight. Nevertheless, empowering 
workers and increasing their involvement is crucial for providing uninterrupted 
improvement in productivity. This may not be easy where levels of trust are not 
high. However, a low level of trust often correlates with a low level of worker 
engagement due to insufficient motivation. It has been shown that increased 
flexibility has created higher levels of motivation, which therefore creates 
engagement and forms the conditions in which flexibility can flourish. Flexibility 
is not an inherent worker's benefit but rather an obtained status by means of 
maintaining trusting relations with one's manager. Taking into account the nature 
of flexible work arrangements, there is much less management control and 
observation compared to situations where the employee is physically present. 
Consequently, it is highly important that managers show trust towards worker's 
integrity and intentions: trust is a prior condition for working flexibly and crucial 
for ensuring completely satisfying and elastic work conditions.  
Trust is not only founded on the material interests of individuals, but it may 
also be based on reciprocity and on the institutional context in which the 
relationships are embedded (Nooteboom 2002; Sheppard and Sherman 1998). 
Flexible informal rules are crucial in an environment based on trust and philia-
reciprocity and make employment relationship more efficient. In addition, a stable 
employment relationship must ensure that parties are always prepared to restrain 
the pursuit of their own self-regarding interests. Any guarantee that the other party 
will not defect does not result from economic incentives but from the fact that 
each sends the other positive signals. Therefore, we conclude that creating trust 
based on reciprocity is a mutual process that requires bilateral effort, signals, and 
engagement.	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Appendix I 
Experiment Tables 
 
 
 
Tables A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 and A6 present the general data collected during the 
experiments. Specifically, they show the data regarding the salaries, effort levels, 
and employers’ and workers’ profits relative to every transaction completed.  
For one-shot treatments (tables:A1 A2, A3 and A4), the data are presented in 
a twofold view: one for employers’ profiles, in which one follows a row to read 
the data relative to the same employer during the course of six iterations, and the 
other for workers’ profiles, in which one row shows the data for a single worker.  
For repeated transactions the data (tables A5 and A6) are presented for pairs 
of subjects, and thus there is no issue in presenting double sets of data. The 
representation in tabular form means the columns can be read to find the averages 
and variants of each iteration. Reading across the rows shows the average and 
variant values for employers, workers or pairs of employers and workers. The 
squares picked out in black show the global values of the average and variant 
values of salaries, effort levels and earnings relative to each treatment. In the case 
where the worker refused the contract, the effort level was entered as 0, and this 
value is included in the average and variant calculations.  
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Table A1  Iteration 
Average 2σ  Data OSF treatment employer’s profile 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
 35 2,7 30,5 40 24 22,9 29,85 37,07 
e  0,1 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,2 0 0,17 0,03 
π  8,5 46,7 9,0 8,0 19,2 0,0 15,22 228,66 
u  15,0 0,7 10,5 20,0 3,0 0,0 8,20 56,88 
2 
 w  40 28 27 27 27 27 29,33 22,89 
e  0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,15 0,00 
π  8,0 9,2 18,6 18,6 18,6 9,3 13,72 24,02 
u  20,0 8,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 7,0 8,83 25,47 
3 
w  34,1 24,1 23,9 21,7 22,3 23,9 25,00 17,37 
e  0,1 0,1 0,3 0 0,1 0,2 0,13 0,01 
π  8,6 9,6 28,8 0,0 9,8 19,2 12,67 83,19 
u  14,1 4,1 1,9 0,0 2,3 2,9 4,22 21,04 
4 
w  60 30 35 35 30 25 35,83 128,47 
e  0,2 0,4 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,23 0,03 
π  12,0 36,0 42,5 8,5 9,0 9,5 19,58 198,12 
u  39,0 6,0 9,0 15,0 10,0 5,0 14,00 135,33 
5 
w  60 35,5 35,5 35,5 35,5 45 41,17 82,97 
e  0,2 0,8 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,23 0,07 
π  12,0 67,6 8,5 8,5 8,5 7,5 18,74 479,45 
u  39,0 3,5 15,5 15,5 15,5 25,0 19,00 118,83 
6 
w  48,5 55,9 48,5 42,1 34,1 29,1 43,03 83,36 
e  0,4 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,17 0,01 
π  28,6 12,8 7,2 7,8 8,6 9,1 12,34 56,15 
u  24,5 34,9 28,5 22,1 14,1 9,1 22,20 73,92 
7 
w  35 20 29 38 35,4 35 32,07 36,42 
e  0,3 0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,17 0,01 
π  25,5 0,0 9,1 16,4 25,4 8,5 14,15 86,27 
u  13,0 0,0 9,0 17,0 13,4 15,0 11,23 31,07 
8 
w  33 23 40 40 40 38 35,67 38,22 
e  0,1 0 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,2 0,15 0,01 
π  8,7 0,0 16,0 24,0 8,0 16,4 12,18 58,34 
u  13,0 0,0 19,0 18,0 20,0 17,0 14,50 46,92 
9 
w  51 32,5 25 40 35 45 38,08 71,70 
e  0,1 0,1 0 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,13 0,01 
π  6,9 8,8 0,0 16,0 8,5 22,5 10,44 50,75 
u  31,0 12,5 0,0 19,0 15,0 23,0 16,75 91,48 
10 
w  51 22 22 29,5 30,6 52 34,52 155,20 
e  0,2 0,3 0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,15 0,01 
π  13,8 29,4 0,0 9,1 8,9 13,6 12,47 78,22 
u  30,0 0,0 0,0 9,5 10,6 31,0 13,52 161,23 
11 
w  40 50 30 28,3 50 50 41,38 87,57 
e  0,3 0,2 0,1 0 0,3 0,3 0,20 0,01 
π  24,0 14,0 9,0 0,0 21,0 21,0 14,83 69,14 
u  18,0 29,0 10,0 0,0 28,0 28,0 18,83 117,47 
12 
w  57 46 37 30 55 48 45,50 90,25 
e  0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,23 0,01 
π  18,9 14,8 8,3 9,0 26,0 21,6 16,43 41,40 
u  35,0 25,0 17,0 10,0 31,0 26,0 24,00 70,00 
Average 
w  45,38 32,81 31,95 33,93 34,91 36,74 35,95   
e  0,20 0,24 0,15 0,13 0,18 0,17 0,18   
π  14,62 20,73 13,07 10,48 14,29 13,18 14,40   
u  24,30 10,31 10,53 12,68 14,08 15,75 14,61   
2σ  
w  99,11 127,61 53,11 38,49 86,81 110,34   106,02 
e  0,01 0,05 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01   0,02 
π  53,90 381,67 135,31 46,63 47,05 44,93   128,04 
u  94,01 141,22 65,25 52,17 72,83 106,46   111,05 
	   	  
w
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Table A2  Iteration 
Average 2σ  Data OSF treatment employee’s profile 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
 35 55,9 35,5 35 22,3 27 35,12 110,38 
e  0,1 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,12 0,00 
π  8,5 12,8 8,5 8,5 9,8 9,3 9,56 2,37 
u  15,0 34,9 15,5 15,0 2,3 7,0 14,95 103,59 
2 
w  40 26,7 48,5 35,5 30 23,9 34,10 69,96 
e  0,1 0,5 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,18 0,02 
π  8,0 46,7 7,2 8,5 9,0 19,2 16,41 199,52 
u  20,0 0,7 28,5 15,5 10,0 2,9 12,93 92,96 
3 
w  34,1 28 30,5 42,1 35,5 25 32,53 30,70 
e  0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,10 0,00 
π  8,6 9,2 9,0 7,8 8,5 9,5 8,75 0,31 
u  14,1 8,0 10,5 22,1 15,5 5,0 12,53 30,70 
4 
w  60 24,1 27 40 34,1 45 38,37 144,27 
e  0,2 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,13 0,00 
π  12,0 9,6 18,6 8,0 8,6 7,5 10,71 14,55 
u  39,0 4,1 6,0 20,0 14,1 25,0 18,03 141,07 
5 
w  60 30 23,9 27 24 29,1 32,33 158,39 
e  0,2 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,23 0,01 
π  12,0 36,0 28,8 18,6 19,2 9,1 20,62 86,22 
u  39,0 6,0 1,9 6,0 3,0 9,1 10,83 164,04 
6 
w  48,5 35,5 35 21,7 27 22,9 31,77 84,51 
e  0,4 0,8 0,5 0 0,2 0 0,32 0,08 
π  28,6 67,6 42,5 0,0 18,6 0,0 26,22 569,34 
u  24,5 3,5 9,0 0,0 6,0 0,0 7,17 70,22 
7 
w  35 46 30 29,5 35 38 35,58 30,53 
e  0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,17 0,01 
π  25,5 14,8 9,0 9,1 8,5 16,4 13,88 36,38 
u  13,0 25,0 10,0 9,5 15,0 17,0 14,92 27,20 
8 
w  33 20 37 28,3 30,6 45 32,32 59,01 
e  0,1 0 0,1 0 0,1 0,3 0,10 0,01 
π  8,7 0,0 8,3 0,0 8,9 22,5 8,07 56,61 
u  13,0 0,0 17,0 0,0 10,6 23,0 10,60 70,87 
9 
w  51 23 29 30 50 52 39,17 145,14 
e  0,1 0 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,2 0,13 0,01 
π  6,9 0,0 9,1 9,0 21,0 13,6 9,93 40,89 
u  31,0 0,0 9,0 10,0 28,0 31,0 18,17 151,14 
10 
w  51 32,5 40 38 55 50 44,42 64,87 
e  0,2 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,23 0,01 
π  13,8 8,8 16,0 16,4 26,0 21,0 16,99 29,44 
u  30,0 12,5 19,0 17,0 31,0 28,0 22,92 50,03 
11 
w  40 22 25 40 35,4 48 35,07 81,36 
e  0,3 0,3 0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,25 0,01 
π  24,0 29,4 0,0 24,0 25,4 21,6 20,73 91,44 
u  18,0 0,0 0,0 18,0 13,4 26,0 12,57 92,67 
12 
w  57 50 22 40 40 35 40,67 122,56 
e  0,3 0,2 0 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,15 0,01 
π  18,9 14,0 0,0 16,0 8,0 8,5 10,90 38,77 
u  35,0 29,0 0,0 19,0 20,0 15,0 19,67 121,89 
Average 
w  45,38 32,81 31,95 33,93 34,91 36,74 35,95   
e  0,20 0,24 0,15 0,13 0,18 0,17 0,18   
π  14,62 20,73 13,07 10,48 14,29 13,18 14,40   
u  24,30 10,31 10,53 12,68 14,08 15,75 14,61   
2σ  
w  99,11 127,61 53,11 38,49 86,81 110,34   106,02 
e  0,01 0,05 0,02 0,01 0,01 0,01   0,02 
π  53,90 381,67 135,31 46,63 47,05 44,93   128,04 
u  94,01 141,22 65,25 52,17 72,83 106,46   111,05 
	   	  
w
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Table A3  Iteration 
Average 2σ  Data OSR treatment employer’s profile 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
 45,5 40,5 44 43,7 43 43,9 43,43 2,28 
e  0,3 0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,25 0,01 
π  22,4 0,0 22,8 22,9 23,1 22,8 19,00 72,21 
u  23,5 0,0 22,0 21,7 21,0 21,9 18,35 67,90 
2 
w  44 40 45 44,1 52,3 45,1 45,08 13,34 
e  0,3 0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,25 0,01 
π  22,8 0,0 22,5 22,8 20,3 22,5 18,48 69,00 
u  22,0 0,0 23,0 22,1 30,3 23,1 20,08 88,84 
3 
w  53 50 40 38 42,8 43,4 44,53 28,18 
e  0,5 0,3 0 0 0,3 0,3 0,23 0,03 
π  33,5 21,0 0,0 0,0 23,2 23,0 16,77 156,61 
u  27,0 28,0 0,0 0,0 20,8 21,4 16,20 138,16 
4 
w  40 60 37 43 44,6 44,5 44,85 53,05 
e  0,3 0,3 0 0 0,3 0,3 0,20 0,02 
π  24,0 18,0 0,0 0,0 22,6 22,7 14,55 109,22 
u  18,0 38,0 0,0 0,0 22,6 22,5 16,85 180,25 
5 
w  41,5 50 42 32,1 46,7 43 42,55 30,59 
e  0 0,3 0 0 0,3 0,3 0,15 0,02 
π  0,0 21,0 0,0 0,0 22,0 23,1 11,02 121,70 
u  0,0 28,0 0,0 0,0 24,7 21,0 12,28 154,97 
6 
w  36 37,5 43,5 42,5 42,3 43,8 40,93 9,21 
e  0,3 0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,25 0,01 
π  25,2 0,0 23,0 23,3 23,3 22,9 19,60 77,41 
u  14,0 0,0 21,5 20,5 20,3 21,8 16,35 60,32 
7 
w  44,9 58 79 44,6 44,9 34,3 50,95 204,54 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0 0,25 0,01 
π  22,5 18,6 12,3 22,6 22,5 0,0 16,43 67,41 
u  22,9 36,0 57,0 22,6 22,9 0,0 26,90 293,82 
8 
w  43 51,2 44 40 80 42,1 50,05 191,47 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,7 0,3 0,37 0,02 
π  23,1 20,6 22,8 24,0 28,0 23,4 23,65 4,87 
u  21,0 29,2 22,0 18,0 50,0 20,1 26,72 120,49 
9 
w  48,4 50 55,5 62 50 78 57,32 106,60 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,32 0,00 
π  21,5 21,0 19,4 23,2 21,0 12,6 19,77 11,55 
u  26,4 28,0 33,5 38,0 28,0 56,0 34,98 104,03 
10 
w  40 43 38 43 42 43,8 41,63 4,07 
e  0,3 0,3 0 0,3 0 0,3 0,20 0,02 
π  24,0 23,1 0,0 23,1 0,0 22,9 15,51 120,41 
u  18,0 21,0 0,0 21,0 0,0 21,8 13,63 94,34 
11 
w  55,2 49,5 44,2 43,4 44,6 42 46,48 20,57 
e  0,5 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,33 0,01 
π  32,4 21,2 22,7 23,0 22,6 23,4 24,22 13,88 
u  29,2 27,5 22,2 21,4 22,6 20,0 23,82 11,17 
12 
w  50 48,5 44,5 45 46 44 46,33 4,81 
e  0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,32 0,00 
π  28,0 21,5 22,7 22,5 22,2 22,8 23,27 4,67 
u  26,0 26,5 22,5 23,0 24,0 22,0 24,00 2,92 
Average 
w  45,13 48,18 46,39 43,45 48,27 45,66 46,18   
e  0,32 0,23 0,20 0,23 0,31 0,28 0,26   
π  23,28 15,50 14,01 17,28 20,90 20,16 18,52   
u  20,67 21,85 18,64 17,36 23,93 22,63 20,85   
2σ  
w  29,41 43,65 116,26 43,34 100,38 102,30  75,43 
e  0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01  0,02 
π  63,46 81,57 106,16 99,61 42,90 45,10  83,48 
u  56,24 176,26 263,29 122,54 112,18 137,14   149,74 
  
w
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Table A4  Iteration 
Average 2σ  Data OSR treatment employee’s profile 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
 45,5 37,5 42 43 42,8 45,1 42,65 6,87 
e  0,3 0 0 0 0,3 0,3 0,15 0,02 
π  22,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 23,2 22,5 11,33 128,43 
u  23,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 20,8 23,1 11,23 126,90 
2 
w  44 40,5 43,5 32,1 44,6 43,4 41,35 18,78 
e  0,3 0 0,3 0 0,3 0,3 0,20 0,02 
π  22,8 0,0 23,0 0,0 22,6 23,0 15,23 115,91 
u  22,0 0,0 21,5 0,0 22,6 21,4 14,58 106,49 
3 
w  53 40 44 42,5 46,7 44,5 45,12 16,55 
e  0,5 0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,28 0,02 
π  33,5 0,0 22,8 23,3 22,0 22,7 20,70 101,45 
u  27,0 0,0 22,0 20,5 24,7 22,5 19,45 79,96 
4 
w  40 50 45 43,7 42,3 43 44,00 9,50 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,30 0,00 
π  24,0 21,0 22,5 22,9 23,3 23,1 22,80 0,85 
u  18,0 28,0 23,0 21,7 20,3 21,0 22,00 9,50 
5 
w  41,5 60 40 44,1 43 43,8 45,40 44,59 
e  0 0,3 0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,20 0,02 
π  0,0 18,0 0,0 22,8 23,1 22,9 14,46 107,50 
u  0,0 38,0 0,0 22,1 21,0 21,8 17,15 180,65 
6 
w  36 50 37 38 52,3 43,9 42,87 41,03 
e  0,3 0,3 0 0 0,3 0,3 0,20 0,02 
π  25,2 21,0 0,0 0,0 20,3 22,8 14,89 113,25 
u  14,0 28,0 0,0 0,0 30,3 21,9 15,70 149,79 
7 
w  44,9 48,5 44,2 43 50 42,1 45,45 8,18 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,30 0,00 
π  22,5 21,5 22,7 23,1 21,0 23,4 22,37 0,74 
u  22,9 26,5 22,2 21,0 28,0 20,1 23,45 8,18 
8 
w  43 58 44,5 43,4 42 78 51,48 170,27 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0 0,3 0,25 0,01 
π  23,1 18,6 22,7 23,0 0,0 12,6 16,66 69,18 
u  21,0 36,0 22,5 21,4 0,0 56,0 26,15 289,05 
9 
w  48,4 51,2 79 45 44,6 43,8 52,00 152,27 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,30 0,00 
π  21,5 20,6 12,3 22,5 22,6 22,9 20,40 13,70 
u  26,4 29,2 57,0 23,0 22,6 21,8 30,00 152,27 
10 
w  40 50 44 44,6 46 42 44,43 9,87 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,30 0,00 
π  24,0 21,0 22,8 22,6 22,2 23,4 22,67 0,89 
u  18,0 28,0 22,0 22,6 24,0 20,0 22,43 9,87 
11 
w  55,2 43 55,5 40 44,9 44 47,10 36,31 
e  0,5 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,33 0,01 
π  32,4 23,1 19,4 24,0 22,5 22,8 24,03 16,10 
u  29,2 21,0 33,5 18,0 22,9 22,0 24,43 27,73 
12 
w  50 49,5 38 62 80 34,3 52,30 233,83 
e  0,4 0,3 0 0,4 0,7 0 0,30 0,06 
π  28,0 21,2 0,0 23,2 28,0 0,0 16,73 145,87 
u  26,0 27,5 0,0 38,0 50,0 0,0 23,58 339,87 
Average 
w  45,13 48,18 46,39 43,45 48,27 45,66 46,18   
e  0,32 0,23 0,20 0,23 0,31 0,28 0,26   
π  23,28 15,50 14,01 17,28 20,90 20,16 18,52   
u  20,67 21,85 18,64 17,36 23,93 22,63 20,85   
2σ  
w  29,41 43,65 116,26 43,34 100,38 102,30   75,43 
e  0,01 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,01   0,02 
π  63,46 81,57 106,16 99,61 42,90 45,10   83,48 
u  56,24 176,26 263,29 122,54 112,18 137,14   149,74 
  
w
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Table 
A5  Iteration 
Average 2σ  Data RF treatment  for pairs of 
subjects 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
 50,0 60,0 60,0 50,0 50,0 25,0 49,17 136,81 
e  0,4 0,6 0,5 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,35 0,03 
π  28,0 36,0 30,0 21,0 14,0 9,5 23,08 85,03 
u  26,0 32,0 34,0 28,0 29,0 5,0 25,67 92,22 
2 
w  29,8 38,0 22,0 25,0 25,0 26,0 27,63 26,74 
e  0,1 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,08 0,00 
π  9,0 8,2 0,0 9,5 19,0 0,0 7,62 41,91 
u  9,8 18,0 0,0 5,0 4,0 0,0 6,13 39,22 
3 
w  50,0 60,0 65,0 60,0 60,0 65,0 60,00 25,00 
e  0,4 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,1 0,47 0,03 
π  28,0 36,0 33,0 36,0 30,0 5,5 28,08 110,53 
u  26,0 32,0 37,0 32,0 34,0 45,0 34,33 33,56 
4 
w  50,0 55,0 60,0 55,0 70,0 20,0 51,67 238,89 
e  0,7 0,8 0,7 0,1 0,7 0,2 0,53 0,08 
π  49,0 52,0 42,0 6,5 35,0 20,0 34,08 261,03 
u  20,0 23,0 30,0 35,0 40,0 -1,0 24,50 175,58 
5 
w  44,9 47,6 50,2 52,0 48,0 45,0 47,95 6,60 
e  0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,38 0,00 
π  30,0 29,0 27,9 27,2 28,8 22,5 27,57 5,92 
u  20,9 23,6 26,2 28,0 24,0 23,0 24,28 5,19 
6 
w  38,0 39,0 36,0 38,5 39,5 42,5 38,92 3,78 
e  0,5 0,3 0,0 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,27 0,02 
π  41,0 24,3 0,0 16,3 24,2 23,3 21,50 147,91 
u  12,0 17,0 0,0 17,5 17,5 20,5 14,08 45,95 
7 
w  35,0 25,0 30,0 34,5 35,5 27,0 31,17 16,89 
e  0,1 0,3 0,5 0,5 0,0 0,0 0,23 0,05 
π  8,5 28,5 45,0 42,8 0,0 0,0 20,79 357,22 
u  15,0 3,0 4,0 8,5 0,0 0,0 5,08 27,87 
8 
w  35,5 36,0 36,0 36,0 36,0 35,0 35,75 0,15 
e  0,6 0,7 0,2 0,3 0,0 0,1 0,32 0,06 
π  50,7 58,8 16,8 25,2 0,0 8,5 26,67 458,47 
u  7,5 6,0 15,0 14,0 0,0 15,0 9,58 31,20 
9 
w  40,0 35,0 50,0 54,3 56,3 60,0 49,27 79,99 
e  0,2 0,0 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,1 0,30 0,05 
π  16,0 0,0 28,0 32,9 38,2 6,0 20,18 195,48 
u  19,0 0,0 26,0 28,3 28,3 40,0 23,60 149,50 
10 
w  50,0 60,0 50,0 25,0 25,0 40,0 41,67 172,22 
e  0,5 0,4 0,2 0,1 0,5 0,2 0,32 0,02 
π  35,0 24,0 14,0 9,5 47,5 16,0 24,33 174,47 
u  24,0 36,0 29,0 5,0 -1,0 19,0 18,67 168,22 
11 
w  65,7 50,3 55,2 56,2 50,0 35,8 52,20 80,78 
e  0,4 0,2 0,3 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,22 0,01 
π  21,7 13,9 19,4 12,8 7,0 8,4 13,88 28,46 
u  41,7 29,3 33,2 35,2 30,0 15,8 30,87 61,97 
12 
w  51,0 61,5 70,5 72,5 77,5 81,5 69,08 103,87 
e  0,4 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,9 0,68 0,02 
π  27,6 35,1 34,7 33,3 34,0 34,7 33,21 6,64 
u  27,0 33,5 40,5 42,5 45,5 46,5 39,25 47,81 
Average 
w  44,99 47,28 48,74 46,58 47,73 41,90 46,21  
e  0,39 0,42 0,38 0,33 0,36 0,20 0,35  
π  28,72 28,82 24,23 22,73 23,14 12,86 23,42  
u  20,74 21,12 22,91 23,25 20,94 19,07 21,34  
2σ  
w  88,32 140,46 202,44 197,55 250,40 313,99  203,87 
e  0,03 0,06 0,05 0,04 0,07 0,05  0,05 
π  174,70 258,30 195,90 131,11 215,97 101,54  207,90 
u  79,37 143,14 192,87 150,08 250,40 269,64  182,89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
w
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Table A6  Iteration  
Average 2σ  Data RR treatment  
for pairs of subjects 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 
 30,0 44,0 51,0 55,0 46,0 42,0 44,67 61,89 
e  0,0 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,28 0,02 
π  0,0 22,8 27,6 26,0 22,2 23,4 20,33 86,22 
u  0,0 22,0 27,0 31,0 24,0 20,0 20,67 97,89 
2 
w  40,0 30,0 35,0 38,0 42,0 41,0 37,67 16,89 
e  0,5 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,28 0,02 
π  40,0 27,0 0,0 24,6 23,4 23,7 23,12 139,52 
u  14,0 8,0 0,0 16,0 20,0 19,0 12,83 48,14 
3 
w  40,0 38,0 38,0 39,9 49,9 30,2 39,33 33,23 
e  0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,20 0,02 
π  24,0 24,6 0,0 24,0 21,0 0,0 15,61 123,14 
u  18,0 16,0 0,0 17,9 27,9 0,0 13,30 102,91 
4 
w  50,0 51,0 50,0 49,0 51,0 44,0 49,17 5,81 
e  0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,32 0,00 
π  28,0 20,7 21,0 21,3 20,7 22,8 22,42 6,74 
u  26,0 29,0 28,0 27,0 29,0 22,0 26,83 5,81 
5 
w  37,5 29,9 30,0 30,0 31,0 31,6 31,67 7,19 
e  0,3 0,4 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,32 0,00 
π  24,8 36,0 27,0 27,0 26,7 26,5 28,00 13,51 
u  15,5 5,9 8,0 8,0 9,0 9,6 9,33 8,93 
6 
w  38,5 30,0 33,0 30,0 31,5 32,5 32,58 8,28 
e  0,3 0,4 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,4 0,38 0,00 
π  24,5 36,0 26,1 36,0 44,3 35,0 33,63 44,48 
u  16,5 6,0 11,0 6,0 5,5 8,5 8,92 15,12 
7 
w  40,0 44,0 30,0 38,0 36,0 37,5 37,58 17,87 
e  0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,25 0,01 
π  24,0 22,8 0,0 24,6 25,2 24,8 20,23 82,38 
u  18,0 22,0 0,0 16,0 14,0 15,5 14,25 46,98 
8 
w  51,0 44,6 37,0 44,6 35,9 44,6 42,95 26,35 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,25 0,01 
π  20,7 22,6 24,9 22,6 0,0 22,6 18,91 72,99 
u  29,0 22,6 15,0 22,6 0,0 22,6 18,63 85,85 
9 
w  42,0 41,8 40,1 40,0 44,0 22,0 38,32 55,04 
e  0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,25 0,01 
π  23,4 23,5 24,0 24,0 22,8 0,0 19,61 77,03 
u  20,0 19,8 18,1 18,0 22,0 0,0 16,32 55,04 
10 
w  30,0 35,0 40,0 42,0 40,0 22,0 34,83 48,81 
e  0,0 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,10 0,02 
π  0,0 0,0 24,0 23,4 0,0 0,0 7,90 124,85 
u  0,0 0,0 18,0 20,0 0,0 0,0 6,33 80,56 
11 
w  33,5 33,5 40,0 44,6 33,5 43,0 38,02 22,22 
e  0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,20 0,02 
π  26,0 0,0 24,0 22,6 0,0 23,1 15,95 128,20 
u  11,5 0,0 18,0 22,6 0,0 21,0 12,18 86,23 
12 
w  36,5 35,0 40,0 44,6 36,5 40,0 38,77 10,26 
e  0,3 0,0 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,3 0,20 0,02 
π  25,1 0,0 24,0 22,6 0,0 24,0 15,95 127,62 
u  14,5 0,0 18,0 22,6 0,0 18,0 12,18 79,73 
Average 
w  39,08 38,07 38,68 41,31 39,78 35,87 38,80  
e  0,28 0,24 0,23 0,32 0,22 0,23 0,25  
π  21,69 19,67 18,55 24,90 17,19 18,82 20,14  
u  15,25 12,61 13,43 18,98 12,62 13,02 14,32  
2σ  
w  39,83 44,23 40,58 46,75 42,91 60,27  48,51 
e  0,02 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,03 0,02  0,02 
π  114,75 151,43 117,29 13,45 182,59 128,25  124,33 
u  68,77 99,58 88,32 46,51 123,04 74,35  88,57 
 
w
117 
 
Appendix II 
Real Effort, the Use of the Computers and Rewards 
This appendix explains the differences between the experiments provided by Falk 
and Gächter (2002) and the institutional gift exchange game carried out in this thesis’ 
experiments. 
Falk and Gächter (2002) begin by determining the occurrence of reciprocity in a 
baseline treatment which involves ten one-shot games (called the OS treatment). They 
analyse the importance of reciprocity with a matching scheme which guarantees that a 
specific couple of participants interact only once. 
In their second repeated game treatment (called the RG treatment) each pair of 
participants play ten repeated versions of the same game. Participants are informed 
they will play ten times with the same individual using a paper-based version of the 
experiment. Employer and employees have their own decision sheet and transmit their 
choices through the experimenter. They record and calculate the income they earn. 
At the beginning of each period employers offer a wage between 20 and 120. The 
higher the level of wage they offer, the lower their income. Employees may accept the 
wage offer and decide the level of effort, or else reject it. If they accept the wage 
offer, the lowest level of work they can choose is 0.1 and the highest is 1.0. The 
higher the quantity of work an employee chooses, the higher his or her work-related 
cost is and, consequently, the higher the employer’s income. The experimenter 
provides a feasible schedule of work and corresponding work-related costs to 
workers. Furthermore, employer and employees receive instructions about how to 
calculate their income in each period when employees accept the wage offer. If the 
worker does not accept the wage offer, both employer and employees earn nothing in 
this period.  
In the institutional gift-exchange game, when making choices regarding salary or 
effort level, each player was able to use a computer which enabled them to calculate, 
in real time, the earnings which could be obtained by means of the various 
combinations of salary and effort level. Prior to making their salary offer, the 
employer could calculate the earnings obtainable by both parties based on every 
possible combination of salary and effort level. The software interface at their 
disposal requested the input of two values, which could be achieved with striking 
simplicity. The calculator then returned the earnings of both parties in real time. The 
worker was equipped with a more complicated interface since, in addition to enabling 
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the completion of these calculations, it also enabled the inputting of the words. The 
worker was informed by the computer of the salary offer they had been made. On the 
basis of this salary, the software allowed them to calculate, in real time, their possible 
earnings in relation to the various effort levels.  
The use of computers achieved a notable increment in the intrinsic value of the 
experiment compared to the value achievable with paper-based experiments. Paper-
based experiments, although far simpler to prepare and implement, do not allow 
players to fully consider all possible solutions. It should not be forgotten that in 
economic experiments the participants are asked to make decisions which, even 
though less complex than those normally faced in reality, nonetheless require brief 
periods of reflection, involvement and effort. In the real world economic agents make 
economic decisions with a level of involvement which varies in relation to the issues 
in question.  
This computer-assisted experiment allowed the players to evaluate a great many 
combinations rapidly and effectively in little time, providing them with a very 
detailed picture of their options. In this way it was possible to minimise the problem 
of short-sightedness, which often results from the fact that the participants in the 
research tend to be of naturally limited rationality. The effects of tiredness and 
boredom were also prevented by greatly simplifying the numerous calculations which 
would otherwise have been impossible for participants who, it must be acknowledged, 
were of limited patience.  
In Fehr, Falk and Gächter’s experiments (Fehr et al., 1993; Falk and Gächter, 
2002) one may cast doubt on whether the participants actually carried out all the 
calculations necessary to achieve a good understanding of the game, and one may also 
suspect that the amount of effort participants put into calculating their own earnings 
was different to the effort put into calculating those of their counterparts. It is also 
possible that at a certain point the effects of boredom took over or that participants 
made mistakes in their calculations of the variables.  
On the other side of the argument, a computer-assisted experiment could be 
criticised because it enables a qualitative level of rationality higher than the more 
limited level actually achievable in reality. However, various factors are in its favour 
since it becomes possible to control, using experimental methods, an external 
variable, namely the differing mathematical abilities of the volunteers used in the 
experiments and, more generally, their I.Q.. As such, these factors are rendered less 
critical. Therefore, one may consider the appealing possibility of being able to carry 
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out economic experiments using participants who are not necessarily students, thus 
improving the quality of the sample and also rendering the contribution of such 
participants more valuable.  
Secondly, computer-based economic experiments can enable the simulation of 
economic situations of a complexity not feasible using paper-based methods, thus 
improving the range of research projects the researcher can conceive. In addition, in 
the experiments conducted by Falk and Gächter (2002), participants make only 
monetary choices; in the institutional gift exchange game, on the other hand, 
participants (the workers) are also invited to accomplish actual tasks consisting of 
work in fixed lists.   
For a researcher, the ability to include real tasks radically changes the way in 
which an experiment is carried out. The first reason for this is the significant increase 
in the time taken to develop the experiment. Whilst developing the actual working 
methods to be used, the need to simulate the institutional culture faithfully must be 
considered as well as the need to avoid exceeding the time which the research 
volunteers can make themselves available for (i.e. normal study hours). The effects of 
tiredness must also be taken into account. The time factor was particularly relevant in 
these experiments because the two groups of volunteers (the workers’ group and the 
employers’ group) took turns using a single room equipped with computers. Since the 
two groups were kept separate to prevent them communicating, it was necessary to 
wait for every member of each group to complete the tasks of their choice before 
having them leave the computer room and sending in the other group. Therefore the 
time required to conclude each session depended on the slowest volunteer in the 
group. The workers’ group obviously took more time, since they had not only to 
choose which effort level to work at but also to carry out the actual tasks. Therefore, 
only when the last of the workers, the “slowest”, had completed the task could the 
workers’ group be escorted from the computer room and the employers’ group 
brought in.  
As such, a researcher who wished to plan an experimental economic project with 
a series of real tasks comparable to this one would have to forecast the time required 
not according to the average time required for the tasks but according to the longest 
time required to complete the tasks amongst all the participants. It is also worth 
noting that the larger the number of participants, the slower the group as a whole is 
likely to become. In actual fact, during the course of the experiments it was notable 
that the higher the number of people involved, the higher was the average time 
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required to complete each session, and thus the longer the whole experiment lasted. 
For this reason the number of participants involved in any single experiment was 
never greater than 28.  
Since “real-task” economic experiments necessitate the collaboration of a number 
of volunteers for considerable periods of time, it is important not to neglect this 
factor. For example, in the experiments I conducted the participants were students 
working during normal working hours, and these times obviously had to be respected. 
It is advisable before initiating a real research programme to run a few pilot 
programmes to fine tune the game, and make informed estimates of the times required 
to complete it. For my research two pilot experiments were conducted, the results of 
which are not included in this report, which enabled us to establish a clearer idea of 
the mechanisms and timescales of the game. As a result of these trials it was decided 
to limit the game to six iterations and to abandon the initial intention of carrying out 
ten iterations.  
The introduction of real tasks therefore incurred a drastic reduction in the number 
of iterations which would otherwise have been possible. To conduct the experiment, 
including the phase in which the participants were instructed in the rules of the game, 
took about 4.5 hours on average. The manner in which the required undertaking was 
presented to the volunteers taking part was of significance. Moreover they offered 
active participation, and indeed some showed interest in the themes being researched.  
An analysis of the data collected shows that there was no constant salary or effort 
level. The pairs continually varied their choices and there was no apparent 
convergence. It is possible that the absence of a clear average may have resulted from 
the limited number of iterations carried out for each experiment. As such the question 
arises whether an equilibrium would have been reached after a certain number of 
iterations. Obviously, the question could be resolved by a research project involving a 
larger number of iterations but the time limits imposed by technology do not permit 
this.  
In more detail, each worker was equipped with three lists: a telephone directory 
extract consisting of 1655 subscribers from the city of Caltanisetta; a glossary of 
Japanese words comprising a total of 1000 words extracted from a Japanese-Italian 
dictionary; and a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations containing a total of 1027 
entries extracted from the appendix of an encyclopaedia. These fixed lists were used 
to carry out the “real tasks”, which consisted of research activities.  A sample page 
from each of these lists follows: 
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Telephone directory (sample page) 
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Glossary of Japanese words (sample page) 
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List of initials, acronyms and abbreviations (sample page) 
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In the experiments conducted by Fehr and Gächter (2002), the worker has to 
choose an effort level, and this has a cost which grows proportionally. The reason for 
this is to replicate, in monetary terms, the psychological and physical exertion of 
human work, consistent with the fact that each hour of work is always tougher than 
the previous one.  
In a research study constructed in this way the psychological element of work is 
lacking – the importance of which the experiment’s psychological elements aim to 
investigate. This idea is based upon the experimental results: there were indeed 
refusals of one-shot offers of work accompanied by low salaries, which would 
nevertheless have guaranteed workers positive, although modest, earnings. The purely 
economic prediction, based on considerations of perfect rationality, would in contrast 
have predicted definite acceptance. Therefore, the refusals cannot be explained by 
anything other than psychological motives. This leads one to wonder why current 
research paradigms do not consider the omission of psychological considerations to 
be sacrilegious, and furthermore that the introduction of “actual tasks” would allow a 
far more accurate reproduction of work situations.  
In order to simulate the different method of working, the institutional gift 
exchange game provides the difference between flexible and rigid treatments. In the 
flexible and discretionary method of working, the worker can choose which research 
tasks to carry out. In other words, they can decide whether to search only for 
telephone numbers in the telephone directory, only for the Italian words which 
correspond to their Japanese equivalent, or only the meanings corresponding to the 
specific acronyms and abbreviations. Furthermore, the participant has the freedom to 
choose how much research to carry out in all three areas, thereby being able to create 
a combination which best suited them. In contrast, in the rigid and specific method of 
working, the computer randomly presented a list of ten tasks, mixing the various 
types and thus containing telephone lists, Japanese words and acronyms. The worker 
had to being with the task indicated on the monitor and, if they wished to continue, 
had to follow the order imposed.  
In the case of both the flexible and rigid treatments, the worker had the right to 
choose how much to work, a choice which was enacted on the basis of the 
calculations which the software allowed them to make. The factor which changed, in 
accordance with the rules of the game, was the quantity of work. The hypothesis of 
this research was that different institutional cultures can influence working relations, 
even for psychological reasons.  
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There follows some screenshots of the software used for the experiment. The first 
screenshots shown are those of the main menu screens. The most important features 
of the interface are shown in detailed screenshots along with a discussion of the 
specific details.  
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 Software configuration 
 
 
2  Above is the start up screen which is used exclusively by the experimenter to set certain game parameters. It enables selection of the gaming mode (flexible work culture) or task 
(rigid culture) and whether the experiment will be one-shot or repeated. Thus the various 
combinations available are: one-shot function (one-shot negotiation / flexible), one-shot task 
(one-shot negotiation / rigid), repeated function (repeated negotiation / flexible) and repeated 
task (repeated negotiation / rigid).  
The number of iterations (in other words the number of times the employer and the 
worker will meet each other via the computer in which the programme is installed) can be 
selected via this screen. In the experiments conducted, the number of iterations was always set 
to six.  
Choosing the option “Protezione dalla chiusura del programma” (“Protection from 
application shutdown”) activates a function which prevents the participants in the experiment 
from inadvertently closing down the application during play. An attempt to shut down the 
programme brings up a dialogue box prompting the user to insert a password to complete the 
operation, a password known only to the experimenters (the password is 1234). 
The “Elenco dummy” (“Dummy directory”) option allows substitution of the telephone 
directory with a fictitious directory in which, rather than listing the subscriber name (e.g. 
Mario Rossi) and telephone number (e.g. 555123) there is, instead, a column in which a 
number is written in words (e.g. four, five hundred, one thousand five hundred and seventy) 
and beside it the same number in digits (e.g. 4, 15, 1570). This dummy list was only used in 
the debugging and testing phase in order to save time in the completion of sample tasks.  
Other options appear titled “Three stage game” and “Possibilità di turni con impegno 
imposto” (“Option of turn with pre-selected tasks”), but these relate to functions of the 
software which are not yet developed and which were not used in the experiments described 
in this research.  
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 Employer’s interface in the function game 
 
2  The employer’s interface shows, at the top details of the current turn and, underneath, the game instructions (the instructions shown in this example are for the one-shot game) and the formulae for the 
profit in relation to the worker and the employer with the table of the cost of the effort level. Below this 
the salary can be selected and the profits relating to the various salary-effort combinations can be 
calculated.  
The “OK” button activates the salary offer selected.  
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 Employer’s interface in the task game 
 
2 The employer’s interface in the task game is similar in every respect to the function game interface, although clearly the instructions are different. The fundamental differences 
are in the salary range, which spans from 22 to 120, and in the effort level, which can be 
made to vary between 30% and 100%.  
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 Worker’s interface in the function game 
 
2  The interface available to the worker is noticeably more complex than the employer’s. At the top, the number of the current iteration is indicated. Below this are the instructions, accompanied by 
earnings formulae and the table of the costs of the effort levels.  
The central section contains the tools for calculating the payoffs and to carry out the acceptance 
or refusal of the offers. It also contains an indication of the level of effort actually made.  
The lower part is used to carry out the actual tasks. In the function version the worker can 
organise their work at their own discretion, in the sense that they can choose which tasks to carry out 
amongst those listed in the three separate scroll boxes. Thus there are three separate lists of tasks and 
three separate text boxes to insert the results. Once the search result relating to the name, Japanese 
word or acronym has been typed in this can then be confirmed by clicking on the “OK” button to the 
right. The computer checks that the text inserted is correct and, if so, assigns an additional 10% of 
effort.  
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 Worker’s interface in the task game 
 
2  The worker’s interface for the task game has two main differences from that for the function game. The effort level can be altered from 30% 
to 100% so that, in order to accept the offer of work the worker must 
perform at least three tasks, whilst in the function version a single task is 
sufficient. The second difference concerns the way in which the worker 
has to work. Here the tasks are pre-set and have to be carried out in a fixed 
order. The computer produces a random selection at each iteration, mixing 
tasks which involve searching for telephone numbers in the directory, 
looking up the meaning of Japanese words and finding the meanings of 
initials.  
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 Salary offer [detail] 
 
2 Here the employer can calculate and choose the salary they intend to offer. For each combination of salary and effort level the 
computer calculates in real time the employer’s and the worker’s 
profits, thus giving valuable assistance in the decision-making 
process.  
 
This slider enables the employer to choose the salary to give his 
employee. This salary varies between 20 and 120 in the function 
game and 22 and 120 in the task game. The interface does not allow 
values outside these ranges. Salaries can be varied by decimal 
fractions, which work on a sliding scale internally but in the GUI are 
varied in unit increments.  
 
In this section of the interface, enclosed in an area indicated 
with a calculator icon, the employer can calculate his profits and his 
worker’s profits as a function of the effort level and the salary. 
Obviously the employer has to make hypotheses and these help him 
make his choices. Essentially the employer has to vary the salary 
(item 1 in the interface) and the effort level (within item 2 in the 
interface). By varying these two values the computer communicates 
in real time the earnings of both parties. The effort level can vary 
from 10% to 100% in the function version and from 30% to 100% in 
the task version.  
 
The “OK” button allows the choice to be activated. After 
clicking OK a dialogue box appears in which the employer is asked to 
confirm his choice and asked to call the experimenter to inform him 
that the choice has been made and to enable him to make a note of the 
choice. In any case the computer saves the employer and the 
employee’s choices to a text file.  
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 Payoff calculation in the worker’s interface [detail] 
 
2 This section of the interface, enclosed in a box indicated by a calculator icon, allows the worker to calculate his earnings and his employer’s earnings as a function of each possible effort 
level. By sliding the effort level the worker can see what earnings they and their counterpart would 
attain. 
 
The worker can slide the effort level within the permitted range in order to calculate his, and 
his employer’s, potential earnings. In the function game this can be varied from 10% to 100%, 
whilst in the task version it can vary from 30% to 100%. The computer calculates each party’s 
earnings automatically. 
 
The worker’s potential earnings as a function of the salary received and the effort level muted 
are displayed. The value is shown as a function of the worker’s payoff formula, thus also indicating 
the effort cost in the variant of the effort level chosen.  
 
The employer’s profit, given the salary received and the effort level offered is shown.  
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 Effort level and acceptance or refusal [detail] 
 
2 In this section of the interface the worker can monitor the effort level inserted up to that point, see the salary  they have been offered and proceed 
to refuse or accept the offer. A warning box explains that the contract 
imposes a minimum effort level of 10% in order to accept. In the task game 
they are advised that this level is 30%.  
 
The effort level bar indicates the effort level actually inserted up until 
this pointAs the number of tasks carried out grows, the bar increases.  
 
Displays the number of tasks carried out. 
 
Displays the salary offered by the employer.  
 
By clicking on this button the worker can refuse the offer received. The 
button is disabled when the minimum effort level requested to be able to 
accept the offer is entered (10% in the function game and 30% in the task 
game). 
 
By clicking on this button the worker accepts the salary offer with the 
effort level entered at that moment. Initially, the button is disabled and is not 
activated until the minimum effort level required to accept the job is reached 
(10% in the function game and 30% in the task game). 
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Actual earnings seen by the worker [detail] 
 
 
 
2 This part of the interface shows the worker their earnings and their employer’s earnings relative to the salary they have received, as well as 
the effort level keyed in up to that point.  
 
The worker’s effective earnings, that is, what  they could obtain by 
accepting the salary offer with the effort level entered up to that point and 
clicking on the “End work” button. The earnings obtainable thus far are 
calculated using the earnings algorithm. 
 
The employer’s earnings, that is, what they could obtain if the 
worker decided to accept the salary offer with the effort level entered up 
to that point.  
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 Insertion of work - function [detail] 
 
2 In the function game the worker can decide which tasks to carry out. There are three lists made available from which they can choose research tasks to carry out: telephone directory, 
glossary of Japanese words, acronyms. The worker can choose whether to carry out research from 
just one list, or from more than one list and without a predetermined order.  
 
Telephone directory / Japanese words / acronyms. From these lists the user can choose 
which research task to perform by simply clicking on a word. Following the click the task will 
appear in field 2 and it will then be possible to insert the result in field 3. The searches already 
carried out cannot be repeated and are greyed out (see for example the word “aka” in the glossary 
of Japanese words).  
 
In the text boxes the worker keys in the results of the searches.  
 
Clicking on the “OK” button shows whether the result entered is correct. If the response is 
correct the effort level is increased; if not, the computer will give an error message. Once the 
maximum effort level is reached it is not possible to insert further words.  
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 Insertion of work – task [detail] 
 
2 When entering the effort in the task game, the computer selects at random a list of ten tasks and they have to be carried out in the order in which 
they are given. The difference between this and the function game is that here 
the worker has a specific list of tasks and whilst they can choose which ones 
to carry out, they cannot choose  how many.  
 
The task which is specifically indicated by the computer, chosen 
randomly from the three lists in its memory. The tasks must be carried out 
incrementally in the order indicated on the screen (working from top to 
bottom).  
 
The field, in which the worker must insert the correct answer (telephone 
number, Italian meaning of the Japanese word, meaning of the acronym).  
 
The “OK” button confirms the answer inserted. The computer checks 
the answer and assigns a 10% increment to the effort level only if the answer 
is correct.  
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The software developed for the experiment was written in C++ by Giovanni 
Lo Magno (my research assistant) under my instruction. The development 
environment used was Dev C++. For the graphic interface the FLTK libraries 
were used (www.fltk.org). It should be emphasised that all the instruments used to 
create the software are free, and can freely be downloaded from the Internet. Thus 
no copyright was violated and the financial cost of the software was nil.  
Since the FLTK libraries were used, the software developed falls, for the 
purpose of licensing, into the category of open source software. As a result it can 
freely be distributed, but if requested a copy of the sources must also be provided 
to permit modification. This restriction should not be considered limiting since 
any improvements in the software affected by other programmers may only be 
considered positive contributions and nobody may assert ownership in the case of 
further distribution.  
It was not feasible to obtain the participants’ involvement without offering 
them some form of reward for taking part in the game. To achieve this, prizes of 
modest yet sufficient value were offered in order to attract interest and inspire 
them to behave as if they were in a genuine economic situation. The virtual 
money of the game (henceforth called “Money”) was thus converted into real 
rewards. The prizes consisted of stamps for collecting points with a well known 
vendor of petrol and blank CDs. It was borne in mind that the prizes had to be as 
divisible into small enough units to correspond to hypothetical increments in 
profit.  
Participants were welcomed with a brief description of the research, followed 
by an explanation of the way the game worked and the rules of play. This phase 
lasted about an hour on average. An explanation of microeconomic details was 
opportunely avoided as this could have influenced the behaviour of the players 
and thus affected the outcome of the experiment. Emphasis was placed on getting 
participants interested and involved in the experience, which was presented to 
them as an educational activity, encouraging them to take part in the game and 
underlining the fact that prizes were available. The experimenters assumed cordial 
and fairly informal attitudes, encouraging questions and checking that the rules 
had been correctly understood. It was made clear that understanding the game was 
a prerequisite for starting the real phase of the experiment.  
 
In the experiments undertaken by Falk and Gächter (2002), each of the 
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participants was also randomly assigned to one of the several groups. The random 
division of the participants into employers and workers was then also made in the 
institutional gift exchange game. In cases where an uneven number of people 
were involved, couples were formed in which the employer was one of the 
experimenters, a pair which naturally was not taken into account in the research 
data. 
The two groups were kept separate (like the two partners in the prisoner 
game) to avoid possible collaboration. Upon first entering the computer room the 
group was instructed on how to use the software. The first iterations were always 
the longest ones because this was the first encounter with the software and the 
first time playing the actual game for real. The software always worked correctly. 
It wrote the data relating to the selections made to the hard disk, thus providing a 
technical backup.  
The experimenter checked that participants were using the software correctly. 
In performing this task the experimenter always maintained the detachment 
necessary to avoid influencing individual choices. At the end of the experimental 
session economic explanations of the experience were made, to complete the 
educational activity of which the experiment formed a part. At the end of the 
experiments, discussions were also held with the participants to help them better 
understand the motivation behind their behaviour during the course of the game. 
This allowed a better understanding of the participants’ rationale and provided 
much food for thought. In these discussions certain terms emerged, such as 
“reciprocity”, “trust” and “indicators”, reassuring me that my idea of the 
behavioural model which I had theoretically incorporated into the game was 
correct.  
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Appendix III 
Isoeffort Line, Isowage Line and the Maximum 
Workplace Welfare Achievable with Equal Payoff 
 
Isoeffort lines describe the combination of all the players’ possible gains 
where the effort levels e  are the same. The equation of the isoeffort line may 
be obtained by replacing the general level e of the payoff functions with a 
constant level of effort e . In general, the payoff functions with a constant level 
of effort may be defined in the following way: 
 
eweew −=−= 120)120(π    [1] 
)(20 ecuw ++=    [2] 
 
If we combine equation [2] with equation [1] we obtain: 
 
eeceue )(100 −+−=π    [3] 
 
Equation 3 is a downward sloping line, where  e−  is the gradient 
coefficient and eece )(100 −  is the vertical intercept. As stated above, this is 
called the isoeffort line and identifies all the payoffs which may be associated 
with a constant level of effort.  
The employer’s gain is negatively correlated with the wage: given e , its 
minimum gain coincides with its maximum wage, and its maximum gain 
coincides with its minimum wage. Thus: 
 
0)120120()120()( maxmin =−=−= eeweπ  
eeewe 100)20120()120()( minmax =−=−=π  
 
While minπ  is always 0 for each level of e , maxπ is always greater than 
zero and it is positively correlated with e .  The employee’s gain is positively 
correlated with his wage: given e , its minimum gain coincides with its 
minimum wage, and its maximum gain coincides with its maximum wage. 
Thus: 
140 
 
 
)()(2020)(20)( minmin ecececweu −=−−=−−=  
)(100)(20120)(20)( maxmax ecececweu −=−−=−−=  
 
While minu  is always negative and negatively correlated with the effort 
level ( e ), maxu , on the other hand, is always positive but also positively 
correlated with the effort level e . Since the worker’s minimum gain coincides 
with the employer’s maximum gain and vice versa, the following coordinates 
identify the limits (extremes) of the isoeffort lines: ))();(( maxmin eeu π  e 
))();(( minmax eeu π . 
The isowage curves describe the combination of all the players’ gains 
among which the wage levels (w ) are the same.  One can demonstrate the 
presence of a geometric property, which can help derive the set of isowage 
curves. One can see that the extreme left of the segment corresponds to the 
payoff couple for which, given the effort level e , the worker’s profit is the 
minimum and that of the employer is the maximum, and the salary 
corresponding to that minimum is 20=w . At the extreme right, the opposite 
values hold: one maximises profit for the worker and minimises that of the 
employer, and for the payoff pair the maximum salary is 120=w . 
 
Figure A.1 Isoeffort lines and salary levels 
w=   100+20l
_q
w=120
w=20
u
π
A' B'
BA l
q
π
πmax=100e
umax=100-c(e)0
u
umin=-c(e)
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Moving to the segment on the extreme left and the extreme right, we find 
payoff couples which have far higher associated salary levels. At the halfway 
point of the segment, we find the salary which corresponds to 
2
1  of the range 
within which the salary can vary, at three quarters of the segment we find the 
salary which corresponds to 
4
3  of the range and so on. If l  is the length of the 
isoeffort segment and q  is the part of the segment which goes from the extreme 
left to the point corresponding to a given pair );( πu , one can demonstrate that  
 
20100min +=+⋅= l
qwrange
l
qw .  
 
This formula comes from the fact that the range in which the salary varies 
is  
 
10020120minmax =−=−= wwrange  
 
and the departing value is 20min =w . 
 
To demonstrate the formula, let us observe the graph and consider, on an 
isoeffort segment for ee = , a generic pair );( πu  with which the segment q  is 
associated, corresponding to CB . The entire isoeffort line is instead called l  
and corresponds to 'CB . To calculate the relationship between 
l
q  one can make 
use of the relationship between the triangles CBA ˆ  and CBA 'ˆ' , as these are 
equivalent.  
Thus the proportion is  
 
'':': BAABCBCB = .  
 
We can calculate the relationship 
l
q  by calculating the relationship 
''BA
AB . 
We reach  
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[ ] )()( ecuecuAB +=−−=  and [ ] 100)()(100'' =−−−= ececBA ,  
 
and thus 
100
)(ecu
l
q +
= .  
 
 
The salary should be  
 
20)(20100
100
)(
++=+
+
= ecuecuw .  
 
Remembering the worker’s payoff formula  
 
)(20 ecwu −−= ,  
 
one can easily verify the accuracy of the original hypothesis, which we 
aimed to demonstrate.  
Since the employer can choose which salary to offer from a defined range, 
one may note that not all the points on this line are achievable. The obtainable 
payoffs correspond to a finite group of points belonging to a segment of the 
isoeffort line. Let us define these points as isoeffort points.  
We can plot the group of payoffs corresponding to the same level of the 
salary w . To do this we exploit the geometric property demonstrated earlier and 
we calculate the couples ),( πu  on each level of the isoeffort line which 
correspond to the subdivisions 0 , 
4
1 , 
2
1  and 
4
3 , corresponding to the salaries  
 
20100020 +⋅= ,  
20100
4
145 += ,  
20100
2
170 +=   
and 20100
4
395 += .  
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In this way we obtain the isosalary curves relative to 20=w , 45=w , 
70=w  and 95=w . Thus, taking into account the geometric properties, we 
have the topographic points necessary, given a point ),( πu  on the map, to 
discern the relative salary. 
It is possible to demonstrate that by using a good adaptation index, the 
isosalary curve can be approximated to one branch of a parabola with the 
concave side facing down. Since demonstrating this is laborious, we do not 
recount it here, considering it sufficient to mention the fact that this 
mathematical adaptation exists. We must, however, emphasise that calling this 
“a curve” is not really appropriate since in reality it is a group of ten points, 
which are joined in the graph to from an approximation for a quicker visual 
reading of the data. 
Furthermore, the bisector of equal payoffs is the point corresponding to 
equal payoffs between employer and employ that is π=u . The payoff frontier 
is the geometric location of points which correspond to optimal payoffs. The 
intersection between the frontier and the bisector, indicated in the graph by E, 
represents the maximum workplace welfare achievable with equal payoffs for 
employer and employee. Since it is a point in the frontier, it is an efficient point. 
We deduce further that this point lies in correspondence to the intersection 
between the isoeffort line max1 ee ==  and the bisector. The equation of the 
isoeffort line 1=e  is: 
82+−= uπ  
Whilst the equation of the bisector is: 
u=π  
Plotting an intersect between the two lines we obtain 41== πu , for which 
we can confirm that the point E  has coordinates )41;41( . 
From the map in the graph we see that the salary corresponding to E must 
lie between 70 and 95. To find the salary it is sufficient to resolve the following 
equation: 
 3841182041)1(2041 −=⇒−−=⇒−−= wwcw  
From which we see that 79=w . 
Using this salary the maximum effort level to calculate the worker’s 
payoff, we obtain: 
411)79120( =⋅−=π  
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Which is the same profit as the worker. 
Summarising everything demonstrated so far, we can state that: the 
maximum equity payoff corresponds to the point )41;41(E ; point E is given by 
the intersection between the bisector and the frontier; being a point on the 
frontier it is also an efficient point; it corresponds to the choices 79=w  and 
1max == ee .  
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